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ACCOMPANYING NOTE 
 
 
The dynamics in the financial services industry is reaching new heights. Consolidation, 
changing regulation, technological innovation, globalisation, customer sophistication 
and lowering of entry barriers are just six examples of factors, which are reshaping the 
industry. In comparison to manufacturing industries, the financial services industry now 
is going through times of increasing maturity, leading to increased competition both on 
revenues and costs. This increased competition leads to a high variety and complexity of 
questions to be answered by academics, business managers and regulators alike. Not 
only is the industry changing fundamentally, also new management practices have to be 
taken into account. The focus on shareholder value, the notion of risk as a central 
component to that, and now very actual the topic of operational risk management, and 
corporate governance are just three topics, which are of paramount importance to good 
corporate management. It is with this background that this study deals with the question 
of operationalising corporate governance while representing shareholders, who take risk 
by participating in the share capital of the financial conglomerate. The analysis results 
in a concept for the corporate centre as the operational tool for corporate management in 
striving for synergies in a financial conglomerate. 
 
In the first part, the author discusses the main trends in the financial services industry: 
consolidation, blurring industry demarcations and the special case of internet banking, 
and shows with this the complexity, which characterises today’s financial world. This 
industry complexity has profound influence on questions of strategy and structure. 
Financial conglomerates try to deal with this industry complexity by strategic 
reorientation and organisational renewal; the author goes on to discuss financial 
conglomerate structures in more detail and appraises the underpinning of the various 
appearances of financial conglomerates. In shaping financial conglomerates, managers 
find a guide in value-based bank management and, in this study specifically, operational 
risk management. As the author argues, focus, understanding and measurements on all 
levels of the organisation are of utmost importance to manage financial conglomerates 
for risk-aware value creation. 
 
In the second part, the author focuses on the main tool for corporate management in a 
financial conglomerate: the corporate centre. Its essence, organisational design, and 
economics are core elements in the analysis for operational corporate governance. 
Various roles, (de-) centralisation, coordination instruments and added value are 
presented, leading to an understanding of the corporate centre norm for tackling 
problem areas, exercising management styles and undertaking activities. The economics 
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of the corporate centre, which the author discusses afterwards, both on the level of the 
division as well as in managerial terms, lead to comprehensive insights in organisational 
dynamics and corporate centre value creation. 
 
In the third part, the integrated corporate centre concept for financial conglomerates 
(ICCC) is presented. Based on the insights and analysis in parts 1 and 2, the normative 
ICCC-concept encompasses 1) the organisational focus in terms of core and added value 
roles, functions, departments, and coordination instruments, 2) the value proposition of 
the corporate centre as manager of a portfolio of businesses and as the ultimate 
operational risk manager with the appropriate ICCC-management style, and 3) the 
economic justification for the corporate centre, which includes value creation and 
measurement, using the presented ResVal-method, a detailed cost benchmark, and a way 
to treat those costs in a meaningful manner. Given that, as the author found, financial 
conglomerates are moving towards a weak variant of conglomeration, this ICCC-
concept can be flexibly applied to financial conglomerates in issues of organisational 
redesign and in benchmarking corporate centres. The ICCC-concept is then compared 
with four representative case-studies, studied in the year 2000. The case-studies provide 
in interesting feedback and identify opportunities for financial conglomerates to 
improve their operational corporate governance.  
 
In this study, the author took on various perspectives on a highly relevant contemporary 
issue for financial conglomerates; this resulted in increased insights, which deserve to 
be taken into account by both academics and practitioners alike active in this exciting 
part of the economy.  
 
Basel, Summer 2002 
     Henner Schierenbeck 
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 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Trends in the financial services industry 
 
The financial services sector has a pivotal role in modern societies. In more advanced 
service economies, such as the United States, the financial sector employs more people 
than the manufacturing of apparel, automobiles, computers, pharmaceuticals, and steel 
combined; U. S. financial services firms employ 5.4 million people. Financial services 
account for almost 5 percent of the U. S. gross domestic product, about 5.5 percent of 
the German, 3.5 percent of the Italian, 6.5 percent of the Singaporean and 9 percent of 
the Swiss (Harker & Zenios, 1998, p.1). Financial services firms also currently account 
for seventy-two of the top three hundred or 24 percent quoted European companies and 
their importance in market capitalization is even greater (Volberda et al, 2001b, p.210). 
Impressive as these statistics may be, they belie the greater indirect role that this 
industry has in the economy. At the time of this study, the financial services industry 
shows an enormous dynamism (see also Taylor, 1999). We witness the following trends 
simultaneously:  
· Mergers and acquisitions, where related companies create multinational financial 
services conglomerates 
· Entrance of traditional non-financial services firms into financial services 
· Entrance of internet companies offering financial services often at lower cost 
· Deregulation and liberalisation, enabling new activities but also  prescribing new 
regulation 
· Disintermediation: firms raising capital by issuing bonds rather than borrowing 
from banks 
· Innovation in financial products enabling further customer sophistication 
· Increasing volumes on capital markets simultaneously as these markets become 
more international. 
 
These trends above interact with each other and sometimes one trend sparks another 
trend. The changing environment is the catalyst for major restructuring and 
consolidation of the industry. To a larger extent, consolidation is based on a belief that 
gains can accrue through economies of scale and scope, increased market power and 
reduced earnings volatility (Pilloff & Santomero, 1997, p.4). Studies have found large 
inefficiencies, on the order of 20 percent or more of total financial services industry 
costs, and about half of the industry's potential profits (Berger & Mester, 1997, p.1), 
which, theoretically, can be gained by consolidation. Opportunities are still available in 
exploiting niche markets or in market dominance (Schierenbeck, 1999, p.23). 
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At the same time the investors’ and management’s focuses are shifting. More than 
anything else, creation of shareholder value becomes paramount. This importance stems 
from the notion that shareholders, e.g. private investors and pension funds, run the 
ultimate entrepreneurial residual risk of a listed corporation. It also implies that all of 
the company's investment decisions have to benefit shareholders in a way that 
compensates them for their risk. Shareholder value creation can also function as a 
yardstick for corporate performance. Especially the manner in which shareholder value 
creation is measured receives special interest. Accounting profit only is no longer the 
only indication of firms’ profitability or a characteristic of measuring investment 
performance as 1) accounting rules allow for ambiguity, 2) as contingent investment 
requirements are excluded, and 3) as the time value of money is ignored. Measurement 
of shareholder value creation deals with calculating a return on invested capital, based 
on adjusted accounting rules, over the cost of capital of the firm. This latter component 
reflects risk, emphasising risk to be a central component of the shareholder value 
concept. Due to further pressures on the profits in the financial services industry, it is to 
be expected that the focus on shareholder value creation becomes more significant and 
leads to further restructuring in the financial services industry. The forming of the EMU 
transformed Europe in a still not-perfect, level playing field, which can be compared 
with the United States; striking is that the EU still has a considerable backlog (Van 
Wensveen, 2000, p.2). EU financial conglomerates have a lower profitability their US 
peers, due to a decreased interest rate spread and increased credit risk provisions, and 
are less cost-effective, a.o. due to more branches. 
 
The role and characteristics of financial service companies 
 
Vander Vennet (1998, 2000) classifies financial services firms with the following 
characteristics, delineating banks by their revealed degree of functional diversification 
and universality, based on observed organisational and financial characteristics. He 
distinguishes three major areas of financial services: 1) traditional banking, 2) 
insurance, and 3) intermediation services. He defines financial conglomerates as 
financial services firms which conduct at least two of the three activities and universal 
banks as diversified banking institutions1 that also hold equity stakes, totaling mo re than 
1% of the assets of the financial services firms, in non-financial companies. Although 
different financial intermediaries are growing in importance, banks are still pre-eminent 
in the financial system. First, they are vital to economic activity, because they reallocate 
money from savers, who have a temporary surplus of it, to borrowers, who can make 
                                                 
1 Vander Vennet (1998, p.7) also notes that he classifies a bank as diversified when the ratio of non-interest 
income to total revenues exceeds 15%, for financial conglomerates that number would lie at 20% and for 
universal banks this number must be greater than 5%; this is a useful indicator as fee-income earned on non-
traditional banking activities such as insurance and securities trading is registered as non-interest income in 
the annual statements.  
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better use of it; banks profit from the difference in borrowing- and lending rates, also 
known as the margin or the spread. Second, banks are at the heart of the clearing 
system. By collaborating to clear payments, they help individuals and firms fulfil 
transactions. Banks also borrow money from other banks in what is called the interbank 
market. As the spread is being driven down by better information and increasing 
sophistication of capital markets, banks have tried to boost their profits with fee 
generating businesses, such as selling mutual funds and advice on mergers, public 
offerings et cetera. 
 
Most of a bank's liabilities have shorter maturities than its assets. There is, therefore, a 
mismatch between the liabilities and assets. This mismatch can lead to problems if 
depositors become concerned enough about the quality of a bank's lending book that 
they demand their deposits. Although some overdrafts or credit lines can be called in, 
longer-term loans are much less liquid. This maturity transformation can cause a bank 
to fail (liquidity risk ). A more common danger is credit risk , the possibility that 
borrowers will be unable to repay loans. This risk tends to mount in periods of 
prosperity, when banks relax their lending criteria, only to become apparent when 
recession strikes. A third threat to banks is interest-rate risk, the possibility that a bank 
will have to pay more interest on short-term funding of the mismatch than it can charge 
for loans. Because banks provide credit and operate the payments system, their failures 
can have a more damaging effect on the economy than the collapse of other businesses. 
Hence governments pay particular attention to the regulation of banks. Individual banks 
have reserve requirements: they must hold a proportion of their deposits at the central 
bank, where they are safe and immediately accessible. A second cushion against a 
liquidity crisis is the central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, known as the safety 
net. When solvent bank struggle to raise money, a central bank, can step in and provide 
finance. Another way in which regulators have tried to support banks is to force them to 
match a proportion of their risky assets with capital, in the form of equity or retained 
earnings. The collapse of one bank can spread trouble throughout the financial system 
as depositors from other, healthy, banks suddenly fear for their money. Regulators then 
step in because they want to prevent a collapse of the entire system. Governments try to 
minimise the risk of such failure in several ways. One is to impose harsher regulation on 
banks than on other industries. Another manner is to try to prevent runs on banks in the 
first place, e.g. via government deposit insurance designs. It can be argued that these 
guarantees make bank failures more likely, because they encourage depositors to be 
indifferent to the riskiness of banks' lending. Moreover, as banks get bigger, they are 
likely to conclude that they are "too big to fail", a further incentive to take on more risk. 
To combat this moral hazard, regulators try to be ambiguous about how big is too big, 
and to restrict the amount of insurance they provide. So, internal considerations and 
external developments have urged executive boards of banks to rethink their 
General Introduction 
4 
positioning, their service offerings and their organisation. For example, European 
financial conglomerates give high priority to (Van Wensveen, 1997, p.16): 
× Extension of investment banking activities globally, by taking over brokers and 
merchant banks 
× Extension of institutional asset management globally 
× Build up of consumer banking activities, aimed at certain countries, and higher-
income clients 
× Selective extension of corporate banking activities directed at certain countries and 
midsize and larger corporate clients, while maintaining market share at home 
× More attention to smaller enterprises and cost reduction. 
 
A competitive advantage can only be achieved when financial services firms re-invent 
themselves on a continuous basis while interacting with their business environments. 
This process of re-inventing can take place on many fronts: market segments, 
competencies and the organisation, enabling a profitable interaction with the business 
environment. Many organisational initiatives can be taken to increase shareholder value. 
An umbrella for these initiatives is given in the term value-based management, where 
all activities are aligned toward the goal of value creation. Lowering risk, thereby 
lowering the required return on equity, and varying financing between debt and equity 
are two possibilities to create value. Although the literature on financial services firms 
pays a great amount of attention to classical risks, as described above, focus on 
operational risk  is required. Interestingly, this type of risk derives more from 
management and governance issues than  other risks known to financial services firms 1. 
From an organisational viewpoint, the pressure to reach a higher level of profitability 
and efficiency and the lower level of (operational) risk is translated into the redesign of 
processes and the adaptation to leaner organisational structures. This practice is already 
known in mature industries, mostly industries characteris ed by the increasing 
commodity nature of the products (e.g. steel) or the stage of maturity of the industry 
(e.g. bulk chemicals). One recent development is that financial conglomerates tend to 
assume a structure comparable with those in the manufacturing industry, suggesting that 
the business environment in which financial conglomerates operate is becoming 
increasingly comparable to more mature industry. Financial conglomerates often report 
products or client orientated divisions with their own profit responsibilities instead of 
with a predominantly regional focus, or a mixture thereof. This process of 
divisionalisation also leads to internal transfers of services in order to service an 
external client better. One part of this divisionalising process is the creation of 
                                                 
1 In this respect, the Bank of England report on the demise of Barings Bank revealed some insights on 
operational risk. First, management teams had the duty to understand fully the businesses they managed. 
Second, responsibility for each business activ ity had to be clearly established and communicated. Third, 
relevant internal controls must be established for all business activities. Fourth, top management and the audit 
committee must ensure that significant weaknesses are resolved quickly (Crouhy et al, 1998, p.45). 
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corporate centre, a function, which is not an operating division generating revenue 
through external clients, but merely a division looking after the common interests of all 
divisions, the corporate group. This corporate centre over time has taken on the roles of 
a holding, performing management services to and on behalf of the divisions1. One can 
say that in financial conglomerates, a corporate centre often produces qualitative gains, 
such as increased brand strength or more efficient processes by standardisation. These 
gains, difficult to quantify, must be higher than the well measurable costs of the 
corporate centre.  
 
Introduction of the research 
 
The number one banana skin for banking is poor management2 
 
It is not until recently, that financial services have been seen as an industry, such as the 
manufacturing industry, for which certain industry rules apply. Despite international 
regulatory harmonisation, the corporate structures of financial services companies still 
differ across countries, mainly reflecting historical differences (Borio & Filosa, 1994). 
However, in terms of organisational renewal, of eight large financial services firms 
investigated in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, seven firms show similar 
behaviour. This suggests an industry specific common mindset or shared managerial 
schema, at least regarding the content of strategic renewal (Volberda et al, 2001b, 
p.220). This herd behaviour may play an important role for renewal processes in the 
financials services industries3,4.  
 
What we aim for in this study is to present an integrated concept for the corporate centre 
in financial conglomerates. This concept deals with questions about the corporate 
centre, on the nature and the role, design, management, organisation, and economics. 
This is done in the light of the reasons for existence of financial conglomerates and the 
fundamental changes in the financial services industry. This attempt for organisational 
renewal adds to the statement of Volberda et al (2001b, p.219) that more financially 
aware firms 5, which financial conglomerates certainly are, engage in a greater number 
of renewal actions. In the financial services industry, this renewal is a necessity in years 
to come. This study, which bases itself on theory while interacting with practice, can be 
                                                 
1 An example of this is when the corporate centre performs the function of communicating with the capital 
markets on behalf of all divisions, so as to influence the share price of the group. 
2 Marshall (2001, p.76). 
3 This was also found by Flier et al (2000); for an analysis of herd behaviour see DiMaggio & Powell (1983). 
4 This result was unexpected as the samples come from different sectors of the financials services industry 
under different regulatory regimes with both public and private firms involved. 
5 A firm is called financially aware when management puts emphasis on disclosure of company information in 
financial terms, thereby trying to align interests of managers and shareholders and decreasing agency costs 
(see also Cools & Van Praag, 2000). 
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characterised explorative, culminating in a normative statement.  In addition, it attempts 
to introduce a new element into the discussions on operational corporate governance of 
financial conglomerates. These insights contribute to the academic literature. Although 
there is a large body of literature on related topics on the level of the financial service 
industry or on financial transaction level, there is hardly any literature available, which 
provides in analyses on the level of the firm. In that respect, this study can reveal new 
avenues for further research. Managers, who seek to contribute to shareholder value by 
means of increasing organisational efficiencies1, could be made more aware of issues 
without having the natural limitations of the own organisation, or use such research as 
an independent comparison. This necessity has not been fully acknowledged yet by all, 
as witnessed by a recent quote from a senior bank manager about his career:  
 
…he was the Head of Corporate Centre – ‘please don’t use that title’2. 
 
Regulators may use this research to better understand the issues facing financial 
conglomerate management so as to provide improved regulation, since governance 
increasingly becomes an issue. As Volberda et al (2001b, p.210) stated: in this turbulent 
environment, both researchers and practitioners need theories as to how financial 
services firms can renew themselves. Figure 1 shows the framework of the study. In part 
1, we will start off with a review of the developments in the financial services industry 
and the effects of these developments on financial conglomerates on a global scale. We 
will then continue with the question of conglomeration and prototypes of 
conglomerates. Value-based management, including operational risk management, is 
the last major topic in part 1. In part 2, the corporate centre will be discussed in more 
detail. This part will touch upon issues of decentralisation, organisational design and the 
financial management of a corporate centre. In part 3, we will discuss the synthesis of 
parts 1 and 2 and we will compare the theoretical findings with four representative case 
studies in order to see how major financial services firms deal with their corporate 
centres in relation to the discussed industry trends. With case studies, the external 
validity is more limited than with surveys under many entities in which, based on 
statistical analysis, a high degree of validity can be established. However, case studies 
allow for a deeper understanding of issues involved, as qualitative, non-measurable 
                                                 
1 An example in case is the Rabobank Group of Utrecht, the Netherlands. As the Rabobank Group, a 
cooperative financial services firm, grew in size due to acquisitions it came to resemble a large centralised 
organisation. Organisational units began to complain that the corporate centre became too powerful by 
imposing its product -driven strategies upon organisational units such as the local banks. In 1999, the 
Rabobank Group reported that a top priority was the creation of synergy between the organisational units, 
while at the same time the corporate centre was to be reduced in size by a more decentralised management 
approach (Volberda et al, 2001a, p.171). 
2 In quotation marks: Mr Luqman Arnold, ex-President and ex-Head of the Corporate Centre of UBS AG and 
at present Chief Executive of Abbey National Group in an interview with The Observer (01.12.2002). 
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aspects receive more attention than in qualitative analysis. Using four cases is a first 
step in the process of testing theoretical development and generalising conclusions. Yin 
(1989) on cases studies: Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the 
experiment, does not represent a 'sample', and the investigator's goal is to expand and 
generalise theories (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisations). It is of the utmost importance that the case studies 
encompass important elements and that they are of great societal, scientific or policy 
value. The selected cases are the following globally active financial conglomerates: 
ABN AMRO Bank of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Credit Suisse Group of Zurich, 
Switzerland, Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt, Germany, and UBS of Basel and Zurich, 
Switzerland. The cases are well documented and information from within the companies 
has been made available. The case studies provide valuable insights on current practice 
and a first opportunity to review the ICCC-model and complement the theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Framework of the study 
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PART 1: THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATION AND VALUE ORIENTATION 
 
In this chapter, we will describe the trends in the financial services industry, the 
financial conglomerate and value-based management. As we will see from the banking 
literature, many observations have been made on consolidation, regulation, competition, 
risk management, conglomeration and synergies. All these notes will lead to a detailed 
understanding of the dynamics and complexity of the financial services industry, how 
financial conglomerates organise themselves so as to cope with this and which concepts 
are important for corporate intentions. 
 
A. Transformation of the financial services industry 
 
I. Consolidation 
 
1. Sector view on consolidation 
 
a) Systemic risk 
 
Systemic risk is defined here as the risk that credit, market or liquidity problems of one 
or more financial market participants create substantial credit, market or liquidity 
problems for participants elsewhere in the financial system and can jeopardise the whole 
financial system. The contagion effect can be transferred through the financial system in 
a number of ways, including failures to settle in payments system, panic runs following 
revelation of an institution's problems because of a lack of transparency, or falling 
prices, liquidity problems, or markets failing to clear when large volumes of securities 
are offered for sale simultaneously. Consolidation may affect systemic risk in part 
because it changes the risks of individual institutions, particularly the risks of large 
institutions whose credit, market or liquidity problems may affect many other 
institutions. If the risk of an individual institution is higher, this raises the probability 
that the institution will fail or become illiquid before settling some of its payments 
obligations, exposing other institutions directly to risks as payees, or indirectly through 
contributing to panic runs or securities markets problems. Consolidation may also affect 
systemic risk in part because it increases the sizes of the institutions. The systemic 
consequences of the failures of larger players may be more severe, spreading problems 
to more counterparties, particularly for institutions that are heavily involved in clearing 
and settlement functions. To some extent, these systemic problems created by larger 
institutions may be partially offset if the smaller number of larger institutions facilitates 
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monitoring of risks by government supervisors or counterpart institutions. Some 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the monitoring of banks by other banks 
may be an efficient mechanism for controlling systemic risk, and this task may be easier 
after consolidation (Calomiris & Kahn, 1996). Consolidation may impose costs on the 
financial system by expanding the financial safety net1. Consolidation may also improve 
the efficiency of risk management by economising on the amount of collateral needed to 
control risks on large-value transfer systems (Humphrey, 1998). Saunders & Walter 
(1994) argue that, in the US, a move to universal banking would enhance the efficiency 
of the financial services sector, without increasing the risks to financial system stability. 
 
b) The flow of money 
 
Consolidation can have several effects on the efficiency of the payments system. 
Mergers and acquisitions reduce the amount of payments processing because payments 
between consolidating firms become intercompany payments2. In addition, many of the 
remaining interbank payments may be cleared more quickly and efficiently because 
there are fewer endpoints to which to send payment information or payment 
instruments. Financial service industry consolidation might also improve efficiency by 
allowing resources to flow to more efficient payments processors or by allowing 
financial services firms to find more efficient means to exchange payments. 
Consolidation of the financial services industry into fewer and larger players may make 
it easier to agree on payment standards and a common technology with standardised 
protocols and fixed technical standards to take advantage of network economies3.  There 
may be a market failure in payments pricing where payers do not bear the full marginal 
costs of their payments and receive float benefits during the time it takes to collect the 
funds. Consolidation could result in more rational pricing of payments, agreements to 
remove much of the float benefits, as occurred in the highly concentrated Canadian and 
Norwegian financial services industries, as well as speeding the adoption of electronic 
technologies (Humphrey et al, 1998).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Government guarantees to protect debtholders or shareholders.The safety net may provide additional 
protection to firms considered "too big to fail", which may be created by consolidation. The safety net may 
also be extended when mergers and acquisitions combine banking with non-traditional financial services 
activities such as insurance and securities underwriting. A result may be the enhancement and the growth of 
the semi-financial services sector at the expense of competing ‘pure play’ financial services providers to a 
point that may represent a socially inefficient allocation of resources (of the safety net). 
2 Payments between these institutions or between their customers require no interbank transfer of funds, as the 
transaction is internal to the consolidated firm. 
3 However, the necessary co-operation may be achieved without substantial financial services industry 
consolidation through the use of the correspondent banking system, outsourcing to service providers, common 
ownership of facilities, government mandate of standards, or mandatory sharing rules (Solomon, 1999). 
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c) Influence of the government and regulators 
 
Regulators for financial conglomerates have three objectives of supervision: 1) micro-
economic stability, 2) investor protection, and 3) proper behaviour, efficiency and 
competition. The regulatory choices concerning the functional scope of financial service 
firms may have implications for the evolution of the structure of the financial services 
industry globally, since the strategic options for financial services firms in terms of 
functional diversification depend to a large extent on the regulatory environment in 
which they operate (Vander Vennet, 2000, p.140). The government plays a direct role in 
consolidation decisions through restricting the types of mergers and acquisitions 
permitted and through approval and disapproval decisions for individual mergers or 
acquisitions. In part, this is to limit the government's liability and to prevent exploitation 
of the safety net1. One way to control the systemic risks and safety net subsidies that 
may accompany consolidation is through new approaches to the supervision of financial 
institutions. Recognising that non-traditional activities and new financial instruments 
may increase the speed at which losses may occur as well as their magnitudes may 
increase, efforts are underway to revamp the basic approach to supervision.  
 
The recent focus is to shift away from formula -focused capital standards and mandated 
portfolio structures towards improvements in transparency and the supervision of risk 
management systems. Supervisors may require that institutions have in place systems to 
monitor and control their own risk-taking. New capital requirements for market risk are 
based on banks' internal risk measurement models (Hendricks & Hirtle, 1997), and new 
approaches to capital requirements for credit risk are under study (Jones & Mingo, 
1999). Another possibility is to increase market discipline through mandatory 
subordinated debt or other requirements (Calomiris, 1997). A related question is that of 
optimal organisational supervisory structure. The divisional model with a corporate 
holding would combine functional regulation (banking authorities regulate banking 
subsidiaries, securities authorities regulate securities subsidiaries etc.) with umbrella 
sight over the whole financial services firm2. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision sees an opportunity to enhance safety and soundness in the banking system 
by public disclosure by banks in order to create transparency for market participants 
(BIS, 1999a, BIS, 1999d). More explicitly, six broad categories of information have 
been identified; these are financial performance, financial position (including capital, 
solvency and liquidity), risk management strategies and practices, risk exposures 
                                                 
1 Regulators prevent mergers and acquisitions when an excessive increase in  risk or an excessive increase in 
market power is expected. Government may also encourage consolidation when this is a solution for troubled 
financial institutions in times of financial crisis. 
2 This supervisory structure permits functional regulators to focus on a narrow set of activities, maintain a high 
level of expertise, and possibly avoid imposing strong bank-like restrictions on other activities. The presence 
of an umbrella supervisor may also facilitate review of the institution as a whole and scrutiny of decision-
making, policies, and internal controls at the highest level (Kwast, 1996). 
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(including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational, legal and other risks), 
accounting policies, and basic business, management and corporate governance 
information. Striking is that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision gives special 
attention to this last topic in a separate paper (BIS, 1999b). In there, it was stated that 
for banking sound corporate governance practices include: 1) establishing strategic 
objectives and a set of corporate values that are communicated throughout the 
organisation, 2) setting and enforcing clear lines of responsibility and accountability, 3) 
ensuring that board members are qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding 
of their role in corporate governance and are not subject to undue influence, 4) ensuring 
of appropriate oversight by senior management, 5) effectively utilising the work 
conducted by internal and external auditors, in recognition of the important control 
function they provide, 6) ensuring that compensation approaches are consistent with the 
bank’s ethical values, objectives, strategy and control environment, and 7) conducting 
corporate governance in a transparent manner. This suggests that the regulator will 
become more active in the field of operational governance of financial services firms. 
 
2. Geographical view on consolidation 
 
The transfer of securities, goods, and services in international markets creates demands 
for currency, deposit, loan, and other services by international financial institutions. 
Thus, the globalisation of markets has likely contributed to (cross-border) mergers and 
acquisitions and the globalisation of financial services firms 1 (Meyer, 1998). The United 
States have the largest single financial market, implying that there are relatively many 
financial institutions. Table 1 summarises the changes in the U.S. banking industry over 
the period from 1988 to 1997; in this period the decrease of the number of banking 
organisations was 26.8 percent2 (Berger et al, 1999, p.64). 
 
   1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
# of US banking 
organisations 
9,881 9,620 9,391 9,168 8,873 
decrease p.a. (%)    2.6 2.4 2.4 3.2 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
# of US banking 
organisations 
8,446 8,018 7,686 7,421 7,234 
decrease p.a. (%)  4.8 5.1 4.1 3.4 2.5 
Table 1: Development of US banking organisations 1988-1997 
 
                                                 
1 The causation likely works in the other direction as well. 
2 Note that in 1979, the United States had 12463 banking organisations. 
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Although these statistics show the situation till 1997, we can safely assume further 
consolidation1. Also in Europe we see major consolidation going on. In Germany, for 
example, the number of independent banks has decreased by 5.3 percent per annum 
since 1990 until 1995, which sums up to a decline from 5000 firms in 1990 to 3600 
firms at ultimo 1995 (Lang, 1996, p.1). Table 2 shows some examples of Western 
Europe for 1998. 
 
Company 1 with company 2 
Banque National de Paris (F) Paribas (F) 
Banca Commerciale Italiana (IT) Intesa (IT) 
MeritaNordbanken (S/F) Unidanmark (DK) 
Swiss Bank Corporation Union Bank of Switzerland 
Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) National Westminster (UK) 
HSBC (UK) Crédit Commercial de France (F) 
Fortis (NL/B) Generale Bank (B) 
BSCH (S) Banca Serfin (S) 
ING (NL) BBL (B) 
Table 2 : Example of bank mergers in Western Europe 
 
Van Wensveen (1997, p.17ff) predicted that after the formation of the EMU, mergers 
among equals within the EU would be within national boundaries and would be 
defensive in nature, as: 
× Cost savings can only be reached when overlaps in large cost bocks, such as branch 
networks, can be eliminated. This is mostly only possible nationally 
× The differences in culture are bigger in international than in national mergers 
× The demand for the combination of banking and insurance products: the very nature 
of these products, where advantages are determined by national fiscal policy, makes 
nationally oriented insurance companies more attractive to same nations banks 
× Values of European banks are not in parallel and their development over time is 
also different; one financial institution of a specific country is therefore expensive 
in relation to another country, which makes it difficult to convince shareholders 
                                                 
1 An example of a major merger was the combination of Citibank and the Travelers Group into Citigroup in 
which the prospect of cross selling of consumer finance products was a major driver (Euromoney, 2000, p.30). 
Special in this case is the fact that Citigroup applied for the status of a bank holding company and anticipated 
the changes in the regulations as discussed in paragraph 1.B.3. Further examples in 1998 include the mergers, 
BankAmerica-NationsBank, Banc One-First Chicago and Norwest-Wells Fargo (Moore & Siems, 1998). 
Noteworthy is that various American (investment) banks have been taken over by financial conglomerates 
(examples include Bankers Trust, taken over by Deutsche Bank and Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette taken over 
by Credit Suisse Group). 
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× Banks do not want to invade other banks on their turf as they prefer to compete 
outside of the EU. 
 
At the same time, inroads in Europe have been made by American firms 1. Also in Japan, 
restructuring and consolidation is a phenomenon2. The Bank of China, one of the big 
four state banks, announced that it would merge 12 member banks in Hong Kong into 
one in preparation for a public listing3. 
 
3. The rationale for industry consolidation 
 
a) Technological progress 
 
Technology is  eroding entry barriers and hence financial institutions face pressures from 
a wider and more diverse range of competitors. Although information technology is 
important for the internal workings of the financial services firm, client-focused 
technologies make the difference in market appearance. In this respect we distinguish4 
(Flier et al, 2001, p.187): 
× Automated teller machine networks (first introduced in Sweden in 1972) 
× Electronic payment methods at the point of sale (EFTPoS), using direct debit 
cards (first introduced in Sweden in 1986) 
× E-purse, a microchip card, which stores electronic money (first introduced in 
the Netherlands in 1996) 
× Remote banking5 including telephone banking (first introduced in Sweden in 
1985), PC banking (first introduced in the United Kingdom in 1985) and 
internet banking (again first introduced in Sweden in 1995). 
 
These technologies open up new delivery channels, and while those are not necessarily 
more cost effective for the firm, consumers get to depend on them and demand access. 
Whereas in the past the branch was the only channel for the distribution of financial 
services, we see today a variety of channels eroding the branch's dominance. Financial 
innovation and the power of new technologies have tended to increase the relative 
                                                 
1 Examples are the take-over of Schroders (UK) by Citigroup and of Flemings (UK) by Chase Manhattan. 
2 In August 1999, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji and Industrial Bank of Japan announced that they were to merge in 
2002 and would create the world largest bank by assets (Euromoney, 1999, p.48). In October 1999, Sumitomo 
and Sakura announced that they too plan to merge in 2002. The new Japanese institutions will not be legally 
possible until 2002 because changes are required to both the tax code and to company law. For Japan, this 
consolidation is revolutionary in nature as the operations of the three banks will be re-organised and run along 
business lines and will therefore cut across the old banking organisations, the final structure of the bank will 
be a holding company overseeing three separate un its again divided along business lines. 
3 Also, the bank needs to accumulate capital ahead of China's accession into the World Trade Organisation, 
which is expected to bring an upsurge in foreign competition (Financial Times, 2000, p.17). 
4 For an in -depth review of how information technology has changed banking, we refer to Carrington et al, 
1997. Topics include payment systems, credit cards, automated branches, etc. 
5 Managing one’s account without physically going to a bank’s office. 
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competitiveness of the capital market vis -à-vis financial services firms, and new 
delivery technologies have lowered the cost of alternative suppliers of financial services 
to the extent that they no longer need to develop full branch networks. There is also 
something of a vicious circle: as capital markets become more efficient, firms have a 
greater incentive to disclose more information in order to get access to capital market 
facilities. In turn, this increased supply of information also enables the capital market to 
function more effectively and act as a greater competitor to banks in their traditional 
lending business (Llewellyn, 1999, p.32). Given the dependence of the financial 
services firm on technology and the influence of technology on competition, financial 
services firms try to realise economies of scale by combining technological capacities 
and to try and create comparative advantage from the use of technology by trying to 
gain an information advantage. 
 
b) Evolving customer demands 
 
The emergence of new and diverse financial products creates new challenges for 
financial institutions that now face a host of product-mix and marketing questions along 
with new competitors. As a result of changing consumer needs, we have seen an 
accelerated growth of financial innovation (Consiglio & Zenios, 1997). For example, 
financial innovation provides savers with greater flexibility in managing their portfolios 
by enhancing the available instrument choice, and by making existing instruments more 
accessible1 (Browne, 1992). In 1980, almost 40 percent of the U.S. consumer financial 
assets were in bank deposits. By 1996 bank deposits accounted for less than 20 percent 
of consumers' financial assets with mutual funds and insurance/pension funds absorbing 
the difference. Financial innovation has enhanced the relative attractiveness of capital 
markets for many corporate borrowers. Developments in the options and asset pricing 
theory, securitisation, and the evolution of contingent claims and guarantees, have also 
led to a deconstruction of the services traditionally provided by financial services firms 
into their constituent components (Lewellyn, 1999, p.39)2.  
 
c) Macro-economic factors 
 
Bank -based versus market-based systems: besides competition between firms, we can 
also distinguish competition between financial systems. Considering the transfer of 
                                                 
1 Examples of changing consumer preference include remote banking, a whole new range of financial products 
and one-stop financial shopping. Payment methods have seen a gradual change from cheques and cash 
towards debit and credit cards and, most recently, to electronic payment devices (Flier et al, 2001, p.193). 
Whereas the typical bank offers a dozen or two different choices of mutual funds, institutions such as Fidelity 
Investment or Merrill Lynch each offer over 100 different products. 
2 To take securitisation of bank loans as an example: a bank makes a loan, temporarily holds it on the balance 
sheet, but subsequently securitises it on the capital market, making it suited for mass trade in secondary 
markets by standardisation. This way, customers get a more sophisticated offer of products. 
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money, we see that in some countries financial services firms play a larger role than in 
others. Where banks take on the larger part of the financing need, we speak of a bank-
based system. The role of banks though, carries well beyond credit extension to, based 
on private information, share ownership, share voting and board membership with 
sometimes far-reaching powers, such as capital allocation, management changes, and 
restructuring of firms (Walter, 2000, p.74). Where capital markets take over the 
financing function, we speak of a market-based system. Commercial banking 
relationships with major companies can be very important but they tend to be between 
buyer and seller. Corporate control tends to be exercised through the take-over market 
on the basis of widely available public information, with the function of the financial 
services firm limited mainly to advising and financing bids. Demirguc-Kunt & Levine 
(2000, p.15ff) found that in higher income countries, banks do not become larger or 
smaller relative to the size of domestic capital markets. But looked at from the level of 
activity, these capital markets tend to become more active and efficient relative to credit 
activities of domestic banks. 
 
Deregulation: we can distinguish between different categories of regulatory changes 
(Flier et al, 2001, p.183ff): 1) eliminating restrictions on domestic competition, removal 
of limitations to the use of competitive tools such as interest rate controls and the 
loosening of controls on capital flows that limit foreign competition, 2) changing the 
scale and scope of financial activities, including cross-border establishments and limits 
on combining banking, insurance and securities activities within a single firm, and 3) 
improving the external competitive position of financial services firms, including 
solvency regulations, capital adequacy requirements, and reserve and investment 
coefficients. In the United States, restrictions on banks' ability to expand geographically 
were relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s. There has also been deregulation of restrictions on 
bank powers in the United States. As discussed in paragraph 1.B.3, the activities of 
investment and commercial banking combined are now allowed in the United States. 
Europe also has been undergoing deregulation. The European Union Banking directive 
has allowed banks to operate freely across national boundaries as well as acquire in 
Europe since 1993. 
 
Excess capacity: Davis & Salo (2000) looked at the presence of excess capacity as a 
precondition for consolidation. Excess capacity is formed in case of a decline in demand 
for financial services, technological shocks making existing capacity redundant, a shift 
of distribution of demand, new competitors, changes in regulation, and firms strategic 
behaviour1. Using profitability measures, Davis & Salo (2000, p.70ff) come to the 
conclusion that excess capacity in the United States has been decreasing over the last 
years. The same applies to the European area although there, more excess capacity is 
                                                 
1 E.g. to build up capacity as a barrier to entry for new competitors, or when increases in demand are expected. 
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still present. As some firms may be below an efficient scale or have an inefficient 
product mix, consolidation opens the way for eliminating excess capacity1. 
 
II. The changing borders of the financial services industry 
 
1. Description of near-banking 
 
Near-banking has not been researched at large, but we increasingly see that companies 
from different industry backgrounds diversify into financial services, as far as regulation 
allows2. The rise of near-banking tells that the financial services industry is attractive 
and that firms are of the opinion that the level of competition between financial services 
firms is not so high they could not be profitable. Also it tells that the skills needed for 
banking and insurance have disseminated in other industries. This lowers barriers to 
entry. Also, we see that financial services firms actually diversify outside of the 
financials services industry3. Often that step is part of the strategy to diversify risk, to 
link services in search of a market niche, to broaden the customer base or to reach a 
larger share of the client’s wallet. 
 
2. Towards a notion of in-house banking 
 
a) Understanding in-house banking 
  
We discussed banking in the general introduction and we saw that the main activities of 
banking are taking deposits, giving credit facilities, clearing transactions and advising 
on financial matters. Examples of financial activities done by an in-house bank within 
an industrial firm include cash management, treasury, borrowing, investing and 
                                                 
1 Institutions that are troubled because of excess capacity in their industry or markets, their own inefficiency, 
or underperforming investments are often taken over as an efficient alternative to bankruptcy or other exits. 
2 Examples from different industries include the following: 
. Marks and Spencer, the retailer in the United Kingdom, made a significant entry into financial 
services. By restricting in -store payment to cash, cheque, or the store's own card, the firm has 
recruited a large number of cardholders. Analysing clients’ spending has enabled the firm to target 
these individuals for loans, saving products, pension and mutual funds through the mail. The firm 
now recognises that selling financial products forms a larger part of their strategy  
. In consulting, we see that management-consulting firms start venture capital operations. Due to the 
nature of the work management consultants often encounter companies, which with management 
and capital effort could indeed improve performance. Examples of this trend include Bain & 
Company. Broader, consulting firms compete with banks in corporate finance type activities 
. Near-banking is also a topic in Japan: Sony plans to offer all types of consumer loans, mainly 
online. Also, Ito-Yokado, best known as the operator of the 7-11 stores, would put cash machines 
that would double as e-commerce terminals in their stores. Interesting here is that there are 
discussions in Japan on giving these non-banks banking licenses 
. Maybe the best -known example is General Electric, which has a non-bank business unit GE 
Capital. This unit offers a full range of financial services such as leasing, debt - and equity 
financing, insurance and credit cards, all targeted at selected industry and consumer groups.  
3 Notably, on a very limited scale some financial services firms in the United Kingdom have entered non-
financial businesses such as selling cars (Lloyds TSB), stationary (RBS) and coffee (Abbey National). 
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portfolio activities. As the level of financial activities of industrial firms increased over 
the years, because industrial firms were doing financial activities internally in a treasury 
department, the topic of in-house banking became more actual and increasingly had a 
more profound effect on the financial services industry. The treasury department 
became a bank for divisions, replacing in part or in full the business lines to external 
financial services firms. In his study, Bereuter (1995, p.34ff) deals with the different 
definitions and this leads to the following  synthesis: in-house banking can be defined as 
a far-reaching separation of the financial management function in order to increase the 
company's1 value by achieving financial synergies, while being responsible for general 
financial management issues on the company level, and offering financial services 
within the company, and/or doing transactions on the capital markets insofar these are 
necessary for the company without the involvement of financial services firms 2. 
 
b) Responsibilities and activities of an in-house bank 
 
Hommels (1995, p.181) distinguishes between three sets of responsibilities of the in-
house bank: 1) consulting: in a decentralised organisation, decisions are made in the 
divisions, often based on recommendation of the in-house bank which use information 
from macro -economics, capital markets and different divisions (cash) positions. The in-
house bank also plays a general role as sparring partner on financial issues facing 
divisions, 2) agency: the in-house bank actually transacts with external banks directly on 
behalf of company's divisions. As the in-house bank does these transactions for the 
whole company, lower transaction and administration costs and a better negotiation 
position vis -à-vis banks are possible, and 3) banking: here focus is on the net trades that 
the in-house bank does with an external banks, i.e. the residual risks stemming from 
positions taken by divisions. A group view is applied. Also activities in intercompany 
transactions3 are performed. These responsibilities result in the following activities: 
(Hommels, 1995, Bereuter, 1995): 
· Provision of capital: required by the business, including negotiating the 
procurement of capital maintaining the required financial arrangements4 
                                                 
1 The company is seen as a firm active outside of the financial services industry, e.g. a manufacturing firm. 
2 In order to establish an in -house bank, the following issues have to be covered (Hommels, 1995, p.303): 
× Value-orientation: the in-house bank delivers better results than an external bank 
× Risk profile: what level of risk, e.g. stemming from refinancing, is appropriate 
× Client interfaces: structure and processes between the in-house bank and its internal clients 
× Range of activities: with an orientation towards value creation, activities should be analysed and 
benchmarked so as to make sure loss-generating activities do not proliferate 
× Information technology: systems must deliver transparency always and support professional services. 
3 I.e. transactions with subsidiaries. 
4 This should include internal clearance of divisional positions in various currencies and to perform 
transactions on the external capital markets when needed including hedging activities. 
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· Investor relations: to establish a market for the company's securities and, in 
connection therewith, to maintain adequate liaison with bankers, financial analysts 
and shareholders 
· Short-term financing: to maintain adequate resources for the company's current 
borrowings from commercial banks and other lending institutions 
· Banking and custody: to maintain banking relations, to have custody of and 
disburse the company's money and securities and responsibility for financial aspects 
of real estate transactions 
· Credits and collections: to direct the granting of credits and the collection of 
accounts due to the company, including the supervision of required special 
arrangements for financing sales, such as time payment and leasing plans 
· Portfolio management: to invest the company's funds as required, and to establish 
and co-ordinate policies for investment in pension and other similar trusts  
· Tax: to optimise the tax charge by management of payment traffic through low-tax 
jurisdictions. 
 
An industrial firm may indeed choose to diversify in banking and pursue a banking 
license to open up a bank. Normally, a company will want to avoid extra regulation and 
only do financial activities, which are in line with operational strategies. 
 
c) Reason for the rise of in-house banking 
 
Although we see an increase in the sophistication of corporate financial skills and 
capabilities, which support the development of in-house banking, macro trends have 
enabled in-house banks to rise to prominence1 (Hommels, 1995 p.12): 
· Globalisation: the tendency of integration of national and international financial 
markets enables an increase of (influence of) foreign investors in national markets2 
resulting in decreased dependence of firms on financial institutions 
· Deregulation: the dismantlement of disadvantages for foreign firms on local 
markets by price-distorting legal and fiscal barriers enabling increasing competition 
· Innovations in and development of the financial markets: the more disseminated use 
of financial products and processes which themselves have been tailored to more 
practical uses, and the availability of more and co-operating markets in different 
types of products  
· Progressing information and communication technology: the increased networked 
market places result in greater market transparency and less information 
                                                 
1 Bereuter (1995, p.43) notes that also upswings in the economic cycle have an effect on the creation of an in-
house bank, as the management of liquidity becomes an important issue to firms. 
2 These ‘foreigners’ do not offer services to local firms but only create efficiencies in national markets. 
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asymmetries; also more data becomes available resulting in higher quality 
decisions; furthermore transactions become cheaper and faster 
· Separation of physical and financial markets: traded volumes on financial markets 
are higher then on physical markets, which implies that transactions are more often 
financially driven; grounds for these transactions include international investing 
activities, risk management and speculation. 
 
3. Interfaces between financial conglomerates and in-house banks 
 
In-house banks of industrial firms require various types of products from financial 
conglomerates. More importance is laid on the fee-based advising business and less on 
the interest spread generating business. In-house banks and financial conglomerates 
have various interfaces (Bereuter, 1995, p.237ff): 
· Commercial banking: deposits, credits, payment traffic, trading, guarantees etc. 
· Investment banking: transactions on the capital markets (primary and secondary), 
application of derivative products for risk management, financial engineering, etc. 
· Trust banking: investment, trust and wealth services such as consulting, analysis  
· Service functions: insurance, credit cards, property services, consulting, etc. 
 
These interfaces between banks and clients take place on different levels and between 
different organisational and often regional units. In choosing a bank, an in-house bank 
of an industrial firm would make an overall analysis of the banking relationships1. The 
upcoming of in-house banking means that the negotiation position of financial services 
firms has worsened. 
 
III. The supply of financial services via the internet 
 
1. Effects of the internet on the financial services industry 
  
The internet is a series of communication protocols that support network interoperability 
with universal connectivity, communication and instant information. Electronic 
commerce (e -commerce) on the internet operates continuously and increasingly 
automates the processes of searching, buying, selling, producing and distributing. On 
the internet, buyers might have more power than in physical markets because they can 
compare prices and they also have more choices. Sellers are eager to learn information 
about buyers' preferences, and are willing to offer something in return. The size of the 
seller becomes less important as barriers to entry lower. A financial services firm, at its 
                                                 
1 In choosing a bank, Bereuter (1995, p.265) distinguishes between two types of criteria: 1) bank specific 
criteria such as size, branch network, foreign presence, response time, flexibility, product scope, interest rates, 
security, quality, credit worthiness, image and personal relationships, and 2) business specific criteria such as 
credit conditions, banking skills, payment services, deposits conditions, trading conditions, foreign services.  
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core, is about controlling the flow of money and financial information. On top of that, 
relationships are built. In financial services, e-commerce can be seen as the entire set of 
transactions, internal processes and payments that are enabled, originated or delivered 
electronically, especially via the internet. The combination of technology, connectivity, 
availability and affordability is fundamentally influencing the balance of power: 
financial services firms no longer have near-exclusive control over the flow of money 
and information. Financial services firms used to be defined by their physical presence. 
But now traditional "bricks and mortar" become not as important as before and 
connectivity allows clients to ignore the walls, to pull apart firms' capabilities and 
rebuild in a way which suits them best. The internet may create a world where every 
financial institution is a specialised provider of products. A world of specialist banks 
may mean the end of the practice of cross-subsidising big clients in the interest of the 
overall relationship1. Joining in internet-banking are non-financial institutions. 
Microsoft, for example, has a joint venture with Itochu of Japan to develop an on-line 
share-dealing platform in Japan. New entrants into brokerage in the US include Charles 
Schwab2, with market share of 25 percent, E*Trade3, with market share of 15 percent, 
Datek Securities, with market share of 10 percent and Ameritrade, with market share of 
9 percent (Euromoney, 1999, p.53); these firms did not exist before 1995.  
 
WR Hambrecht, an internet based investment bank, plans to make the pricing of initial 
public offerings more of a science by using algorithms to find the optimal price based 
on orders received. Due to lower costs Hambrecht charges less than the standard 7 
percent. Another example is AOL, an internet service provider, which has teamed up 
with retail internet investment bank Wit Capital in the US, adding 17 million potential 
accounts to the bank's client base. Wit Capital, 20 percent owned by Goldman Sachs, 
seeks co-lead manager mandates on initial public offerings to sell shares to those retail 
clients. Another interesting example forms E-loan, an on-line provider of mortgages. Its 
website allows borrowers to search more than 50,000 products offered by 70 lenders and 
receive, according to E-loan, unbiased recommendations. It also reckons it removes half 
of the costs by remo ving the need for a commissioned loan agent. Forrester Research 
reckons the US market for online mortgage originations will grow from US$ 18.7 
billion in 1999 to US$ 91.2 billion in 2003 (Euromoney 1999, p.78). Egg, a UK internet 
bank, which started in October 1998 and is majority-owned by Prudential, reported that 
the number of new clients is still growing rapidly: in 2001, Egg won over 600,000 new 
customers, totalling 2 million. Early 2002, Egg declared itself sustainably profitable 
(Armstrong, 2002). Retail investors, empowered by the internet, are fast becoming 
                                                 
1 That will mean transparent pricing in each business area as opposed to the distortions that are evident today. 
2 For an analysis of Schwab, we refer to Dewan & Mendelson, 2000, p.195ff. 
3 E*Trade is an example of a successful internet bank, which acquired operations such as telephone banking, 
mortgages, credit cards, and an ATM-network; a partnership with a chain of stores provides a presence (Orr, 
2001, p.42). 
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much more proactive and influential, at least in US equities. Financial services firms 
fear that they lose privileged access to information, which financial services firms can 
use for their own purposes. Anonymity in trading systems means that even the largest 
fund paying the most commission will have to pitch in with other, smaller, funds. For 
financial services firms, e-commerce cannibalises existing businesses, especially in 
highly liquid and commoditised businesses, but it can also serve to expand markets.  
 
2. Reactions of financial institutions to the internet 
 
Using legitimacy of the “bricks and mortar” financial services firms, first mover 
entrants facilitate the emergence of an e-commerce industry1. By using a combination of 
this form of legitimacy and the legitimacy of internet-only partnerships2, incumbents are 
more likely to survive the competition of fast progressing entrants and lead in an 
emerging e-commerce industry (Hensmans et al, 2001, p.239ff). Although this can be 
seen as an attempt to split the market among them, it also means that financial service 
companies are looking for ways to get capabilities and resources to be able to cope with 
the internet. Most of the leading US banks have set up e-commerce steering committees. 
Those banks seem to be following the same broad agenda (Euromoney, 1999, p.62): to 
consolidate any e-commerce-related initiatives into one co-ordinated effort, to drive 
forward all proprietary developments, to evaluate all approaches made to the financial 
services firm seeking partnership and/or funding, and to examine any consortium-based 
initiatives that the firm should be involved in. Nowadays major financial services firms 
all have an internet operation. At the same time we see banks going into other internet-
related business as well. Different chances for financial services firms come up as well. 
By offering real-time credit checks while the on-line order is being made, financial 
services firms can put themselves into the transactions of internet shops. Another case in 
point is Merrill Lynch. In July 1999, Merrill Lynch announced an agreement with 
Works.com to enter the procurement business3. Wells Fargo Bank has launched a 
similar service. This bank also offers the service of electronic filing of tax returns4. 
Financial services firms initially wanted to move as many of their services and products 
online as possible. Now, before launching new internet efforts, banks are asking what 
products the marketplace wants, deciding whether they can effectively deliver them or 
not, and analysing if they can make extra profit or reduce cost with internet offerings. At 
                                                 
1 Electronic banking operating costs are estimated at only 25 to 30 percent of the cost of providing traditional 
banking services through bricks and mortar branch offices (Klinkerman, in: Hensmans et al, 2001, p.232). 
2 E.g. in 1999, Barclays Capital, a UK bank, joined Tradeweb, an electronic government bond trading vehicle 
initially set up by Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Brothers; Merrill Lynch and 
JP Morgan are also associated. Effectively, Tradeweb is eroding the advantages the US banks have had by 
allowing non-US banks to compete on a level playing field. JP Morgan Chase provides cash management and 
treasury advisory to large corporate and institutional clients globally, and middle-market clients in the US. 
3 This business is seen as a potentially lucrative way of tying small/medium-sized firms to the brand because 
the bank manages the customers' transactions.  
4 A requirement under US law for firms with more than US$ 50,000 in payroll taxes (Moules, 1999, p.87). 
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present the online products offered by banks don’t necessarily work well together or 
make sense. Many financial institutions have struggled to link existing legacy systems 
to the real-time, personalized nature of the internet, and to integrate websites with 
bricks-and-mortar operations (Murphy, 2001, p.8). 
 
3. Uncertainty of the internet in financial services 
 
To what extent e-commerce becomes a threat to financial services remains to be seen for 
three reasons (Euromoney, 1999,p.60): 1) the ability to gain business often depends on 
the ability to form relationships with clients, 2) banking is a highly regulated industry, 
which therefore knows entry barriers, and 3) the amount of capital needed to do 
business in the capital markets can be prohibitive.Due to the speed in developments in 
this field, it is unclear how regulation should act. Countries have committed to the 
general principles of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 1999c) and 
will need to assess if these developments lead to changes in regulation policies. Given 
the prospects for the internet, there are still some barriers to overcome as can be seen 
from Figure 2 (GIG/ADL in: Engler & Essinger, 2000, p.40). Musto (in: O’Brien 
Coffey, 2001, p.38) reported that customers, who are shopping for financial products 
online, prefer the internet to other channels for routine customer care. These customers 
are interested in new online services that banks are rolling out en their number in the 
United States has increased from 6.1 million in December 1999 to 13.6 million in 
December 2001; based on demographic profile and further innovation the potential is 
estimated at another 16.3 million customers. Cross-selling becomes the apparent 
strategy for financial firms. Looking to future developments given the recent downturn 
in internet activities but the present potential, Grief et al (2000) give the following 
guidelines for financial services firms: 
× Keep options open and don’t choose to pursue only one option; this includes 
making several investments, forming alliances and push some and abandon other 
× Have an open-mind to new pricing strategies: financial service providers must be 
agile and flexible in their approach to pricing without succumbing to the temptation 
to buy market share at unprofitable prices; at times, it may make sense to sacrifice 
short-term profits to build the online business for the long term 
× Focus on customers’ needs and dissatisfactions: online business provides the 
advantage of gathering vast amounts of customer data; interpretation is essential 
× Leverage the assets of the traditional business, specifically assets such as brands, 
client relationships, distribution networks 
× Be creative in rethinking organisational structures and management processes. 
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Figure 2: Barriers to adoption of internet commerce 
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B. Financial conglomerate structures 
 
I. Universal banking and prototypes of financial conglomerates 
 
1. The debate on universal banking 
 
Introducing a scale, we can say that on one end of that scale we find the specialised 
financial institution, such as a brokerage or a life insurance firm offering one (type of) 
service to one (type of) client locally. On the other end of the scale, we find one 
conglomerate firm, which offers all financial products available, serving all clients on a 
global scale. In this research, we focus on financial conglomerates and therefore, we 
will focus our attention to understanding this form.  
 
Mostly, performing different financial services to a mixed group of clients is called 
universal banking. Saunders & Walter (1994, p.74) and Smith & Walter (1997, p.426) 
define a universal bank as a bank with a high degree of integration of banking and 
securities activities1. Most of the financial conglomerates have a strong home market 
presence and operate only globally in specific areas, while building a worldwide 
presence for specific clients. Due to the nature of the activities, financial conglomerates 
are large as measured by total assets. Size conveys certain comparative advantages on 
both the funding and asset sides of activities of the financial services firm2. To what 
extent a bank can be called a financial conglomerate or not, is open for discussion: this 
is the question on how wide that range of financial activities can or should be (see also 
Vander Vennet, 1998). This question will not be answered here. Nevertheless, in order 
to be able to cover firms with that wide range of financial products, be it advice or 
funds, and clients, be it corporate, private or public, and acting internationally, in one or 
more countries, and within that class belonging to the biggest firms, as measured by 
assets or market capitalisation, we will refer to them as financial conglomerates3. 
                                                 
1 More specifically defined, universal banking can be seen as the conduct of a range of financial services 
comprising deposit-taking and lending, trading of financial instruments and foreign exchange (and their 
derivatives), underwriting of new debt and equity issues, brokerage, investment management and insurance 
underwriting and brokerage (Saunders & Walter, 1994). In Germany this conduct is called Allfinanz and in 
France Bancassurance (Saunders & Walter, 1994, p.204, Schierenbeck & Hölscher, 1992, Smith & Walter, 
1997, p.105, Santomero, 1996, p.417). Calomiris (1996, p.109) sees universal banking as an intermediate 
technology in which the same intermediary provides a broad range of services to suppliers and users of funds - 
including deposit taking, lending, underwriting, risk management, and portfolio management. 
2 For example, large size is linked to the ability to undertake major transactions and the ability to fund cheaply 
in the wholesale and retail markets. It may also be linked to portfolio diversification and perceived credit 
quality issues. On the negative side, size brings with it the potential for complexity and inertia that can be a 
serious disadvantage in dynamic financial markets. 
3 Note that this is a definition driven by business/managerial objectives. Legal, regulatory and other 
considerations, although relevant, are exempted. As we have seen in part 1.A, new organisations, not based on 
other then business objectives and which cannot be typified as banks, help shape and change the financial 
services industry. 
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2. General overview of prototypes 
 
Due to different reasons, financial conglomerates appear in a different manner in 
different regions of the global economy. Countries with legal systems based on English 
common law are more likely to have market-based financial systems than countries with 
other legal origins (Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2000, p.26)1. These countries tend to 
stress the rights of minority shareholders with beneficial implications for securities 
market development (LaPorta et al, 1997). Countries with German legal foundations 
tend to stress the rights of creditors to a much greater extent than other countries 
(LaPorta et al, 1998). Different legal systems treat equity and debt contracting 
differently. A major force driving appearances is local regulation. We distinguish 
between four types (Smith & Walter, 1997, p.427ff) as shown in Figure 3 on page 27. 
 
3. The fully integrated financial conglomerate 
 
This conglomerate is  capable of supplying the complete range of financial services from 
one entity. As this variant has no regulatory obligation to fragment the production of its 
services this variant should be able to produce any given mix of output at the least cost 
(Herring & Santomero, 1990, p.481ff). 
 
II. Non-fully integrated financial conglomerates 
 
1. The German variant 
 
a) General description 
 
In Germany, the term universal bank  is applied to the major classification of the 
financial conglomerates to distinguish these from the specialised ones, which only 
provide one type of financial service. In its appearance, this variant approaches type 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In a paper discussing countries' financial structure and economic development, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine 
(2000) compare different factors in explaining why countries have a bank-based or market-based system. 
Although this is not the focus of this study, it is noteworthy to take notice of their conclusions: 
× Countries with strong accounting standards tend to have market -based financial systems and are unlikely 
to have underdeveloped financial systems 
× Countries with regulations that restrict the rights of banks to engage in securities market activities, real 
estate, and insurance are more likely to have underdeveloped financial systems 
× Countries with explicit deposit insurance systems are less likely to have market-based financial systems. 
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Figure 3: Four types of universal bank organisational structures 
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number of years in Germany, only the Deutsche Bank has a wholly owned life insurance 
subsidiary. Most of the other banks have strategic alliances, with or without equity 
stake, with insurance companies where the bank sells a range of insurance products and 
the insurance companies use bank products such as pension plans or mutual funds. In 
general, under German banking statutes, all activities can be carried out within the 
structure of the parent bank except for insurance, mortgage banking, building savings 
activities, and mutual funds, which require legally separate subsidiaries. It is not implied 
that German universal banks are completely free to pursue all financial services 
activities. There are three broad classifications of German universal banks: 1) 
commercial banks: these banks' activities span virtually the entire range of commercial 
and investment banking 2) savings banks, and 3) co-operative banks. Three aspects 
characterise a Ge rman universal bank: the preferred bank concept (Hausbank), an equity 
stake in non-banks and corporate control, and proxy voting of depository shares. 
 
b) Characteristics 
 
In the preferred bank concept, a company relies on one principal bank for all it's 
financial services. The relationship is two sided from the company: they have a partner 
who also in less prosperous times might be prepared to provide financial backing. Even 
if the company collapses, the debt can be converted into equity and the bank can take 
over control. The bank ensures itself with a long standing business relation and all of the 
banking business of its client. German universal banks often have equity stake in 
companies ranging from less then 5 percent to more then 50 percent (Canal, 1997, 
p.162, Steinherr & Huveneers, 1989a). In many cases these equity stakes give banks a 
seat on the supervisory board. Further, many retail clients have deposited their stocks at 
the bank. Share custody is a common service in Germany and although theoretically the 
ultimate shareholder exercises the voting rights, the banks exercise votes belonging to 
shares held in deposits; this is called proxy voting. This gives the German universal 
bank a several times larger influence on a corporation then their proportionate share. 
 
2. The British variant 
 
a) General description 
 
This is the variant under which the financial services firm focuses essentially on 
commercial banking and all other services, including investment banking and insurance, 
are carried out through legally separate subsidiaries of the bank with dedicated capital. 
Legal separateness will entail some efficiency costs, and so the cost of producing a 
given mix of financial services may be higher than under the first and second variant. 
There are two offsetting advantages (Herring & Santomero, 1990, p.225ff). First the 
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corporate structure separates non-banking activity and is more likely to result in 
functional regulation, which would reduce the costs of regulatory oversight. Second, in 
principle, this variant protects the bank from disastrous outcomes in other activities 
undertaken by the conglomerate while permitting it to benefit from all positive return (if 
no guarantee was issued). In reality, this may be an overly optimistic view. It assumes 
that the profitability of the bank is unrelated to he performance of its subsidiaries. Two 
considerations argue against this assumption. First, if operational synergies are 
important, the profitability of the bank may be adversely affected by the collapse of the 
subsidiary. Second, the bank's reputation and its cost of funds may be adversely affected 
by the failure of its subsidiaries. Thus, the parent bank may have business reasons to 
support a faltering subsidiary beyond its capital investment. Market confidence that the 
bank will not exercise the option to walk away from a troubled subsidiary enhances the 
creditworthiness of the subsidiaries. This is an advantage to the parent bank insofar as it 
reduces funding costs for the conglomerate, but it may distort competition and prove 
costly to the regulatory authorities. The parent bank's access to the safety net of the 
lender of last resort may be implicitly extended to the subsidiaries. This may weaken 
market discipline and lower the cost of funding for a function organised as a subsidiary 
of a bank rather than as an autonomous corporation. Furthermore, if trouble occurs, the 
regulatory authorities may find that it is less costly (in the short run) to validate market 
expectations by assisting the parent bank in bailing out its subsidiary than to withhold 
resources from the parent and let the subsidiary fail. To mitigate this risk, the regulatory 
authorities may attempt to re-enforce legal separateness with operational separateness 
by requiring firewalls between the parent bank and its subsidiaries. 
 
b) Characteristics 
 
Historically, the British financial system has been a structured system with clear 
demarcations between different types of financial institutions. However, unlike other 
countries, this specialist structure has been due not to legal barriers to diversification, 
but more to self-imposed restrictions on the range of business, coupled with moral 
suasion pressure of the regulatory authorities, the Bank of England in particular 
(Llewellyn, 1996, p.161ff). The structure of the British financial system has shifted 
towards the universal banking end of the scale as financial institutions have steadily 
diversified into each other’s traditional territories. This move required no changes in the 
law or regulations: the driving forces have been competitive pressures, developments in 
information technology, and the evolving strategic objectives of financial institutions. 
After the "Big Bang"1 in 1987, commercial banks were free to conduct the full range of 
                                                 
1 The term "Big Bang" represents the deregulation of securities industry in London by the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). LSE practice was based on a strict "single-capacity" rule, which meant that member firms 
were either brokers or jobbers (market makers) in securities (equities and government and corporate bonds, 
but not Eurobonds), but could not be both. Traditionally, member firms had to be partnerships, and the extent 
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securities business and, at the same time, became manufacturers, as opposed to just 
distributors, of retail insurance and pension products. Different to the German variant, 
British banks do not take equity stakes in their corporate clients and do not have voting 
rights (either directly or via proxy) in companies. Also doing business through a 
subsidiary is a formal requirement and not a free choice. Overall, the British approach of 
financial conglomerate structures is designed to secure the benefits of full 
diversification, while guarding against at least some of its potential hazards. 
 
3. The American variant 
 
a) General description 
 
This variant is also known as the holding company structure, where a holding company 
owns both banking and non-banking subsidiaries that are legally separate and 
individually capitalised, insofar as financial activities other than "banking" are permitted 
by law. These may be separated by regulatory restrictions1 if there are internal or 
regulatory concerns about institutional safety and soundness or conflict of interest. The 
holding company may also be allowed to own industrial firms or may be itself an 
industrial company. The main advantage of this variant over the British variant, is that 
the bank may have less incentive to bail out a faltering non-bank if it is  an affiliate 
rather than a subsidiary. American regulation has attempted to accentuate this 
separateness on occasion by requiring firewalls such that an affiliate differs from the 
bank in name, in employees, in location, and in distribution networks. In part, these 
restrictions are aimed at reducing the potential loss of reputation to the bank if the 
affiliate should fail2 (Herring & Santomero, 1990, p.485). In a 1994 study, Saunders & 
Walter (1994, p.204) concluded that for US banks there are potential risk reduction 
gains from allowing banks to expand their activities in a limited fashion and that these 
gains increase with the numbers of activities taken. The main risk-reduction gains 
appear to arise from banks' expanding into insurance rather than securities activities. 
More-over, quite substantial risk-reduction gains appear to exist at the most 
comprehensive level of universal banking, where the activities life and casualty 
insurance, commercial banking and securities brokers/dealers are being combined. In 
general, in this variant the cost of producing a given mix of financial products is likely 
                                                                                                                       
of external ownership (e.g. by banks) was strictly limited by the LSE's own rulebook. Changes, brought about 
in 1969 and 1982, allowed member firms to become limited companies, but a limit was placed on outside 
shareholdings in those firms. The government’s decision to refer the LSE's rulebook to the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Court was the catalyst for change. Structural changes followed and in 1986, fixed commission ended 
and stock exchange rules were changed to allow 100 percent of outside ownership of stock brokering and 
jobbing firms (Llewellyn, 1996, p.181ff). 
1 Known as Chinese walls or firewalls. 
2 The Federal Reserve Board has traditionally advanced a "source-of-strength" doctrine, which implies that 
during periods of financial stress or adversity, the regulatory authorities should be permitted to use the 
resources of the holding company and force subsidiaries to support the bank.  
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to be somewhat more expensive than in other models. Also, according to Smith & 
Walter (1997, p.428), studies have suggested that the American variant incorporates a 
number of comparative disadvantages against various other forms of universal banking. 
The limiting factor here has been the Banking Act of 1933. 
 
b) Characteristics 
 
The Banking Act of 1933 has had severe consequences for the American variant and we 
will go into some detail. This act also has become known as the Glass-Steagall Act. The 
Glass-Steagall Act consists of four different sections of the Banking Act that separates 
commercial banking from investment banking1. The main two sections are section 16, 
which prohibits a national bank from dealing or underwriting securities and section 20 
which defines that a Federal Reserve member bank can not be affiliated with any entity 
dealing with the "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution of debt and 
equity securities not permitted in section 16". The objective of this law was to separate 
the banking industry from the securities industry so that if a major declination in the 
market occurred again, banks would not be in the same trouble that they were in during 
the depression. Another reason for this set of regulations was to limit the degree of risk 
that a depository institution could sustain in the assets it acquired and in the securities it 
offers to the public in order to raise funds. These constraints are most demanding for 
commercial banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. These limitations also apply to 
many non-depository financial institutions. Following these banking regulations in the 
early 1930s, the restrictions placed on financial institutions became much more severe. 
In light of the changing times, many changes have been made to the Glass-Steagall Act.  
 
There have been many questions about different regulations that have been put into 
action. These regulations restrict the bank's business to the deposit-taking business only. 
Lending can be just as risky as securities underwriting. It seems that by diversifying the 
bank's business to more than one type of business, risk can be lowered, especially 
during periods of low demand or low profitability. Also, fluctuations in earnings power 
can be minimised (Garten, 1991, p.34ff). Another argument for banks to offer 
investment services is through looking at foreign markets. Since foreign banks can offer 
a variety of financial services, domestic banks need to be able to compete in these areas 
as the economy globalises. The banks decided that they needed to broaden the 
alternative financial services offered to corporate clients, not only to keep their credit 
clients, but also to keep those relationships. Therefore, a few large banks looked for 
different ways to get around this law. They found a loophole in section 20. It had 
originally been defined that banks were prohibited from certain activities but the large 
banks argued that it just limits these activities. Therefore, banks were allowed to 
                                                 
1 These four sections are sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. 
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become engaged in some earlier ineligible securities such as municipal bonds, 
commercial paper, and mortgage related securities. This became known as section 20 
tier I powers. Besides taking on other financial activities, banks anticipated changes in 
the legislation to formally allow further integration of financial services companies 1. In 
1999, the Gramm Leach Bliley Act was passed. This acts explicitly aims to enhance 
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for 
the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial 
service providers. In effect, universal banking as described in the German variant comes 
into sight. In terms of international competitive performance, financial institutions that 
are subject to different organisational forms as a result of legal or regulatory barriers 
may suffer against those institutions that are freely able to choose their optimal 
organisational form. The fact that regulatory environments, which are totally 
unrestricted as to the organisational form of financial services firms, are home to so 
called “true universal banks” suggests that structure-related sources of institutional 
competitiveness do in fact exist. 
 
III. The structure of a financial conglomerate 
 
1. Matter of reach in efficiency, markets and products 
 
The degree to which the same corporate entity may legally supply all types of financial 
services, but may also create separate subsidiaries or affiliates when warranted by 
market conditions, is increasing. Management has complete freedom to structure the 
organisation to achieve maximum comparative advantage, which may have to involve 
the creation of separate legal or functional entities, firewalls, or other forms of 
fragmentation. Under this arrangement, the optimum delivery system from the 
standpoint of competitiveness dictates the form of the organisation. In the view of 
Herring & Santomero (1990, p.492), the question of appropriate structure is really a 
question of how best to achieve economies of scope in production and consumption 
while minimising any extension of the safety net from the lender of last resort from the 
basic financial services business to other activities. According to Herring & Santomero, 
(1990, p.473), financial conglomerates are formed because owners or managers of 
financial services firms believe that they can achieve economies of scope that will make 
it more profitable to provide a range of services to a possibly larger client base within an 
integrated corporate group than to provide each service through a separately managed 
corporation, or because a financial services firm may be induced to diversify simply to 
gain economic power or comparative advantage through being bigger. If the bank 
secures either economies of scale or scope through diversification, competitive markets 
produce a sharing of these benefits between the firm and the consumer. Even the 
                                                 
1 The 1998 merger of Citicorp and Travellers Group into Citigroup is an example of a move in that direction. 
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formation of the EMU can be used to increase efficiency in financial conglomerates, 
although this would not be straightforward and it would be restricted.  
 
2. Separateness and restrictions 
 
It is important to distinguish two different concepts of corporate separateness: legal and 
operational separateness (Stein, 1993). Legal separateness implies that different 
products are provided by separate corporate entities, each of which has its own 
management structure, set of accounts, board of directors, and capital1. In the absence of 
additional restrictions, the managers of a conglomerate may co-ordinate the activities of 
the separate corporate entities that they control and achieve many of the advantages of 
an integrated firm. Operational separateness implies regulatory or self-imposed 
restrictions that inhibit the integrated production of different products. Restrictions may 
prohibit flows of credit and information between different units and may require that 
different products be produced by different people at different locations and be 
distributed through different channels. Such restrictions inevitably reduce the extent to 
which a conglomerate and its clients can realise economies of scope in either production 
or consumption. If the restrictions are self-imposed, there is a presumption that clients 
value separateness more than savings that would result from more integrated production 
and distribution of financial products. If regulators impose restrictions, the rationale 
may be to prevent abuses of power, the contagious transmission of shocks, cross-
subsidies, or an extension of the potential liability of the lender of last resort. In reality, 
a certain degree of corporate separateness may be desired even when it is not required, 
e.g. for the association with independence between activities in terms of operations, 
financing, and financial info rmation flows (Herring & Santomero, 1990, p.488).  
 
Further, limited liability gives the conglomerate the option of limiting losses in the 
event of a substantial shock to a particular line of business. Sometimes, tax laws even 
encourage the formation of separate subsidiaries in order to capture tax benefits that 
would be lost in a consolidated reporting of income for tax purposes. When a subsidiary 
is acquired rather than started by the corporate conglomerate, a certain degree of 
corporate separateness may be maintained in order to make use of the reputational 
capital of the acquired firm. Corporate separateness may facilitate managerial control, 
particularly if compensation practices for one kind of business are substantially different 
than for another. Similarly, corporate separateness may also be a useful way to deal with 
different business cultures. Finally, corporate separateness may be a useful way of 
assuring potential clients that they will be protected from conflicts of interest, which 
might otherwis e put them at a disadvantage vis -à-vis other clients of the conglomerate 
or the conglomerate itself. Specialised financial services firms will continue to compete 
                                                 
1 Shareholders are legally protected from bad outcomes in the separate corporate entity by limited liability. 
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effectively by using different production or delivery systems than their mass-market 
conglomerate competitors. They may also choose to specialise in activities or products 
in which economies of scope are less valuable. Concluding on these arguments, Smith 
and Walter (2000, p.15) expect that corporate separateness, i.e. the American variant, is 
going to be dominant for financial conglomerates in the future, splitting the landscape in 
centralised and decentralised forms of financial conglomeration. 
 
3. Considerations on conglomeration 
 
a) Synergies as seen from the firm’s perspective 
 
Literature hardly reports any evidence of the existence of economies of scope in 
financial conglomerates (Herring & Santomero, 1990). Only some research indicates 
economies of scope with large banks, especially through the economic use of 
information technology, the offering of a wide range of products, and through shared 
inputs. Berger & Mester (1997, p.18) report on weak evidence that banks in holding 
companies are more efficient than independent banks. In the case of diversified banks 
size does matter. The largest banks usually outperform their smaller competitors in 
terms of efficiency (Vander Vennet, 2000, p.158). Benston (1994) concludes that data 
on economies of scale and X-efficiency indicate some advantage for universal banks 
over specialised banks. If we now see holding companies as a prelude to a financial 
conglomerate, increasing efficiencies can be expected. Other reviews fail to find 
unambiguous support for economies of scope (Llewellynn, 1996, p.172). In a survey 
conducted for an OECD study (1993), the conclusion was: 
 
On the basis of 108 studies carried out between 1982 and 1991, existing methodological 
approaches do not yield conclusive results as to the existence of significant economies 
of scale and scope in the financial services industry, and that, at the cost-efficiency 
level, the effects of organisational inefficiency (failure to attain cost control and 
management efficiency) are much more important. 
 
Obviously, with developments of information technology, together with the new 
emphasis on cost control in banks, evidence on the basis of past performance may be a 
poor guide to potential future economies of scope.  These may be realised whenever the 
cost of producing a given mix of products jointly is less than the sum of costs of 
producing each product separately. They are likely to be important whenever a fixed 
cost can be shared across products. Several factors would appear to give rise to 
economies of scope in the provision of financial services (Llewellyn, 1996, p.172ff)1. 
                                                 
1 Examples (in the footnote on page 35) include: 
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b) Synergies as seen from the client’s perspective 
 
Synergies may also exist in the consumption of financial services; users of financial 
services may value a package of financial services from a single source higher than the 
same array of products obtained separately from several different firms. In addition to 
realising economies of scope in production, the view that cross-selling products to 
clients increases profitability is based on the assumption that clients will be willing to 
pay more per product as the number of products obtained from a single institution 
increases. These economies of scope in consumption may, for the client, arise from a 
reduction in search, information, monitoring, and transactions costs, which may be 
realised when several financial products may be purchased from the same firm. Vander 
Vennet (1998, 2000) finds that financial conglomerates are more revenue efficient than 
their more specialised competitors and that the degree of both cost and profit efficiency 
is higher in universal banks than in non-universal banks12. Strategically speaking, 
financial conglomerates may also respond more flexibly and at lower cost to demand 
shifts and market conditions across financial products as client needs require, than other 
firms that offer only a limited menu of services or financial products (Steinherr & 
Huveneers, 1989b, p.8). Moreover, the perception of greater flexibility over time may 
be an advantage for which clients are willing to pay a premium. Diversification is then 
seen as developing a more intensive and extensive client relationship, with the potential 
to tie in the client to a more secure and continuing relationship. It could be that the more 
services a consumer purchases from a bank, the less likely the client is to shift between 
firms, due to high switching costs. Conversely, the more diffused a client relationship is, 
the greater is the risk to the financial services firm that the client will shift existing 
financial services business to other institutions. Also, the wider relationship a client has 
with a bank may enable the consumer to negotiate better deals. Just as the switching 
costs of moving a diverse account is high for the consumer, so the costs to the bank of 
                                                                                                                       
× The fixed cost of managing a client relationship may be shared across a broad range of financial services 
(Steinherr & Huveneers, 1989a, p.8) 
× It might also be possible to use distribution channels established for one product to distribute other 
products at slight marginal cost  
× Several services can be marketed simultaneously, and the bank may gain both a marketing advantage 
and a reputation or image advantage in being seen to be offering a wide variety of services 
× Client information used to produce one product may be used for other products at little additional cost  
× In terms of the financial services firm's risk profile, and depending on the nature, size, and correlation of 
risks, diversification has the potential to reduce portfolio risk in the overall business structure. 
1 Vander Vennet (2000) found that financial conglomerates and universal banks attain the highest cost 
efficiency levels, in comparison to specialised banks. This may indicate that technology spillovers and cost 
synergies are best achieved by a full form of organisational integration. Universal banks also show superior 
profit efficiency. With an exception of very large banks, he also found that cost efficiency is largely unrelated 
to size; the way individual banks are managed is dominant. 
2 Saunders (1994) argues that allowing banks to be acquired by other financial companies or even commercial 
firms would impose monitoring and creative incentives for efficiency and value-maximising behaviour. It 
would also reduce expense-preference behaviour, which has been found to be present in banking. Often, the 
formation of a financial conglomerate constitutes an occasion for focused rationalisation programmes, a 
phenomenon that also has been observed in EU bank mergers (Vander Vennet, 1996). 
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losing the account are greater. The consumer has the potential to exploit relationship 
banking. The imp lications for market structure differ if the motive for forming a 
conglomerate is economies of scope in consumption rather than economies of scope in 
production. If economies of scope in production are negligible, economies of scope in 
consumption could be exploited by using the distribution network of one institution to 
sell packages of financial services that are produced by others; Herring & Santomero 
(1990, p.475) call this an agency form of a financial conglomerate. To the extent that 
conglomerates have more scope to develop innovative new products and services in 
response to changing technology and market conditions, they may be better able to 
respond to client needs. Integrated conglomerates, within which information flows 
freely and incentives are harmonised, may have an advantage in meeting the changing 
needs of clients relative to either specialised firm or autonomous firms whose products 
are offered in joint distribution. 
 
c) Diseconomies of scope and concluding remarks 
 
Managers must weigh the potential economies of scope against diseconomies, which 
may jeopardise the efficiency of multi-business conglomerates (Herring & Santomero, 
1990, p.475): 1) the sheer size of the bureaucracy that usually accompanies a 
conglomerate structure may be a disadvantage - the regulation and compliance costs of a 
diversified business may be very high, 2) the complexity of managing and developing 
several different kinds of  business in one integrated structure may erode some of the 
potential economies of scope (The Economist, 1999, p.89), 3) clients may perceive 
disadvantages in the joint production of financial products, as they may be concerned 
that information they share with the conglomerate in one transaction could be used to 
their detriment in other transactions. Further, the consumer's image of traditional 
businesses may be contaminated by an unsuccessful venture into new areas, 4) 
according to Boot & Schmeits (1996, p.1), a major cost of conglomeration is less 
transparency and therefore a reduction in the effectiveness of market discipline. Due to 
an increase in opaqueness of the balance sheet of the financial services firms, outsiders 
cannot assess the performance of financial services firms sufficiently, and more 
importantly, have little control over the financial services firm, whereas managers may 
have excessive discretion1, and 5) for public policy, the major interest in favour of 
allowing more diversification is that it enhances competition or contestability in 
                                                 
1 The absence of market discipline may result in free-rider problems, since each division does not fully 
internalise the consequences of its own actions. The primary mechanism that Boot & Schmeits see for market 
discipline is the bank's cost of capital. Divisions should face a cost  of capital reflecting the riskiness of their 
activities. In the extreme, with perfect or complete market discipline of stand-alone activities, conglomeration 
(in absence of synergies) is never optimal. However, with ineffective market discipline, conglomeration may 
or may not be beneficial. Introducing internal cost allocation schemes may create internal market discipline 
that complements the weak external market discipline of the conglomerate. These schemes should be dynamic 
and thus should respond to act ual risk choices. 
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financial services, erodes any economic rents earned by existing firms in sub-sectors of 
the financial system, and minimises institutional risk. All in all, we can state that in 
practice, the advantages of financial conglomeration are not that clear and that good 
management is needed to bring about these advantages, as we find them in industrial 
firms. Walter (2000, p.79) summarises it as follows: do not expect too much from 
economies of scale, do not expect too much from supply-side economies of scope, and 
be prepared to deal with any diseconomies that may arise, optimise x-inefficiencies 
through effective use of technology, reductions in the capital-intensity of financial 
services provided, reductions in the workforce, etc., exploit demand-side economies of 
scope where cross-selling make sense, seek -out imperfect markets that demonstrate 
relatively low price-elasticity of demand, specialise operations using professionals who 
are themselves specialists, where possible, make the political case for backstops such as 
underpriced deposit insurance; shareholders clearly benefit from implicit subsidies, pay 
careful attention to limiting conflicts of interest in organisational design, incentive 
systems, application and maintenance of Chinese walls, and managerial decisions that 
err on the side of caution where potential conflicts arise, minimise the conglomerate 
discount by divesting peripheral non-financial shareholdings and non-core businesses, 
leaving diversification up to the shareholder, get rid of share-voting restrictions and pen-
up shareholdings to market forces, pay careful attention to the residual value of the bank 
by avoiding professional conduct lapses that lead to an erosion of the financial service 
firm’s reputation or uncontrolled trading losses. 
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C. Value-based management in financial conglomerates 
 
I. Shareholder value as yardstick for the organisation 
 
1. Introduction to the shareholder value concept 
 
a) Basic premise of shareholder value 
 
In a conglomerate a key issue is how divisions add value to the group. From the 
viewpoint of financial theory, according to Rappaport (1998, p.5), the only social 
responsibility of business is to create shareholder value and to do so legally and with 
integrity. This means that all actions of a company, and thereby also its divisions and 
the corporate centre, must be aimed at this value creation. Seen from a management 
perspective, one can also use shareholder value creation as a yardstick to measure how 
well the company is doing. Although, at a minimum, the survival of the company must 
be ensured, there does exist a zone between bankruptcy and absolute value creation 
leadership. This means there is room to give other interests a higher priority when 
necessary. Narrowed down, the shareholder value approach estimates the economic 
value of an investment by discounting forecasted cas h flows by its cost of capital. These 
cash flows, in turn, serve as the foundation for shareholders return from dividends and 
share-price appreciation1. As an example, Table 3 shows an international cross-section 
of financial services firms, which, from the investor’s viewpoint, created shareholder 
value (as defined as the sum of dividend and capital growth) (Barfield, 1998, p.26). 
 
Firm Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
MBNA Corp  Banco 
Santander 
ING  
Groep 
Citicorp 
TSR (%) 55.9 51.9 47.2 45.1 43.1 
Firm Bank Boston Bank of  
New York 
Lloyds TSB 
Group 
ABN AMRO US 
Bancorp 
TSR (%) 41.3 39.6 38.8 38.3 38.0 
Table 3: Total shareholder value return (TSR) 1993-1998 
 
Value creation can be captured in  generic Equation 1 (Stewart, 1991, p.136)2: 
 
 
                                                 
1 If an investor is considering buying equity and becoming a shareholder, the investor ought to take account of 
the opportunity cost of having capital tied up there rather than in a different stock with a similar risk profile as 
witnessed in the capital markets. 
2 Stewart uses the abbreviation EVA™ (Economic Value Added) for Economic Profit. 
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Equation 1: General formula for Economic Profit 
In banking, the debt component of the balance sheet is part of the daily business of the 
firm. We therefore have to modify Equation 1 and we focus on the cash flows to equity. 
This results in Equation 2 in which economic capital1 reflects the risk-adjusted equity 
(Paul, 2001, p.38, p.102ff). The cost of equity reflects the specific level of risk in the 
firm and can be calculated as shown in Equation 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 2: Formula for Economic Profit in banks 
For long it was thought that only functional excellence created value. Thus, a financial 
services firm that excelled at, e.g., origination, distribution, servicing, or making 
markets was considered likely to succeed in creating value for its customers and 
ultimately for its shareholders. However, functional excellence is not enough. Financial 
conglomerate strategists increasingly share the view that a focus on customers in terms 
of anticipating, understanding and responding to their needs rapidly and efficiently, and 
ultimately establishing enduring relationships between service providers and customers, 
creates value that is sustainable and often difficult to imitate (Melnick et al, 2000, p.5ff).  
 
b) The debate on methodologies  
 
Measuring shareholder value creation is of utmost importance and there is a need for 
methodologies by which companies and divisions can be analysed, re-oriented and then 
managed to conform to a value creation imperative. In many cases, we see that 
accounting-based numbers, e.g. earnings, are used to measure corporate and divisional 
performance. Earnings, however, fail to measure changes in the economic value of the 
firm as alternative accounting methods may be employed, as investment requirements 
and the time value of money is excluded: research has shown that historical accounting 
earnings and stock market performance have little correlation (Rawley & Lipston, 
1985). Measuring corporate and divisional performance with accounting numbers 
                                                 
1 For a review of methodologies for allocating economic capital within a bank, we refer to Paul (2001) 
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therefore might lead to ill-advised decision-making. In contrast, the relationship 
between cash flow and share price is significant (Black et al, 1998, p.45). Different 
methods for measuring shareholder value creation treat the source data on cash flow and 
capital to show different aspects of value1,2. 
 
c) Business risk as a central component of shareholder value 
 
Another important aspect of shareholder value is the notion of business risk, i.e. the risk 
inherent to the company and to the division. The compensation for business risk is 
reflected in the cost of capital for a firm or a division, be it debt or equity. In order to 
calculate the cost of equity, we use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which 
says that the investors’ expected return (E(r)) is the sum of a risk-free rate (Rf) and an 
equity risk premium (Rp) (Ross et al, 1999, p.257ff). The equity risk premium (Rp) is a 
product of the positive difference between the average market return (Rm) and a risk free 
rate (R f), and a company or division specific risk factor (ß), which is the relation 
between a) the covariance between the return of the asset (e.g. the stock of a company) 
and the return on the market portfolio, and b) the variance of the market. In Equation 3:  
 
 
Equation 3: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
In essence, CAPM argues that the received and expected returns are related to the risk 
incurred by owning particular financial assets. One key insight is that there is a risk-
weighted discount factor, which allows for assessment of the value today of 
developments and cash flows later. This discount rate is derived from capital markets 
observations and defines what the opportunity cost is. 
                                                 
1 Implementing methodology: free cash flow in a financial institution can be thought of as the dividend paying 
capacity of the business (Black et al, 1998, 153ff). This is not the same as cash flow in an accounting sense. 
The logic for this approach is that banks have specific regulatory requirements, and banks cannot, except with 
special permission, issue dividends to the extent that capital is reduced. In that respect value drivers, in the 
categories growth, returns and risk, can be identified. The model for a bank differs from other sector models 
specifically in the treatment of the capital adequacy adjustment, as growing the balance sheet involves 
ensuring that there are adequate reserves to meet regulatory requirements; qualifying capital therefore is more 
appropriate than tier 1 capital – this influences the weighted average cost of capital. Black et al (1998, p.151ff) 
give a hint how to apply shareholder value models for activities in banking, insurance and fund management. 
2 Well-known methodologies include: 
× Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI), developed by Holt Value Associates 
× Economic Value Added (EVA™), developed by Stern Stewart & Co 
× Free Cash Flow (FCF), developed by McKinsey & Co  
× Shareholder Value Added (SVA), developed by LEK/Alcar Consulting Group 
× Value per Share (VpS), developed by Schierenbeck (1997), see Figure 63. 
The differences between these methodologies lay a.o. in the treatment of certain accounts but their common 
focus is on calculating a return which should be higher than the cost of capital. Most start with corporate 
finance theory as developed by Modigliani & Miller in 1961, whose work addressed the measurement of 
corporate performance and the relation with market valuation. The Value per Share method starts with the 
familiar DuPont scheme. 
)R(R*ßRRRE(r) fmfpf -+=+=
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2. On value-based management 
 
a) Introduction to value-based management 
 
Value-based management (VBM) is based on the insights of shareholder value creation. 
VBM is present when all activities within the financial conglomerate are focused on the 
sustained long-term improvement of the value of the equity (Schierenbeck, 1997b, 
p.422). VBM takes these insights further by focusing on how companies use them to 
make major strategic and everyday operating decisions (Copeland et al, 1996, p.96). 
Properly executed, VBM is an integrative approach to management whereby the 
financial conglomerate’s overall aspirations, analytical techniques, and management 
processes are all aligned to help the financial conglomerate maximise its value by 
focusing decision making on the key drivers of value. The first step in VBM is 
embracing value maximisation as the ultimate financial objective for the financial 
conglomerate. Furthermore, management must know how this financial objective 
weighs in against other objectives. In general, financial conglomerates must have two 
sets of goals: financial goals and inspirational non-financial goals, which motivate the 
performance of the entire organisation1. Non-financial goals, however, must be carefully 
considered in light of the financial circumstances. Objectives must be tailored to the 
level of the organisation. For the division head objectives will have a different 
performance measure, probably more value-explicit than for a subordinated team leader. 
 
b) Identification of value drivers 
 
An important part of VBM is a deep understanding of what performance variables will 
actually drive the value of the business. Copeland et al (1996, p.106ff) call these key 
value drivers. There are two reasons such an understanding is essential. First, the 
organisation normally cannot act directly on value. It has to act on things it can 
influence, such as  capital expenditures, cost, etc. Second, it is through these drivers of 
value that senior management learns to understand the rest of the organisation and to 
establish a dialogue about what it expects to be accomplished. Responsibility for the 
performance of these value drivers can be assigned to managers who can help the 
organisation meet its targets. Value drivers must be developed down to the level of 
detail that aligns the value driver with the decision variables directly under the control 
of line management. Generic value drivers apply equally well to nearly all divisions, but 
lack specificity and cannot be used well at all levels (Copeland et al, 1996, p.107). 
Value drivers are not static, but must be periodically reviewed. To understand 
interrelationships among value drivers, Copeland et al (1996, p.111ff) advise to employ 
scenario analysis. Scenarios represent the value impact of different sets of mutually 
                                                 
1 These may include goals about customer satisfaction, product innovation, and employee satisfaction. 
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consistent assumptions on the value of a company or division. They help top 
management to understand the relationship between strategy and value. Value drivers 
and scenarios make VBM fact-based by linking actions to their value effect of the firm. 
 
c) Implementing value-based management 
 
Because VBM requires a change in mindset for decision makers at all levels, it can be a 
long and complex process. Figure 4 can help managers put the change process in 
perspective by helping them understand where their company is today in VBM terms 
(Copeland et al, 1996, p.120ff). Six characteristics measure how deeply VBM informs 
an organisation. To what extent is it performance driven, value-based, managed bottom 
up and top down (see dual control approach further down), using two-way 
communications, using self-reinforcing incentives, and low cost? These characteristics 
capture both the “hard” and “soft” elements of VBM. Figure 4 shows a spider web 
diagram in which an example firm scores1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Six conditions for VBM 
The cornerstone for implementing VBM is the so-called triad of VBM in financial 
conglomerates (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.1ff). The primacy of profitability applies here, 
i.e. all operational and strategic business decisions have to generate an appropriate 
minimum profitability. In this context, the growth of a company serves equally as a 
means of increasing profitability (value-oriented growth policy) and as a means of 
taking on risk (value-oriented risk policy). An integrated controlling policy, based on 
this philosophy, steers a financial conglomerate towards a value-oriented approach at 
                                                 
1 5 is a high score, 1 a low score. 
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the group level, the division level and at the level of individual transactions. In terms of 
company policy, controlling inevitably takes on a coordination function. Value-oriented 
business philosophy is the first core element, derived directly from the basic philosophy 
of value-oriented financial services management, and can be defined as a management 
concept that focuses first and foremost on income (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.6ff). The 
financial conglomerates results are always put at the centre of all business policy 
deliberations at all levels of the financial institution’s hierarchy. Profitability is the 
prime concern, with growth and risk policy subordinated as means of supporting 
profitability. This philosophy requires institutionalised cost control and cost reduction in 
the sense of continuous productivity improvement as part of a lean banking concept, 
which we will discuss in paragraph 1.C.I.3.c. Customer benefit banking aimed at the 
systematic development of competitive advantages within the chosen customer target 
markets, is also required. The performance-oriented design of operational incentive 
systems and the synchronization of bank-wide goals with individual compensation and 
career goals represent another element of this first key component. Goal-oriented 
management, as second part, supported by planning, decision, implementation, and 
control, as shown in Figure 5 (Voegelin, 1999, p.8), requires the procurement, storage, 
processing, transmission and dissemination of information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Constituting elements of management 
 
The controlling process links planning and control in a hierarchically interconnected 
cybernetic control loop model (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.11): 1) planning is done 
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according to the so-called counter flow process, which is a combination of going 
bottom-up and top-down, and 2) controlling goal achievement and variance analysis are 
done based on a “management by exception” strategy. This assumes a high degree of 
self-controlling. When these points are taken into account we get to a dual control 
approach. This can be characterised as in Table 4 (Schierenbeck, 2001, p.91ff). 
 
Profitability control vs Risk control 
Broad control focused on potential vs Narrow control focused on action 
Portfolio and balance structure control vs Business control 
Centralised control vs Decentralised control 
Table 4: Dual control model 
 
There has to be an appropriate organisational and operational structure for the 
institutionalised controlling cycle to work properly –  this is the third  part. As in the 
planning and control area, a distinction has to be made within the corporate structure 
between decentralised market areas and central specialist departments. The former have 
to be organised with a focus on customers and markets. The latter take care of central 
tasks. Perhaps most important amongst these are management of the business portfolio 
and of the balance sheet structure. These centralised units can also take on servicing and 
processing jobs for the divisions. The final element in a value-based controlling concept 
is an information system for the financial conglomerate’ management. This system has 
to ensure that decision-relevant information is available at all levels of the financial 
conglomerate. The main supplier of quantitative information for the management 
information system is the operational accounting system. A management information 
system, the fourth and last part, has to be able to provide transparent information about 
how much money a particular transaction earns, taking into account terms and 
conditions, risk and volumes - this is called the reporting function. Secondly, the 
management information system has to help managers make decisions by informing 
them how much income individual transactions have to generate, or what the minimum 
revenue is before the transaction makes a profit, again taking into account terms and 
conditions, degree of risk and volumes – this is called the decision support function. 
 
3. Value orientation by using the profit centre concept 
 
a) Characteristics of the profit centre concept 
 
According to Meyer (1995, p.4), the profit centre has an independent responsibility for 
its own results, which forms the organisational framework for active (financial) 
management. He mentions the following advantages of the profit centre concept: 
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× The creation of smaller, more comprehensible organisational units improves 
the management of the financial conglomerate as a whole 
× The division of units into results-oriented profit centres enables faster and more 
flexible response to changes  
× Greater transparency in costs and revenues enhance earnings orientation 
× The motivation of managers and staff improves as a result of direct 
responsibility for profits 
× The evaluation assessment staff is carried out on the basis of performance. 
 
Two basic features of the profit centre concept become apparent: responsibility for 
results and independent decision-making. Table 5 shows that various types of 
responsibility, all of which are subsumed under the profit centre concept, which can be 
identified depending on the nature of these goals (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1989, p.529ff). 
Profit centres can be established according to different criteria. This permits the various 
hierarchical levels of results to be linked to the hierarchy of the company, which means 
that individual departments’ operating results at each level can be aggregated. This is 
significant for management accounting as an information tool. Moreover, these are 
profit centres in the strict sense, and the individual divisions are therefore not able to 
make investments without approval, though they are accountable for success. 
 
Type of profit centre Responsible for 
Cost centre Service production 
Revenue centre Sales processes 
Profit centre (strict sense) Profitability by the sale of services 
Investment centre Profitability including investments 
Table 5: Types of profit centre and scope of responsibility 
b) Implementation of the profit centre concept 
 
Before a customer-oriented profit centre concept can be implemented in a financial 
services firm, a series of technical and organisational requirements must be met (Meyer, 
1995, p.18ff). These include decentralisation of management structures, operational 
independence, allocation of costs and revenues to profit centres and creation of technical 
accounting units in accordance with the areas of responsibility. Control requirements 
also need to be taken into consideration. A three-dimensional scheme needs to be put in 
place to ensure that costs and revenues are appropriately allocated to the profit centre’s 
customers, products and distribution channel. The MFTP-concept and Activity-Based 
Costing/Process-oriented Standard Direct Cost accounting (ABC/PSDC)-systems are 
the tools used to this end (see paragraph 1.C.II.2.a). Also, the profit centres must be run 
according to future-oriented guidelines in line with the objectives of the financial 
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conglomerate as a whole. The PSDC system is one element for the implementation of 
the institutional control cycle used in this context. 
 
c) Integrating lean and customer banking in profit centres 
 
A financial conglomerate operating with the discussed structures and systems needs 
coordination and motivated staff. Vertical coordination concerns relations between the 
financial conglomerate’s corporate centre and the individual profit centres. Horizontal 
coordination is concerned with relations between divisions. While profit orientation and 
organisational structure are of importance for the profit centre, the lean banking concept 
concentrates on the organisation of workflows and processes (see figures 6 and 7). 
There are notable cultural differences between these concepts. The profit centre concept 
is American. The individual and motivation are the key issues. Lean management on the 
other hand originated in Japan, and embraces the concepts of continuous improvement, 
customer-focused production and total quality management. In these latter concepts, the 
performance of the group as a whole is the most important issue (Voegelin, 1999, p.41). 
Aside from customer focus, there is a clear shift of focus to value creation processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Customer benefit banking 
 
The profit centre concept is complemented by process-oriented lean banking and creates 
a market-oriented organisational structure capable of rapid adaptation. As can be seen in 
Figure 8, the basic idea of business re-engineering1, involving restructuring of the 
company in accordance with horizontal processes rather than functions, is thus realised 
within the profit centres (Voegelin, 1999, p.43). Value-oriented management based on a 
structure of this nature is thus realised. 
                                                 
1 For an extensive discussion of business re-engineering see Hammer & Champy (1995). 
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Figure 7: Lean banking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Divisionalised profit centre organisation with lean banking processes 
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II. Measuring value-based management 
 
1. The importance of controlling 
 
We have seen that controlling  is central to a value-oriented business philosophy. Value-
controlling, as part of value-based management, can be seen as a process with three 
steps: in the first step, the value of the firm is determined; in the second step, value 
controlling analyses the potential value creation of the firm; in the final step, business 
divisions are supported in the implementation of value enhancing strategies, which are 
based on value controlling, by controlling-specific measures (Lister, 2001, p.1127). A 
distinction can be drawn between strategic and operational controlling (Horváth, 1993, 
p.327). The responsibilities of strategic controlling can be to ensure the continued 
existence of the company (competitor analysis, strategy analysis, etc.), and to identify 
potential opportunities for successful new business. Operational controlling, by contrast, 
deals with the planning, management and control of operational processes. It does this 
based on the results of strategic planning, but can be a starting point for strategic 
controlling. Strategic and operational controlling are thus linked to each other in an 
interdependent relationship. Efficient controlling systems should meet the following 
requirements (Schierenbeck, 2000, p.15): 
× Integration: integration into the corporate philosophy and policy has to be 
ensured, there has to a closed control loop between planning and controlling, 
and the controlling system has to be able to synchronise margin calculations 
with profit calculations 
× Acceptance: if users are to accept the system, there has to be congruence 
between the relevant competencies, allocation and revenue responsibility, and 
the guarantee of the quality and plausibility of the information provided 
× Flexibility to adapt: to changes in the organization, to developments in 
information technology, and to new calculations conditions 
× Cost-benefit relationship: internal customer oriented functionality is more 
important than over-designed systems. 
 
According to Vettiger (1996, p.37), the accounting system is an indispensable 
precondition for the efficient and effective operation of a controlling system: by 
providing operational and financial data, it supplies the information required for the 
controlling system to carry out its coordination and information function. It is 
particularly important that operational controlling and accounting are closely interlinked 
to take account of the fact that the accounting system – as the chief supplier of 
quantitative information – has to be an integral component of the controlling system. 
Controlling as an instrument of value-based management not only has to be linked 
closely with the divisions within the organisation, but also with the general financial 
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services environment, in order for e.g. benchmarking against other financial institutions 
to become possible. Furthermore, controlling can use external data to work out 
strategies and to analyse the goals that have been achieved.  
 
2. Instruments for value controlling 
  
a) Matched Funds Transfer Pricing 
 
All areas in a financial conglomerate, be they cost or profit generating, can be seen as 
creating or destroying value1. In recent years, the so-called Matched Funds Transfer 
Pricing method (MFTP) has established itself as the most suitable way of evaluating the 
relative advantages of the available choice of interest-earning transactions 
(Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.72ff); a core element in this method is the use of opportunity 
costs. The MFTP attempts to isolate the revenue contribution made by each individual 
transaction. Using the opportunity cost principle, the basic MFTP model attempts to 
evaluate each asset-side and liability-side transaction by comparing them individually to 
realistic alternative transactions – with comparable maturities – on the capital markets. 
As a rule, one always looks at alternative transactions on the same side of the balance 
sheet, i.e. an asset-side transaction (passive-side) is compared with an investment 
opportunity (borrowing opportunity) on the capital markets2. As a result, the gross 
interest rate, which is calculated across the institution as a whole, is split between the 
total asset-side and total liability-side conditional contributions on the one hand (i.e. the 
total additional returns of the individual transactions compared with alternative capital 
market transactions with equivalent maturities and currencies), and the structural 
contributions (additional returns based on maturity and currency transformations in the 
sense of a lending premium) on the other. In this way it is possible to produce an 
accurate allocation of revenue contributions to each individual reporting unit3. Use of 
the basic model is limited to fixed-interest business (e.g. final maturity loans without 
discounts, as well as term money) that permanently ties up capital over its lifetime 4. It 
makes sense for a financial conglomerate to use the MFTP if it also analyses and 
manages balance-sheet business with the help of decision-oriented effective margins on 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of value controlling, we refer to Schierenbeck & Lister (2001). 
2 For exceptions see e.g. Schierenbeck (1995, p. 65ff). The corresponding customer interest rates are adjusted 
for risk, and the opportunity cost interest rates are adjusted to allow for regulations on minimum reserves and 
liquidity regulations. Fluctuating interest rates and split capital markets rates should be taken into account. 
3 As a rule, the conditional contributions are allocated to the customer areas, whereas the treasury department 
is allocated the structural contributions. 
4 In order to make the MFTP work for other individual transactions, it has to be supplemented by the cash 
value model (Wimmer, 1993, p.140ff), the main feature of which is the (dynamic) calculation and periodic 
distribution of conditional and structural contributions on the basis of the interest rates that can actually be 
achieved in the capital markets and in customer business.  
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the basis of individual transactions1. The MFTP-concept also has limits as an aid to 
decision making, and various elements have to be examined more closely. The MFTP-
method is dependent on the efficiency of the capital markets2. For banking transactions 
with no capital markets equivalents, the maturities and/or interest rate assumptions used 
can only be approximate (Meyer, 1994, p.626). The MFTP-method does not 
automatically co-ordinate asset and liability positions, which means that bank-wide 
balance-structure management might be necessary. If market interest rates are used, no 
account is taken of the systematic characteristics of bank deposits and loans with regard 
to the maturities and volumes of equivalent, but not intermediated, financings (Neus, 
1997, p.45). At the time when the transaction is concluded with the customer who is 
being advised by the bank’s front office department, central management has no 
influence on the size of the structural contribution (Wimmer, 1993, p.130). Despite the 
criticism, the MFTP concept has established itself above all other modern interest rate 
transfer concepts. It thus has to be included in an integrated management approach, 
especially if the financial conglomerate concerned is supposed to be managed using the 
profit centre concept. In its expanded calculation form, the MFTP is a prerequisite, if the 
financial conglomerate wants to calculate the revenue contribution of each individual 
product, customer or region and attribute this contribution accurately and fairly to the 
relevant profit centre. Properly attributed revenues are used as the basis for various 
evaluations when calculating the profitability of customers, products and branches. 
 
b) Activity-Based Costing 
 
The value creation process within financial conglomerates has fundamentally changed 
in recent years. The individual areas of value creation within these firms have become 
much more complicated and interlinked, and this has led to an increase in joint costs as 
a proportion of overall costs (Voegelin, 1999, p.26). Automation and rationalization in 
particular have encouraged this trend. Traditional cost accounting systems, which tend 
to use overhead allocation and fixed cost proportionalisation in cost centre accounting, 
take insufficient account of the changed relationship between individual and joint costs3. 
In cost management three trends can be distinguished (Shuh, 1997, p.35ff): 1) the 
functional expansion of cost accounting, which has given more weight to process 
design, 2) the temporal expansion – in that cost accounting is now used not only as an 
accounting method, but also as a forecasting tool, and 3) the integration of systems for 
cost planning, cost control and cost management. As the objects of costing are always 
                                                 
1 Over recent years the treasury effective interest rate method (TEI)1 is found to be an appropriate method for 
this purpose (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.163ff). This is an applied method of classic dynamic investment 
calculation, which calculates interest rate capitalization by focusing over time on opportunity cost transactions 
and transferring these to customer transactions. Account is taken of the fact that interest also has to be paid on 
immature trenches of investment when refinancing transactions (Schierenbeck, 1995, p.105). 
2 Main inefficiencies are: volume restrictions, outside influence, limited access and split capital market rates. 
3 For a criticism of the traditional systems see e.g. Bohnenkamp (1995). 
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activities, activity-based costing (ABC) tries to avoid the risk of miscalculation and 
erroneous decisions by focusing on value creation processes and on production 
activities. The main difference between activity based costing and traditional cost 
accounting1 is the differentiated analysis and allocation of overhead costs, which allows 
an accurate division of (overhead) costs to the individual products and services that 
actually generate these costs. ABC can deliver additional information, the impact of 
which can be divided into three effects (Coenenberg, 1993, p.209ff): the allocation of 
overhead costs on the basis of the actual use of operational resources to produce services 
leads to a different cost charging than when done by the traditional systems; in addition, 
ABC offers the opportunity to accurately and fairly reflect the complexity and variety of 
services and products; with traditional full-cost accounting, a constant overhead rate per 
unit is charged on the basis of proportional overhead cost allocation; however, process 
costs per unit decrease as the number of units increases: ABC takes this into account. 
ABC can provide in a powerful evaluation capability in terms of actual product costs, 
capacity utilisation, and period analysis (Meyer, 1995, p.32ff).  
 
The degree of complexity of the ABC-system will be influenced by the pursued 
corporate goals, if there is only one goal, a small number of cost drivers will suffice, and 
by the variety of products, e.g. the degree of similarity between the different 
products/services in the range (Cooper, 1990). ABC can be used to investigate the 
profitability of market areas, customer segments and individual customers, which allows 
for analysis of the influence of changing demand on overhead costs. The concept of 
ABC is characterised by a two-step approach, in which two different types of cost driver 
are used (Cooper & Kaplan, 1988, Innes & Mitchell, 1993, p.59). In the first step, 
actions serving to produce a particular service are brought together as activities. To have 
a sound foundation, a labour and resources analysis is necessary. This means that work 
processes must be clear and used resources must be allocated to (parts of) activities2. 
This will lead to insights on where costs really are and allows for comparison to the 
(monetary or non-monetary) value brought by that activity. Cost drivers, factors, which 
reflect the volume of work throughput of the activity, can then be identified. If there are 
                                                 
1 In traditional accounting systems direct costs are added to indirect overhead cost based on a percentage, thus 
falling in a cost pool, which is difficult to divide correctly. 
2 In order to come to this labour analysis, Cole (1995, p.43ff) distinguishes between several approaches:  
× Historical averaging: this is used when the one wishes to avoid disturbing the workers at their stations or 
when there is a only a need for information based on historical relationships; it involves comparing 
relationships of previously recorded data in order to draw inferences on the measurements of tasks 
× Self-logging or time ladders: this method relies on the workers to account for their individual time 
× Relative values: here task or activity values are assigned by relative weight to one another; usually the 
lowest time is assigned a weight of 1.0; the weights are determined through a one-time analysis 
× Work sampling: this is the process of surveying the distribution of work through a form of sampling, 
such as randomly spaced visits; this is most useful in sorting out multiple task times in a work unit  
× Stopwatch: standard times may be developed as sample observations are made and tasks are timed 
× Predetermined time standards: these are defined as the arrangement and classification of movements 
with the assignment of associated time values. 
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more cost drivers in one cost pool, further analysis is needed on segregating cost 
drivers. The activities are allocated to the corresponding cost pool on the basis of a cost 
driver; there is one for each activity; the allocation is made either by measuring the 
proportion of resources used directly, or by estimating resource use indirectly. The 
greater the number of actions that are put together under one activity, the more difficult 
it becomes to evaluate the corresponding use of resources with only one cost driver1. 
According to Innes & Mitchell (1993, p.66) three types of cost driver have emerged: 1) 
pure activity output volume: this can occur where the basic transactions of the activity 
are identical in terms of their resource demands, 2) activity/output volume/complexity: 
this can occur where the basic transactions of the activity differs in terms of their 
resource demands, 3) situational: this basis can be used where an underlying situational 
factor can be identified as the key factor determining the workload of the activity. In the 
second step, the activity costs are allocated to the relevant products (Cooper, 1990, 
p.345ff). The choice of cost driver is critical here, because the allocation should take 
place in accordance with the actual use of resources. Figure 9 (based on Cooper, 1990) 
explains this. For the purposes of evaluation and analysis, some individual activities 
within a service production process, or the corresponding cost pool, can be grouped 
together in what is known as an activity centre. By allocating the right activities to the 
right hierarchical level within the production process, the attribution of costs can be 
made even more accurate (Cooper & Kaplan, 1991, p.131ff).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Activity Based Costing scheme 
                                                 
1 Putting various actions together as activities makes the costs shown for each product less precise, though at 
the same time this method dramatically reduces the work required (Cooper, 1992, p.361ff). 
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c) Process-oriented Standard Direct Cost Accounting 
 
In general, management is based on both present and future considerations. Full cost 
accounting systems such as ABC are not suitable for planning and short-term steering 
purposes in financial conglomerates, as they are based on historical data. The use of 
planned or standard costs within a future oriented system is thus essential. It is in this 
context that the concept of process-oriented standard direct cost accounting (PSDC) 
arises (Bohnenkamp, 1995). Through the derivation of specific budget values for 
activities, it is particularly useful for the implementation of planning and budgeting on a 
cost-driver basis. The primary objective of PSDC is to gather and quantify all business 
processes  of the financial conglomerate for cost accounting purposes. These business 
processes are to be understood as a bundle of activities carried out in relation to the 
production or sale of financial products and involving more than one cost centre 
(Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.328ff). A PSDC-system has the following characteristics: 
× The principle of direct cost accounting with standardised units of service 
production makes it possible to establish a hierarchical system for step-by-step 
(direct) cost allocation 
× Calculation of cost items per unit of output on the basis of standard workflows, 
processing times and volume of resources used; and definition of standard cost 
absorption rates on the basis of these quantities 
× Relativisation of individual and general costs considerations and assignment of 
primary production processes to the lowest possible hierarchical levels or to the 
relevant dimensions (customer, product, sales outlet). The process costs are 
thus allocated to each unit of service production on the basis of their origin. 
This permits allocation even without allocation keys. 
 
In order to apply a system of this nature, it is necessary to plan future production of 
services (production processes, volumes, costs and revenues) in detail. The use of 
standard costs provides clear criteria for the calculation of future output. Thus, 
identification of standard costs is a prerequisite for an internal billing system. The 
comparison of target costs with actual costs calculated at the end of the relevant 
planning period also provides significant data for meaningful profitability analysis. 
Before a PSDC system can be implemented, it is necessary to analyse and clarify in 
detail certain issues arising in the context of the origin of costs. Which cost categories 
are incurred in the production of services at what hierarchical levels of the bank, and 
what are the cost drivers. This analysis results in a three-way split of the costs incurred 
(Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.331ff): 
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× Direct standard (process) costs: these costs arise in the context of recurring 
processes. They can be allocated to production processes at the relevant 
hierarchical level of the financial conglomerate as direct (process) costs1 
× Indirect standard costs (overhead): These comprise areas of activity, which are 
not attributable even at the highest level of the cost hierarchy and therefore 
cannot be allocated either to the direct operational service production process 
or to projects. The output generated by these activities cannot be standardised. 
Accordingly, the PSDC system is only partially applicable in this area and 
conventional cost accounting classifications must be used2  
× Residual costs: these arise from the non- or inefficient use of existing capacity 
or from increases in cost levels. As they cannot be allocated to a specific 
source, these costs have to be treated as overhead costs. 
 
The main areas for the application of PSDC as a hierarchically structured variable cost 
accounting system are the identification of standard cost items and thus for the 
calculation of customer, product and business costs. The standard costs worked out in 
this manner are also suitable for use in the institutional control cycle as a planning, 
budgeting and control tool. According to Schüller (2001, p.304ff), the PSDC system can 
be applied to the following: performance benchmark for business results, productivity 
efficiency benchmark, and determination of price of services billed internally. A critical 
approach to the way activities are defined is important here, as the definitions 
themselves may have a decisive influence on the accuracy of the system3. ABC makes 
use of the cost driver principle as the basis for the categorisation of all types of costs, as 
opposed to (process) cost centres. This principle, however, becomes ever more difficult  
to apply as the costs become further removed from the main business activities and it 
becomes less easy to establish a direct relationship between costs and output. In these 
areas, the application of process-oriented cost accounting is no different from “classical” 
cost accounting with regards to quality of allocation. Particularly in the financial 
services industry, the implementation of ABC can be restricted. The main argument for 
this is the (supposedly) large number of non-repetitive activities carried out in the 
production of services. The costs incurred cannot be accurately allocated to cost drivers, 
and this can have significant effects as their number increases. Nevertheless, it may also 
be argued that the extent to which an activity is regarded as repetitive depends primarily 
on how it is defined. The more precise the definition, the less activities are considered 
repetitive. However, if a wider definition is used more activities can be appropriately 
                                                 
1 Schierenbeck (1997, p.335) shows a classification of relevant cost items as a core part of the PSDC system. 
2 These overheads are estimated to represent from 5 to 15% of the total costs of banks (Schierenbeck, 1997, 
p.333). The system becomes a full cost system where these amounts are included in the calculation. 
3 According to Vettiger (1996, p.174), the costs and time required to implement process-oriented systems 
should not be underestimated. In particular, the increasingly dynamic environment (as mentioned earlier) in 
which financial conglomerates operate raises the issue of system design. The system must be quickly 
adaptable to changes in the organisational structure. 
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traced and allocated to services and cost drivers. Because the majority of general costs 
are short or medium-term items (e.g. personnel costs and fixed asset costs), ABC or 
PSDC provides only a minimum of useful management data for product and pricing 
policy decisions (Voegelin, 1999, p.36). Indeed the danger exists that using full costs as 
a basis for negotiating terms and conditions with customers can result in inflexible 
positions. In certain circumstances, this might lead an institution to price itself out of the 
market. These costing methods are thus not valuable as a basis for short-term decisions, 
but rather for tackling long-term issues. Combining these systems, ABC serves as a 
strategic planning and control tool, and PSDC serves for operational control purposes.  
 
3. The financial dimension balanced 
 
a) Introduction to the Balanced Scorecard 
 
The balanced scorecard is a tool, which can be used to translate strategy, be it on 
corporate or on a divisional level, into specific strategic objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 
1996, p.10). It is called balanced as financial measures, discussing past performance are 
complemented by non-financial measures of future performance. It is important to note 
that in using the balanced scorecard in financial services firms the financial measures 
must be risk-adjusted; we arrive then at a Risk Adjusted Balanced Scorecard  
(Schierenbeck & Lister, 2001, p.52). The balanced scorecard takes on the following 
views (as shown in Figure 10): 
× Financial perspective: appropriate financial metrics should be developed; to 
succeed financially, how should we appear to our shareholders? 
× Customer perspective: to achieve, how should we appear to our clients? 
× Internal business process perspective: the most critical processes for achieving 
customer and shareholder objectives are identified. The question: to satisfy our 
shareholders and customers, what business processes must we excel at? 
× Organisational learning and growth perspective: to provide the infrastructure to 
enable objectives in the other three perspectives to be achieved. To achieve our 
vision, how will we sustain our ability to change and improve? Three principal 
categories for exploration are: 1) employee capabilities, 2) information systems 
capabilities, and 3) motivation, empowerment and alignment. 
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Figure 10: Balanced scorecard 
 
b) Workings of the Balanced Scorecard 
 
The balanced scorecard can be seen as a system of ratios, which are connected to each 
other via cause-and-effect relationships (Wiedemann, 2001, p.495ff), supported by the 
controlling function. These relationships show the effect of the change in ratios on other 
ratios and final value. In this way, implementation of strategies can be assessed. By 
choosing ratios, a balance should be struck between objective and subjective ratios, 
external and internal oriented ratios, and ratios which describe the past and the future. 
At the end of the cause-and-effect relationships stands the financial result. The balanced 
scorecard does improve the link between business planning and budgeting.  
 
c) Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard 
 
Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard is done in four steps (Schierenbeck & Lister, 
2001, p.51ff): 1) formulation of vision, strategy and corporate goals, 2) communication 
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of results of step 1, which allows for incentive systems to be aligned, 3) planning of 
goals for parts of the organisations, and 4) control of the realisation of goals 1,2,3. 
 
III. Focus on risk management 
 
1. The core of risk management 
 
a) Introduction to the concept of risk 
 
The last of the tools for value-based banking concerns the risks arising from financial 
conglomerate’s activities. Financial conglomerates accept risks in order to generate 
profits (profit -oriented risk policy). The acceptance of risk is therefore subject to 
profitability concerns on the one hand, while on the other, the financial conglomerate’s 
ability to carry risks must be taken into account as a strict condition on activities. From 
among the many systematic risk typologies, five main risk categories are of importance 
to financial conglomerates (Schierenbeck, 1997c, Zimmermann et al, 1995): 
× Operational risks: these are often termed “people risks” and are defined as risks 
that could arise for the financial services firm as a consequence of voluntary or 
involuntary errors or inappropriate action on the part of staff 
× Systemic risk: this concept embraces hazards affecting the stability of the 
financial system as a whole or raising the spectre of a general breakdown 
× Strategic risks: these are risks related to (erroneous) decisions made by 
management of the financial conglomerate in relation with products, 
acquisitions, investments, et cetera 
× Credit and counterparty risk: these are risks arising as a consequence of 
impairments in the solvency of debtors. These risks are not only significant in 
“traditional” lending but also in relation with derivative business 
× Market risk: this concept includes the risk of losses arising in the positions 
taken by the financial conglomerate due to changes in market prices; the main 
market risks are interest rate, currency and share price risks 
 
These types of risk are not unrelated, but rather interact which each other. That is to say, 
they affect each mutually and can have both cumulative effects as well as cancelling 
                                                 
1 A difficulty looms as it might prove difficult to translate vision into concrete actions, certainly when 
supporting systems and processes are not synchronised to relate to these corporate actions and when too much 
focus is put on single budgets. 
2 The scorecard is not only useful on a corporate level but can be decentralised to the smallest organisational 
unit; the budget is the closing part of the scorecard and is essential for success. 
3 Strategic feedback and learning should be used to test hypotheses and assumptions on which strategies are 
based; this can be achieved by analyses of ratio correlations (e.g. of different dimensions), scenarios based on 
real situations of the past, analyses of success stories, and peer review; this latter step is also useful as a 
system for the early recognition of opportunities and threats. 
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each other out. Compliance with the provis ioning requirements established by the 
regulator is no longer sufficient to control these risks. Therefore, in the context of VBM 
the following definition for risk control applies: the task of risk control is to identify, 
record and assess (particularly with regards to interrelationships) the individual banking 
risks arising at different aggregate business levels, and to influence and manage them 
within the framework of VBM (Voegelin, 1999, p.44). 
 
b) The risk matrix as a tool for risk management 
 
In order for risks to become tangible, Schierenbeck (1997c, p.9) shows a risk matrix 
forming the core of a risk control system (see Figure 11). The risk matrix is formed by 
the risk categories affecting the individual areas of the business, as structured in terms 
of products, regions and customers, and the organisational structure. It may be the case 
that individual risk positions involve more than one risk category1. Using this risk 
matrix structure, management gets to know on what risks the financial services firm 
entered, how high they are, what their structure is and where they are located.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Risk matrix 
                                                 
1 E.g. derivatives positions contain various market and counterparty risks, while variable interest-bearing 
securities are subject to the risk of non-performance and interest rate risks. 
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c) Asset and liability management, and market and credit risk 
 
In Asset & Liability Management (ALM) a common aim in terms of VBM is the 
allocation of internal (risk) capital to the organisational units and activities of the 
financial conglomerate in accordance with economic criteria 1. This enables establishing 
the extent to which the market value of own resources invested by the financial 
conglomerate may fluctuate in response to changes in prevailing market conditions. In 
turn, this means that the risks inherent in individual financial activities or the positions 
taken must be identified and assessed. The concept of value at risk  (VaR) is nowadays 
widely used in the financial services industry to ascertain and value the risks inherent in 
financial positions (i.e. market risk); the actual applied formulations can differ markedly 
though. In general, the VaR is treated as  a measure of the maximum possible change in 
the value of a portfolio of financial instruments within a given likelihood and for a 
specified period and is intended to quantify the potential losses inherent in a portfolio 
within a given likelihood and for a specified period of time. The underlying VaR 
concept2 is based on the following Equation 4 (Paul, 2001, p.156): 
  
 
 
 
 
Equation 4: General formula for Value at Risk 
 
The applicability of VaR is based on a number of assumptions. The chief factor is the 
use of historical data and the simplified approach of basing standard distribution on 
historical distribution when setting parameters for calculating future market trends34. 
VaR recommends itself as a highly practical risk assessment tool, because it enables the 
financial conglomerate management to consider all transactions and positions (whether 
                                                 
1 For an extensive and recent discussion we refer to Paul (2001). 
2 Also in the field of ALM 
3 As a first step, the market values (or appropriate equivalents) of the various assets, liabilities and off-
balance-sheet positions must be determined. The main information regarding balance sh eet positions is 
provided by the MFTP concept. The volatility of the positions is then calculated on the basis of historical data 
(e.g. in the form of variances). The results for these two blocks of data are then applied as multipliers to the 
expected market fluctuations (scenario simulation: e.g. variance/co-variance method, Monte Carlo simulation, 
benchmark scenarios, etc.) at differing levels of confidence. Finally, the financial conglomerate’s overall risk 
position is calculated as the sum of the individual positions. In the course of this process, however, the 
individual interdependences of risks or the expression thereof in the individual positions taken by the bank 
must be taken into consideration. This is done using the correlations between the indiv idual positions 
identified, which is expressed as the diversification effect and has the result that the overall risk position of the 
bank is in fact smaller than the sum of the individual exposures (for a detailed discussion of the diversification 
effect, see Elton & Gruber, 1995). 
4 For further discussion of the VaR-concept we refer to Jorion (1997). 
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on or off the balance sheet) using a single measurement procedure and to quantify the 
overall risk of the institution using simulations, while taking the diversification effect 
into consideration. The quantification of the VaR makes it possible to set aside the 
necessary funds (risk provisions) to cover risks in accordance with criteria set in terms 
of the desired safety margins (level of confidence).  Moreover, these techniques also 
make it possible to calculate the likelihood that risk provisions will need to be applied. 
Credit risk, at a minimum, is the risk of loss due to borrower defaults and is attributed to 
all units with borrower or counterparty exposure (Zaik et al, 1999, p.325). It occurs 
across the entire spectrum of financial institution’s activities and includes loans, debt 
securities, equity investments, on- and off-balance sheet counterparty exposures etc. 
Issues of concern in credit risk management include (McLoy & Lee, 1999, p.84): 1) 
structure of the balance sheet, including relative proportion in different low credit-risk 
assets compared with higher risk assets, 2) breakdown of fixed-income securities by 
type, largest positions, market value and maturity, 3) breakdown of equity securities by 
economic sector, largest exposures, proportion of investment portfolio relating to 
previous underwriting positions, investment strategy, and book value compared to 
market value, 4) credit portfolio broken down by maturity, loan type, collateral, 
customer base, economic sector, size, currency and country, 5) strategic stakes in 
companies and types of benefits and risks posed by these holdings, and 6) extent to 
which political or other interests are able to influence decision making. Credit risk 
management has evolved from credit scoring of individual borrows to sophisticated 
aggregate models of borrowers’ default probabilities and the extent of asset recovery 
(Marshall, 2001, p.24). The measurement of credit risk requires estimates of expected 
loss, unexpected loss, and unexpected loss contribution. The capital level is calculated 
based on the unexpected loss contribution and the coverage level desired1. 
 
2. Understanding operational risk  
 
a) Definition of operational risk 
 
Although there can be many definitions for operational risk, we use the following 
definition: operational risk  is the potential for any disruption in the financial 
conglomerate’s (operational) processes; operational risk can also be seen as a 
quantitative residual, i.e. the variance in net earnings not explained by financial risks 
                                                 
1 The first step is to calculate expected loss, the average losses anticipated from a given credit exposure 
measured on a per annum basis. For individual credits, expected loss is modelled and computed as the product 
of, at a minimum, three variables: default probability, loan equivalency exposure, and severity (Zaik et al, 
1999, p.327). Applications of using VaR and taking account of diversification, i.e. adding a loan to a loan 
portfolio (for a discussion on credit risks in a loan portfolio, we refer to Saunders, 1997), handling unexpected 
losses and credit limits, are CreditMetrics, developed by JP Morgan, Credit Portfolio View developed by 
McKinsey, and Credit Risk+, developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products. 
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such as market and credit risks (Marshall, 2001, p.25ff)1 and includes reputational risk, 
legal enforcement of contracts and claims, leading to long-term damage to the financial 
services firm’s standing2.  
 
b) Causes of operational risk 
 
According to Donahoe (1998, p.99ff) underlying causes of operational risk include 
complacency or a false sense of security, cost, as controlling operational risk can be 
seen as a new activity, difficulties in measuring operational risk, miscommunication 
when using jargon, over-reliance on outside vendors and suppliers, incompatible 
systems, decentralisation which complicates oversight of operational risks, and 
organisation-specific factors. Chorafas (2001, p.16ff) states that operational risks are 
primarily caused by mismanagement, lacking quality of skills and organisational flaws; 
Figure 12 shows this. Reputational risk3 can result from incomplete or false information 
(Sheldon Green, 1992, p.10) and internal problems, particularly mismanagement, 
inadequate preparation or flawed business plans (Chorafas, 2001, p.34). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The four key domains of operational risk 
                                                 
1 For a practitioners guide on operational risk, we refer to Arthur Andersen (1998). 
2 An example is Barclays Bank, which was left with a serious image problem after a series of public relations 
blunders and badly timed announcements in 1999 and 2000. Barclays is now examining how it can better 
integrate reputational risk into the risk management function (Aldred, 2000, p.68ff). 
3 Taking in to account that, generally speaking, physical assets now represent less than 25 percent of a 
company’s net worth, down from 75 percent in 1991, minimising reputational risk has outstripped the 
management of physical risks as the chief concern of UK risk managers (Unsworth, 2001, p.53). 
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c) Impact of operational risk 
 
To show what operational risk can encompass, Table 6 shows some examples. It is clear 
that financial conglomerates should have a philosophy and toolset to deal with 
operational risks pre-emptively. 
 
Institution Activity Year Loss US$ mio 
Daiwa Bank Unauthorised bond trading 1984 - 1995 1,100 
Sumitomo Corp Unauthorised copper trading, fraud, and 
forgery 
1986 - 1996 1,700 
UK life-insurance 
industry  
Pensions mis-selling and non-compliance 1988 - 1994 18,000 
Credit Lyonnais Poor lending control 1980s, 1990s 29,000 
Kidder Peabody Bond trading, lack of internal controls 1994 200 
Morgan Grenfell Misrepresentation 1990s 640 
Barings Inadequate control of futures trading 1995 1,600 
Deutsche Bank 
(Grenfell) 
Investment outside authority 1996 600 
Table 6: Examples and impact of operational risks 
 
Risk tends to decrease value by limiting management’s ability to achieve its objectives. 
Risk management tries to limit this reduction, thereby increasing value, and must be 
organised to facilitate the objectives as show in Table 7 (Marshall, 2001, p.48).  
 
Operational 
objectives 
Business 
objectives 
Risk components Rationale 
Efficiency Cost reduction Expected losses Lower costs 
Change management Growth Unexpected losses Ease of planning; less use of 
external financing 
Internal control Efficient use of 
capital 
Catastrophic losses Decreased likelihood of financial 
distress; satisfying regulatory 
requirements 
Opportunism Revenue increase Upside potential Typically strategic options 
provided by infrastructure 
investments 
Table 7: Integration of objectives for operational risk management 
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3. Management of operational risk 
 
a) The sense of operational risk management 
 
Operational risk management finds its greatest use in preventing loss of expected cash 
flows, rather than reducing the discount rate for those cash flows (Marshall, 2001, 
p.50ff). Discount rates reflect only those risks that are non-diversifiable. If losses cannot 
be controlled internally, the risks can be transferred externally. However, investors can 
nearly always replicate risk transfer directly. This suggests that risk transfer of 
uncontrollable risks has little or no effect on the discount rate. In contrast, most 
controllable losses affected by loss prevention and loss mitigation activities are firm 
specific and therefore not correlated with other firms’ losses. These losses can be 
diversified away by shareholders; therefore, loss control activities too have limited 
effect on a firm’s cost of capital. To conclude, the only operational risks that have an 
effect on the discount rate are those for partially controllable risks for which the only 
other strategy is decreased business levels or business exit. As a result of this activity, 
operational risk management will increasingly influence (the perception of) shareholder 
value creation vis -à-vis risk exposure (Laycock, 1998, p.131). Table 8 shows some 
examples of risk factors (Marshall, 2001, p.85). 
 
Controllable Partial controllable Uncontrollable 
Product development Operating leverage1 Market volatility 
Processing speed Loss of key staff Economic performance 
Number and variety of distribution 
channels 
Product complexity Competitive position 
Volume and diversity of business Infrastructure development Regulation 
Risk policies Operation size Customer demand 
Process errors Level of automated 
processing 
Natural disasters 
Quality of customer service   Power outages 
Table 8: Examples of risk factors 
 
Managing expected losses is the easiest to justify since these directly affect the 
profitability, and hence the value of the firm to shareholders. Subtler is the management 
of variance, or unexpected losses. Usually, most managers are naturally averse to 
outcome variance. But financial conglome rates are ambivalent. On the one hand, these 
                                                 
1 To what extent revenue fluctuations match expense fluctuations, depending on the asset base relative to 
operating expense. 
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firms are in the business of taking on and managing risks. It is only through such risks 
that firms can obtain their required returns. On the other hand, there are good reasons 
for stakeholders to fear variance in outcomes. Shareholders can hold diversified 
portfolios that remove much of the non-systematic risk faced by firms. Marshall (2001, 
p.49ff) notes that, portfolio diversification by shareholders and firm risk management 
are naturally such close substitutes that it makes sense to ask which has the lower cost. 
The marginal cost of diversification through the stock market is very low compared with 
risk management. So, the extent to which we should involve ourselves in risk 
management diminishes with the ability of shareholders to reduce risk on their own. 
Nonetheless, risk management of both those risks that managers can control through 
prevention and mitigation and those that they cannot control directly (only through risk 
transfer and financing) can still add value to shareholders. For controllable risks, risk 
management is assumed to be a competitive necessity. Firms have different reasons to 
manage the uncontrollable portion of their unexpected losses and risks: 1) business 
planning of financing and investments is made easier without fears of uncontrollable 
risks, 2) for firms facing convex tax schedules1, minimizing variance in the firm’s pre-
tax income decreases tax payments, 3) risk management may reduce the expected costs 
of financing losses because external funding activities are more expensive than internal 
funding activities by better aligning investment sources of internal capital with projected 
uses of capital, 4) risk management might change the level of systematic risk by 
positioning the financial conglomerate’s risk profile to be more in keeping with investor 
demands, 5) risk management reduces the likelihood of financial distress, 5) risk 
management allows the increased use of debt financing, which in turn creates interest 
tax shields, supporting shareholder value creation, and 6) regulators may require certain 
levels of risk management through particular risk-based capital levels, which can be 
used to justify managing catastrophic losses. 
 
b) Guidelines for operational risk management 
 
As we have seen in paragraph 1.A.I.1.c, much of the impetus for operational risk 
management has come from industry groups. We mention four types of qualitative 
guidelines (Marshall, 2001, p.35). Industry guidelines for good operations practices in 
the financial services industry: these include the separation of front-office from back-
office operations, independent risk management reporting to senior management, 
periodic and effective audits, quality information systems, and risk integration across 
the firm; a major challenge remains the reliance on a variety of systems across a number 
of different business lines for valuation, processing, settlement, accounting, and risk 
management.  Guidelines for internal control: on operational risk, already in 1992, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 
                                                 
1 I.e. an increasing marginal rate of taxation. 
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in: Marshall, 2001, p.37) issued a report focusing on internal control and corporate 
governance. It said that internal control must incorporate the following elements: 
process-based risk assessment: a set of techniques to identify, measure, analyse, and 
manage the risks related to various activities, sound control environment: the culture, 
values, and resources available within an organisation must be risk aware, robust control 
activities: carrying out policies and procedures to secure objectives, effective 
information and communication: systems to capture and exchange the information 
required for effective operations, and ongoing monitoring: the means to monitor 
operations to enable flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions. Process and 
resource quality guidelines: quality management has become an important topic in 
financial services. One of its leading advocates, the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), has defined it as a management approach of an organisation centred 
on quality, based on the participation of all its members and aiming at long-term success 
through customer satisfaction, and benefits to all members of the organisation and to 
society (Juran, 1999). The ISO-standards require features that should be present in the 
management system; the requirements can be summarised as a control loop of effective 
goal-setting and resource allocation, implementation, maintenance and record keeping, 
performance assessment, and learning.  
 
According to Marshall (2001, p.38), quantitative measures for operational risks are still 
not as advanced as those for market and credit risk. Regulatory capital requirements: it 
is precisely the drive toward regulatory capital requirements based on assessments of 
financial conglomerates’ market and credit exposures that is prompting many 
operational risk assessments. While regulators have traditionally focused on audits and 
measuring certain ratios1, they increasingly look to limit institutional guarantees and 
accurately estimate capital adequacy measures as a proxy for institutional solvency. The 
required level of risk capital is determined by the nature of the catastrophic risks 
associated with the various assets, liabilities, and operations of the financial 
conglomerate and the acceptable probability of insolvency2. Further, guiding principles 
for operational risk management are (Crouhy et al, 1998, p.51): objectivity: risk 
measures using standard criteria; consistency: same risk profiles result  in same reported 
risk, relevance: reported risk is actionable, transparency and completeness: all material 
risks are identified, captured and reported, and group-wide approach: risk should be 
aggregated across entire organisation. Senior management may not fully understand the 
hidden risks involved in many new services. Operational risk is often managed on an ad 
hoc basis, and financial conglomerates can suffer from a lack of coordination among 
functions such as risk management, internal audit, and business management (Crouhy et 
                                                 
1 Such as financial conglomerate’ liquidity ratio of short-term assets to liabilities and interest margin. 
2 Marshall (2001, p.75) notes that after a major disaster 40 percent of organisations go out of business within 
one year; 43 percent never reopen, and 29 percent go under within two years. 
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al, 1998, p.47). Operational risk managers should actively investigate new products and 
service proposals for hidden risks. They should also lead the development of 
management and control solutions and policies to minimise unnecessary risk. A 
corporate operational risk model may create the false impression that the head of 
operational risk is responsible for managing operational risk throughout the financial 
conglomerate. Actually, operational risk originates at a micro level and should be 
managed on a decentralised basis (Aerts, 2001, p.55). Responsibilities for implementing 
guidelines for operational risk management can be distributed as shown in Table 9 
(Chorafas, 2001, p.92).  
 
Hierarchical level in the firm Main activities 
Senior management Determines risk control goals 
  Differentiates between major/minor events 
  Sets limits to operational risk 
  Takes top level corrective action 
Central operational control Follows up on goals and limits 
  Analyses the causes of operational risks 
  Records and reports deviations 
  Takes command and control level corrective action 
Decentral operational control Assures compliance with senior management directives 
  Keeps accurate, detailed record of major operational risks 
  Treats statistically minor operational risks 
  Takes local level corrective action 
Table 9: Responsibilities for operational risk control 
 
c) Operational risk factors 
 
Quantities influencing and determining operational risk are called operational risk 
factors. Risk factors can be specified by three elements (Marshall, 2001, p.65): 1) the 
factor’s probability during a defined time period, 2) the factor’s direct impacts on the 
target variables such as cash flows, net come or asset values, and 3) the factor’s indirect 
impact on the frequency or mean impact of loss events during some time period. For 
financial conglomerates the factors as show in Table 10 are regarded as most important 
(Marshall, 2001, p.314). It is striking that operational risk seems to be more of a 
management task than an accounting task. Indeed, an overemphasis on the quantitative 
measurement of operational risks may be dangerous to firms without good management 
and staff or well-designed processes because it may lull them into a false sense of 
security and lead to unnecessary risk taking. Ultimately, the main defence against 
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operational risks must be governance: management and staff who are knowledgeable 
about the risks and the good processes and systems that embody that knowledge. 
 
Type of risk 
factor 
Risk factor Risk management approach 
Design and 
complexity factors 
Organisation 
Technology, products and 
processes 
Organisational design 
Reengineering 
  Divergent goals and 
constituencies 
Alignment of activities 
Individual 
behaviour factors 
Competence 
Honesty 
Selection, training 
Culture, personnel selection, incentive system, 
fraud detection, shift rotation, boundary 
systems 
  Motivation Culture, boundary systems, incentives, 
warnings 
Cultural factors Organisational culture and 
administration 
Culture, aligned incentives, boundary systems, 
audit, policies 
  Leadership Change in leadership, training, personnel 
selection 
  Morale and communication Work and job restructuring, job enlargement, 
communication processes and tools 
Change and 
volatility factors 
Industry/environment Business and market intelligence, 
organisational learning and knowledge 
management 
  Organisation/operations Project risk management, change management 
  Technology  Redundant design, modularity and flexible 
open systems 
Economic and 
financial factors 
Revenue sensitivity Operating 
leverage 
Diversification 
Contractual risk transfer 
  Financial leverage Financial restructuring 
  Transaction exposures Derivates for hedging 
Table 10: Risk factors and risk management approaches 
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PART 2: DISCUSSION OF THE CORPORATE CENTRE 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the main governance body of the financial conglomerate: 
the corporate centre. Not only will we discuss central themes such as (de-) 
centralisation, coordination, and influence, we will also touch upon roles, functions, 
contribution, staffing, managerial issues and economics of the corporate centre. In 
assessing the effectiveness of the corporate centre, Campbell & Goold (1998) made a 
distinction in terms of management style, which will be dealt with in paragraph 2.B.II.1, 
but which does relate to topics in paragraph 2.A. The literature is quite dispersed and we 
try to reach a comprehensive overview in which we try to recognise patterns in theories. 
Further, together with part 1, it will from the basis for the integrated corporate centre 
concept for financial conglomerates, as presented in part 3. 
 
A. The nature of the corporate centre  
 
I. Decentralisation, coordination and influence 
 
1. Decentralisation characterised 
 
a) Characteristics of decentralisation 
 
In the literature, and also in practice, quite some attention is given to the subject of 
decentralisation and centralisation. As we discuss corporate level management, we will 
limit the discussion to decision making. As decentralisation and centralisation are 
complementary concepts, we will often talk about decentralisation, thereby also 
implying effects on centralisation. In his comprehensive study, Bassen (1998) suggests 
to look at decentralisation using three characteristics (Bassen, 1998, p.31):  
× Content: distribution of the decision competence and activities in the firm 
× Direction: here we can distinguish between the vertical decentralisation where 
part of a decision or an activity is being performed on a lower hierarchical 
level, and the horizontal decentralisation where focus is placed on functions, 
markets, products etc. 
× Dynamic perspectives: here we can distinguish between a static perspective 
where a decentralisation is fixed in an organisation, and a dynamic perspective 
where decentralisation changes on a continuous basis. 
 
These characteristics will come back when we discuss models for decentralisation of 
decision-making.  
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b) Goals of decentralisation 
 
In decentralisation of decision making the following goals are recognised (Bassen, 
1998, p.47ff): flexibility for the divisions, increased transparency within the group, 
increasing innovativeness of the divisions, increase of the motivation of division 
managers, and ease of separating or integrating certain  parts of the business. In pursuing 
these goals, autonomy costs arise, as the goal of integration, or acting as a group, is 
harder to reach. The causes for these costs are dependencies between divisions and the 
corporate centre. From Figure 13 (Bassen, 1998, p.53ff), it becomes clear that pursuing 
the goals of integration and autonomy at the same time produces a clash. When we 
choose to fully decentralise, we introduce opportunity costs as we miss out on the 
integration advantages, whereas when we choose to fully centralise we miss out on the 
autonomy advantages and introduce opportunity costs on that side. Therefore, any (part 
of) corporate centre should consider where it needs to be positioned on that continuum; 
this should not necessarily be in the middle . The level of influence the (part of the) 
corporate centre has to assume, determines the position on this continuum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Goals of the (de-) centralisation of functions and corporate centre statuses  
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Figure 14: Complexity, dynamics and the status on the decentralisation continuum 
 
c) Five statuses for the corporate centre 
 
Based on Bassen (1998, p.71ff) we develop a model for (parts of) the corporate centre, 
which identifies five statuses on the continuum (see also Figure 13 on page 70): 1) core 
status: both decisions and activities are performed in the corporate centre; this also 
means that no other part of the organisation is involved and that the function is uniquely 
placed in the corporate centre; there is full centralisation, 2) policy status: decisions are 
taken in the corporate centre, but implementation is done in the divisions (with or 
without support of the corporate centre),  3) matrix status: functions are performed both 
in the corporate centre and in the divisions; decisions are reached through discussions in 
especially formed committees; the committees will determine where activities will take 
place, 4) service status: decisions are taken in the divisions and the corporate centre 
executes; the impact on the corporate centre can be further increased when external 
suppliers participate on service delivery or when external benchmarking is performed, 
and 5) autarchy status: decision and implementation i.e. complete functions are fully 
decentralised and no corporate centre function is present. Which status is appropriate in 
which situation depends on the complexity of and the dynamics in the environment in 
which the company operates and, as a result, of the chosen governance model and 
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management style of the corporate centre. This is done by (market) information 
processing by the divisions, which then inform the corporate centre. If we use these two 
dimensions, complexity and dynamics, then we come to the following grid (see also 
Figure 14): 1) static and low complexity: corporate centre functions best performed 
using the policy status , 2) dynamic and low complexity: corporate centre functions best 
performed using the core status, 3) static and high complexity: corporate centre 
functions best performed using the matrix status, and 4 ) dynamic and high complexity: 
corporate centre functions best performed using the service and autarchy status. 
 
2. Instruments of coordination 
 
a) Characterisation of coordination instruments 
 
Decentralisation cannot function without coordination. Coordination is done to (try to) 
undo the negative effects of decentralisation. We can distinguish between vertical and 
horizontal coordination (Bassen, 1998, p.94ff). Vertical coordination deals with 
decision and implementation activity as divided between hierarchical levels. Insofar the 
corporate centre has authority over the divisions, vertical coordination is an issue. 
Horizontal coordination takes place when decision and implementation is distributed 
over different departments, which do not relate to each other in a hierarchical manner. 
This concept of coordination initially takes place on the level of simple (one-way) 
transactions but can be juxtaposed on departments, organizational units and at the firm 
at large. For this study we will use the definition of Bassen (1998, p.99): coordination is 
implemented with the use of special instruments which manage the interdependencies 
between decisions and implementation in existing organisational units directed to 
fulfilling the firm’s goals. Using different coordination instruments can support the 
goals for centralisation or decentralisation, and may limit the divisions in their decision-
making powers. Bühner (1996) sees examples of instruments as depicted in Table 11. 
 
Technocratic Structural  Personal  
Legal and contractual 
arrangements such as 
participations and contracts 
Central services Executive board members with different 
functions in the board at the same time 
Group controlling Committees Executive board members with a function 
in the Board of Directors 
Central treasury Project groups  
Transfer prices   
Table 11: Management instruments of executive board members 
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Going into further detail, different levels of coordination can be reached by using the 
following indirect and direct1 instruments: company (sub) culture, role standardisation, 
self-management, plans, programmes, and personal instruction. These instruments can 
be positioned along the continuum of centralis ation and decentralisation as show in 
Figure 15 (based on Bassen, 1998, p.132). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Positioning of coordination instruments 
 
b) Instruments for different degrees of (de-) centralisation 
 
Personal instruction: this  is the instrument with the strongest coordinating impact and 
can have effect on both processes and output. It is only one authority, which coordinates 
with instructions. A hierarchy of decision-making authorities is a precondition. The 
coordinating effect of personal instruction on decentralisation is limited. Anticipating 
interdependencies and activities in advance, together with information dispersion will 
lead to high costs for integration. Personal instruction also might have a negative 
motivational impact. Decisions and activities can be implemented ad hoc, leading to 
flexibility in reaching goals. At the same time, when changes are needed, it is difficult 
to get them implemented, as they first have to travel up the hierarchy. If and when 
interdependencies and scale and scope economies are accounted for at the initiation of 
personal instruction, there is less need for coordination in a later stage, thereby serving 
centralisation well. Also, there will be no obscurity about direction and goals. 
 
Programs: here we mean that processes are prescribed on how tasks should be 
performed. This leads to standardisation and a pre-coordination. These processes can be 
between and within organisational units. Programs might entail alternative processes, in 
case of changing conditions, or can be rigid. Programs coordinate because of the 
                                                 
1 Indirect: not yielding immediate change; direct: at the disposition of management. 
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detailed uniform approach to activities. The corporate centre defines these programs. 
Programs do not really support coordination in decentralisation, as the detailed 
standardisation and top-down approach can lead to lower motivation with employees. 
Also using programs does not increase flexibility. At the other end, centralisation is well 
served by programs. Horizontal interdependencies are decreased and coordination 
efforts are less needed. Also one can expect a more efficient resource allocation. 
 
Plans: here we mean the results of planning processes, which are directed towards 
group goals and which are time-bound. Also, although in- and outputs might be 
described, the way on how to reach the results is not part of a plan. Plans can contain 
transfer prices, goals and budgets, which all have a coordinating impact. Hierarchy 
between organisational parts becomes less pronounced as all participating units know 
they are measured on their contribution to the realization of the plan. Goals, derived 
from corporate strategy, picture the future and as such coordinate efforts. Budgets show 
operational room to manoeuvre in monetary terms. Already in the production of a plan 
coordination takes place. Partial plans will need coordination and therefore will produce 
coordination costs. At the same time, as this does not happen too often, it might be that 
these costs are low and result in a continued period in which no coordination is needed 
and the plan can function as reference. Because plans do not specify processes, plans 
maintain flexibility when the environment changes1. Plans can also be used for 
centralisation. Reflecting corporate plans and knowing the output, the horizontal 
dependencies are automatically taken care of. 
 
Self-management: here we mean that departments are empowered to coordinate among 
themselves thereby excluding the need for vertical coordination. This also means that 
only horizontal coordination takes place. In practice and in larger organisations, this 
does not happen, as it is too complex; however, this is possible in small organisations. 
Self-management can therefore only be used for specific and selected issues and not for 
complete (parts of) corporate centres as such. Self-management can be used for 
processes and results, and to lower vertical coordination costs and may introduce 
compromises, which, in itself, may not fully serve (de-)centralisation to the fullest. 
 
Role standardisation: here we mean that by experience or training, certain functions get 
standardised which lowers the need for coordination. This can be true for both results 
and processes. Again, this can be especially useful for decentralisation and we expect 
higher flexibility in changing circumstances. Similar to company culture, the need to 
coordinate via this tool is less, and therefore the use of this tool in centralising does not 
support coordination as much as it does with decentralising.  
 
                                                 
1 But only insofar that these changes do not have impact on resetting of inputs and outputs.  
Part 2: Discussion of the Corporate Centre  
75 
Company (sub) culture: here we mean the shared values in (different parts of) the 
corporate centre: what is seen as accepted behaviour, the preference for certain (type) 
goals, the relationship between people and the business environment. These are shared 
by all employees1. Company culture can be used as a tool insofar this  can be influenced. 
When a company (sub) culture is strongly present, one can expect a strong coordinating 
impact. Especially decentralisation can be supported by company culture; when 
decentralised units share the same culture, then the corporate centre needs to coordinate 
less. Company (sub) culture is less useful in the case of centralisation, as the need for 
coordination is less when functions are centralised, and therefore having a strong 
company (sub) culture, useful for other goals, does not support coordination greatly.  
 
c) Concluding remarks on coordination instruments 
 
The use of coordination instruments is affected by developments in the business 
environment, such as internationalisation, size of the organisation and technological 
developments. Here also we can use the dimensions of complexity and dynamics. 
Mintzberg (in Bassen, 1998, p.134ff) formulated the relationships as follows: 1) when 
the environment becomes more dynamic, the structure will become less bureaucratic, 
and 2) when the environment becomes more complex, the structure will be more 
decentralised. Combining these insights with the coordination instruments, this leads to 
the use of instruments in situations of different complexity and dynamics, as depicted in 
Figure 16. When we see corporate centre’ activities as parts of processes aimed at a 
larger corporate result, then these activities by itself also influence coordination We can 
distinguish between known and unknown, new processes, and measurable, quantifiable 
and non-measurable output. Using the coordination instruments from Figure 16, we 
come to the relationship between output and coordination instruments, as shown in 
Figure 17. Combining corporate centre’ output and process dimensions,  and the 
environmental complexity and dynamics, we can make a detailed positioning of the 
coordination instruments. This is shown in Figure 18 (based on Bassen, 1998, p.144). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the company at large or an organisational unit. 
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Figure 16: Coordination instruments and 
environmental complexity and 
dynamics 
Figure 17: Corporate centre’ output and process 
dimensions  and five corresponding 
coordination instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Placing of corporate centre' coordination instruments 
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3. Influence of the corporate centre in the group 
 
a) The actual level of influence 
 
In conjunction with issues of decentralisation and coordination stands the issue of 
influence of the corporate centre. Influence can be seen as the result of decisions of 
design and implementation of decentralisation. Although corporate management has 
overall responsibility of the group, corporate managers in Europe tend to believe that 
importance for the success of the businesses is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
justification for corporate centre’ involvement (Young et al, 2000, p.29ff). Influence 
tends to be highest in the general planning areas1. Influence tends to be lower in the 
functional areas2. Table 12 shows to what extent the corporate centre has influence over 
divisions (based on Young et al, 2000 p.30, own calculations3). Functional influences 
are linked to the relatedness of the business divisions in the company. Higher functional 
influence is associated with greater likelihood that functions will be included within the 
corporate centre and greater centralisation of functional staff. Companies with greater 
diversity tend to have more decentralised decision-making. The table implies that 
companies make decisions on decentralisation and coordination resulting in the shown 
level of influence. The corporate centre influences decisions affecting business 
divisions, but the areas and the extent to which they do this vary from company to 
company. The mix in a particular company generally reflects both the nature of the 
business being managed, and the skills, preferences and background of the senior 
managers within the corporate centre, including their beliefs about how value can be 
added to the business divisions (Young et al, 2000, p.60). 
 
General planning influences (in %) Europe USA Japan 
  Setting of budgets and financial targets 71 83 73 
  Major capital investments 75 87 70 
  Business strategy/new business creation 79 73 67 
General influence score 76 81 70 
    
                                                 
1 Setting of budgets and financial targets, major capital investments, strategy and new business creation. 
2 Human resources, research and development, marketing etc. 
3 100% would mean maximal influence, 0% minimal influence. 
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Functional influences (in %) Europe USA Japan 
  Human resources 48 53 67 
  Research and development 38 53 53 
  Marketing 30 37 47 
  Purchasing/logistics 29 47 37 
  Property management 46 N/A 73 
  Information technology  55 70 70 
Functional influence score 40 53 55 
Table 12: Corporate centre' influence over divisions 
 
Take the example of product development of Figure 19: if there are few overlaps in 
production processes between divisions, then three quarters of corporate centres feel 
constrained to exert minimal influence over product development decisions1 (Young, 
1998, p.935). However, if there is a high level of similarity then there is more freedom. 
In another example, Figure 20 shows that in UK companies in which the corporate 
centre had a minimal influence upon human resource decisions, over 60 percent did not 
have a corporate human resource function (Young & Goold, 1999, p.29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Corporate centre influence on product development 
                                                 
1 This research was done in manufacturing industry: it is a proxy for the financial services industry. 
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Figure 20: Centralisation Human Resource staff activity 
 
b) The right level of influence 
 
Of course, striking the right balance of influence, i.e. fine tuning decentralisation and 
coordination is problematic. High levels of influence in combination with a very diverse 
portfolio could indicate either that the company is too centralised in its decision-
making, or that the portfolio is insufficiently focused. This lack of focus might arise in a 
financial conglomerate, which from this logic would call for a lower level of influence 
by the corporate centre. On the other hand, low levels of influence in combination with 
a focused portfolio could indicate that the company is missing opportunities to add 
value. Therefore, there must be a continuous test if the influence exercised is 
appropriate and effective. Feedback should continuously fine tune decentralisation and 
coordination policies. Equilibrium though will be hard to reach, especially when 
operating in a dynamic environment. Schulman et al (1999, p.33) supports this notion as 
they state that centralisation versus decentralisation is a false dichotomy, as neither of 
these models work in an environment of global competition and instant communication. 
Companies decentralised because centralisation led to a monolithic and insensitive 
corporate culture with little regard for customer needs. Decentralisation though led to 
the need to create duplicate infrastructures to conduct support functions.  
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c) The impact of influence on staffing 
 
Although we will discuss staffing in paragraph 2.B.II.3, influence impacts staffing and 
costs. In general, we can see that companies with higher influence corporate centre 
functions are more likely to centralise functional staff and so have larger corporate 
centres. This becomes clear from Figure 21 (based on Young et al, 2000, p.61): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Functional influence of the corporate centre vs. staffing 
 
One tool to deal with ambiguity in corporate centre influence is the use of focused 
committees: units which operate on a non-permanent basis; members come from 
different divisions. Activities can include information exchange, coordination, advising 
and decision-making (Hungenberg, 1995, p.266). 
 
II. Types and roles of the corporate centre 
 
1. Core of the existence of the corporate centre 
 
a) Two corporate centre’ models  
 
There are two different types of corporate centres: separate and embedded corporate 
centres. The latter type is integrated in the main division and is most common when the 
company comprises either a single division, or a dominant business together with a few 
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minor divisions (Young et al, 2000, p.18). If the minor divisions develop into more 
major operations, such companies tend to the separate corporate centre form. In this 
study we focus on the separate corporate centre. Although the corporate centre consists 
of the collection of central services, this does not imply all central services should take 
place in the corporate centre. Hungenberg (1995, p.257ff) calls this the distinction 
between mono- and polycentric management structures. As companies deal with 
globalisation, we recognise that companies can optimise their centralised services by 
positioning them in divisions, which, based on qualifications, regional or functional 
considerations, are best place for those activities. This means that operational corporate 
centre functions are distributed over more operational corporate centres1. 
 
b) Focus on the strategic role of the corporate centre 
 
From a strategic viewpoint, we can also assume that the corporate centre is primarily 
there to help develop and help implement the overall corporate strategy. Without this 
alignment the reason for existence of the corporate centre can be questioned and the 
business model as such requires reconsideration. In bringing value to divisions the 
corporate centre can take on different roles2. Van Oijen & Douma (2000, p.560ff), 
defining a role as an instrument the corporate centre can use to manage its divisions, 
note that choosing the correct role or roles is essential for firm performance. Both in the 
literature and in practice quite some attention is given to these roles, although few 
authors explore the necessary detail. The role of the corporate centre is effective if the 
extent and intensity of business coordination reflect the potential value contribution. In 
changing circumstances, strategies change and the extent to which (parts of) the 
corporate centre plays a specific role varies. One aspect of this, the relation between the 
corporate centre and the extent of the diversification of the company, has been 
researched by Van Oijen & Douma (2000) and Van Oijen (1997)3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 One approach is where this can take on a regional character (lead country principle). Bartlett & Ghoshal 
(1998) and also Suckfüll (1994) came up with the notion of the integrated network organisation. Here parts of 
the corporate centre are distributed over the company with one of those parts playing the leading role.  Main 
goal is to reduce the resources needed for fulfilling the task, by using underutilised resources elsewhere. More 
attention though will have to be paid to matters of integration. 
2 Canals (1998, p.626) distinguishes between managing, coordinating, and advising, but leaves unexplored. 
3 Research: 67 Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock exchange (Van Oijen & Douma, 2000, p.565). 
Part 2: Discussion of the Corporate Centre  
82 
As diversification increases, the corporate centre will1: High 
performing 
companies 
Low 
performance 
companies 
Be less involved in strategic planning for the BUs Confirmed X 
Rely more on financial criteria then a combination of 
strategic and financial criteria for evaluating the BUs 
Confirmed X 
Be less involved in selection of BU-personnel Confirmed More  
Organise less rotation of personnel between the BUs X More  
Use a more financial motivation for the BU-managers Confirmed More2 
Use fewer instruments for BU-coordination X X 
Offer fewer centralised services for BU-support  Confirmed X 
Table 13: Influence of diversification on the corporate centre 
 
In firms with high financial performance, corporate centres adjust roles in planning, 
evaluation, selection, motivation, and support3. 
 
2. Corporate centre roles further examined 
 
a) Roles according to Hungenberg 
 
Hungenberg (1993, p.67ff) sees three management roles with differing intensity of 
coordination: 1) an operational holding is an effective role for the corporate centre if 
intensive influence and cross-business coordination can add substantially to the 
divisions values. In this case, the corporate centre is intensively engaged in decision-
making processes at division level (1:1 influence). Additionally, cross-business 
coordination and synergy exploitation are main tasks of the corporate centre. The 
corporate centre controls strategic management and to a large extent also operational 
management of divisions. Operational holdings can be effective due to potential 
synergies and similar business systems of various divisions, 2) a financial holding, 
where the holding is directly involved in the strategic management of businesses by 
determining financial goals and staffing top management positions, can be effective if 
the potential for value enhancement through intensive 1:1-influence and cross-business 
coordination is small. This description frequently applies to diversified companies 
controlling heterogeneous divisions., and 3) a management holding ranges between an 
operational and a financial holding in terms of potential value contribution and intensity 
                                                 
1 X means no statistically significant relationship found. 
2 strategically oriented 
3 The high performing firms, therefore, do not distinguish themselves from the low performers by being more 
or less diversified or more or less decentralised: the high performers have a better fit between their 
diversification strategy and the roles their corporate centre performs (Van Oijen & Douma, 2000, p.568). 
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of coordination. A management holding does not interfere with operational management 
of divisions, but controls strategic management tasks, involving the divisions’ 
management to some extent. A management holding is appropriate where divisions 
require similar managerial skills, and where advantages  of shared business systems can 
be exploited. Later, Hungenberg (1995) tries to make the notion of roles more tangible 
when he defines the roles for the corporate centre as follows (see also Figure 22): 
Conductor: here the corporate centre takes on all essential tasks with respect to 
divisional strategies. Characteristically, the corporate centre acts as a conductor and 
directs the individual player and the orchestra as a whole; Coach: here the corporate 
centre and the divisions jointly develop and agree on divisional strategies. 
Characteristically, the corporate centre acts as a coach who assesses performance 
potential of individual players and stimulates them, while at the same time he tries to 
enhance and develop the team play, without participating in the games himself; 
Investor: here the corporate centre takes on no influence with respect to the content of 
the divisional strategies. The divisions are autonomous and independent. 
Characteristically, the corporate centre acts as an investor who chooses the composition 
of his portfolio and the individual investments, which he judges on financial criteria 
only and which can be traded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Corporate centre roles according to Hungenberg 
Investor
Coach
ConductorManagement by
corporate centre
Joint
management
Management
by divisions
No
formulation
Joint
formulation
Central
formulation
Supradivisional functional
and regional strategies
D
iv
isi
on
al
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s
Part 2: Discussion of the Corporate Centre  
84 
b) Roles according to Young et al and Goold et al 
 
According to Pettifer (1998a), the basic role of the corporate centre is to assist corporate 
management in the execution of obligations, where the corporate centre ought to match 
management style. According to Young et al (2000, p.9ff), the corporate centre can 
have three different roles (see table 14): the minimum corporate parent role, which 
enables the company to exist as a single legal entity, the influencing and policy-making 
role, which aims to add value to the businesses, and the service provision role, which 
concerns activities which are needed by the business operations, but which are believed 
to be provided most effectively by the corporate centre; the divisions typically have 
some degree of control. In close connection, Goold et al (2001, p.84) distinguish 
between three distinct roles as well (see table 15): the minimum corporate parent , the 
value-added parent and the shared service centre. The first role, called the minimum 
corporate parent role, involves discharging the legal and regulatory obligations of the 
corporation and meeting minimum standards of due diligence in corporate governance. 
 
Role Examples Characteristics 
Minimum 
corporate 
parent 
Raising capital, basic control over 
business operations, meeting obligations 
to investors, submitting tax returns, 
complying with legal requirements for 
compiling and publishing accounts 
Essential 
Not easily devolved to divisions 
Influencing 
and policy 
making 
Strategic guidance, devising, 
implementing and policing group-wide 
policies and standards, setting 
performance targets and monitoring 
progress towards achievement, providing 
expert advice and assistance on selected 
topics 
Discretionary 
Believed by corporate managers 
to add value to the business 
divisions 
Service 
provision 
Information systems, payroll, training Needed by divisions 
Could be devolved or 
outsourced 
Centralisation believed to 
provide economies of scale, 
scope or specialisation 
Table 14: Corporate centre roles according to Young et al 
The obligations mentioned are unavoidable and can include preparing annual reports, 
submitting tax returns, and ensuring that legislation is observed. Also, the corporate 
parent must establish a structure for the company, appoint senior management, raise 
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capital, handle investor relations, and implement control processes for major decisions 
and checks on performance. The second role, called value-added parenting, is about 
how the corporate parent influences and adds value1 to the divisions. It is therefore 
closely related to the company’s corporate strategy. Since the corporate strategy for 
adding value differs from company to company, the appropriate level and nature of staff 
groups in this role is bound to differ. This means that benchmarking of the staff size and 
cost can be misleading. The third  role, called shared services, is about providing 
centralised services to the divisions. These services may be standard activities, or they 
may be more complex services. The divisions normally have some control over the 
work done at the corporate centre. 
 
Role Examples Characteristics 
Minimum 
corporate 
parent 
Raising finance. Basic control, 
compiling and publishing accounts, 
submitting tax returns 
Essential 
Not easily devolved to divisions 
Value-
added 
parenting 
Strategic guidance, stretching 
targets, leveraging corporate 
resources, facilitating synergies 
Discretionary 
Believed by corporate managers to add 
value to the divisions 
Shared 
services 
Information systems, payroll, 
training, transaction processing 
Needed by divisions 
Could be devolved or outsourced 
Centralisation believed to provide 
economies of scale, scope or specialisation 
Table 15: Corporate centre roles according to Goold et al 
 
c) Roles according to Van Oijen & Douma 
 
More operationally, Van Oijen & Douma (2000, p.562ff) distinguish seven roles: 
1. Planning: the degree of involvement is influenced by a firm’s diversification 
strategy: when diversity is lower, corporate centre involvement is higher 
2. Evaluation: assessing divisions’ investment proposals and results and 
allocating resources 
3. Selection: appointing personnel of the divisions so as to ensure that key 
positions are held by cooperative people who have an affinity with the firm’s 
overall goals 2 
                                                 
1 Management might prefer their activity to be classified as value adding rather than core or shared services as 
they feel that that improves their status, provides security during reorganisat ions, improves relationships with 
business units, and emphasises the entrepreneurial character of their activities (Jagersma, 2000). 
2 In case of present potential i.e. limited diversification. 
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4. Rotation: organising rotation of personnel between divisions, which facilitates 
the exchange of resources between divisions and reduces cultural differences 
5. Motivation: providing division managers with incentives based on the level of 
diversity and the performance of the individual division and the group 
6. Coordination: installing mechanisms that encourage interdivisional 
cooperation1 
7. Support: performing services for the divisions where firms with less 
diversification have opportunity to centralise functions efficiently.  
 
These roles are being spread over the role classifications of Hungenberg and Young et 
al and Goold et al and can be valid throughout the corporate centre. 
 
III. Contribution of the corporate centre 
 
1. Propositions according to Pettifer 
 
When the corporate centre is successful in their activities value can be created. At the 
same time the corporate centre should have opportunities to operate. These 
opportunities arise from imperfect conditions. Pettifer calls these opportunities 
propositions. Five types of propositions are distinguished (Pettifer, 1998a): 1) build 
propositions: which are about helping a business to grow substantially bigger, to 
improve positioning, to move into new markets or products, to make large acquisitions 
or merge, 2) stretch propositions: these are about supporting business to become leaner 
or more professional, 3) link propositions: these concern the corporate centre as 
facilitator to help businesses link to create synergy2, 4) leverage proposition: corporate 
centres often possess valuable resources and assets that can be leveraged across 
businesses3, and 5) portfolio development proposition: buying, selling and business 
start-ups provide further opportunities for centres to add value4. These propositions 
offer a way to think about corporate centre contribution and they can be useful in 
reflecting on strategies adopted by corporate centre departments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 1 
Where firms with closely related activities have large opportunities for cooperation between divisions.  
2 Five types of linkage can be recognised: know how sharing, activity sharing (economies of scale), pooled 
negotiating power in dealing with suppliers, unions and other external parties, vertical integration, involving 
trading between businesses in a way that reduces cost or improves quality, and strategic coordination, where 
the strategy of one business is altered to benefit the other. 
3 These include corporate brand, patents, properties, licenses and relationships. 
4 Some companies have venturing departments in their corporate centres to seek out new businesses or 
identify "potential" from the firm's portfolio. As projects develop, they are formed into a division. 
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2. Value creating activities 
 
a) Value added on an abstract level 
 
Hungenberg (1993, p.64) sees two possible ways in which the corporate centre can add 
value: definition of the business portfolio where the corporate centre defines and 
prioritises the company’s businesses, and coordination of businesses by determination 
of actions and decisions at division level by the corporate centre. In a conglomerate, this 
means that a corporate centre can be seen as a middleman, sitting between investors and 
divisions; and as such, a corporate centre can only justify its existence if the corporate 
centre enables the divisions to continuously achieve performance it could not achieve on 
its own or with any other potential corporate centre, so as to make sure that the value of 
the group is higher than the value of the combined individual divisions.  
 
b) Conditions for value creation 
 
As corporate centres do not generate client-based income, the value proposition of the 
corporate centre is of an indirect nature. According to Pettifer (1998a, p.7) there are 
three positive conditions necessary for value creation by the corporate centre1: 1) the 
opportunity condition: there must be an opportunity for the corporate centre to add 
value: businesses must be failing to fulfil their potential2, 2) the skills and resources 
condition: the corporate centre must have, or be able to acquire, the skills and resources 
needed to provide leverage to divisions. Especially we can think of relationships with 
expert centres and governments , and 3) the “sufficient feel" condition: which is about 
the degree of understanding the corporate centre needs for its businesses3. 
 
c) Added value according to Goold et al and Canals  
 
Goold et al (1994) have presented a conceptual framework, describing the type of 
resources and skills that the corporate centre can contribute to the different divisions, 
that we can apply to financial conglomerates (see also Canals, 1998, p.632ff). The 
authors distinguish between four types of generic advantage obtained from good 
corporate management (see Figure 23):  1) decentralisation, in terms of financial and 
                                                 
1 Note that Pettifer’s statements for value creat ion by the corporate centre are qualitative in nature and prove 
hard to quantify in terms of monetary value 
2 The suggestion here is that there will always be the opportunity for a wise, well-resourced or well-connected 
corporate centre to add value by enabling divisions to perform better. Unit managers are consistently 
presented with challenges that they do not have the knowledge or experience to meet. 
3 Corporate centres can be highly influential and unit -level managers react strongly to signals coming from 
their corporate executives. If the corporate centre understands the businesses well, the signals it will give off 
will not only support the priorities that units should be focusing on, but also facilitate good decision-making; 
alternatively, lack of understanding will produce a converse effect: the signals will be unhelpful distracting the 
business from its priorities, or encouraging mistakes. 
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human resources, and a high degree of autonomy of the divisions; after appointing 
managers it trusts, the corporate centre will probably retain certain rights regarding the 
approval of operating and investment budgets and other critical decisions1. The 
advantage of this contribution is that each division acts as a competitor, 2 )search for 
interrelationships or synergies between the different divisions; this contribution consists 
of the series of relationships that it can establish with the divisions and, at the same 
time, help them get maximum benefit from these relationships. Throughout and within 
the company; the focus lies on policies, organisation structures, and communication 
channels; these can be in areas such as information technology and human resource 
policies, 3) functional services shared between the corporate centre and the different 
divisions2, this contribution consists of the influence the corporate centre has on the 
divisions, either through a more or less active presence of the corporate group’s 
managers in the different divisions or through services that the corporate centre offers 
its divisions3, and 4) corporate development guided by the corporate centre; this 
contribution is related to development of the group by means of investment decisions, 
entering new businesses, or withdrawing from businesses4. This includes monitoring 
and controlling: being able to intervene and rectify underperformance can add value; the 
monitoring criteria and the performance levels must be appropriate. 
 
3. A note on the S-word: Synergy 
 
a) Achieving synergy 
 
One way to realise the synergy potential is to identify affinities and critical 
interrelationships within the group, develop and analyse value chains per division and 
look for common characteristics, formulation of a strategy in coordination with 
corporate and division strategies with goals supporting the pursuit  of interrelationships, 
and configuration of the synergy activities (Jagersma, 2000). In these steps, different 
instruments can be deployed (Wijers, 1994, p.75ff): 1) change of attitude of 
management: recruitment of collaborating management is important, 2) structuring 
collaboration: here we can think of informal and formal meetings, which are supported 
by division management, know clear rules and are able to reach intermediate results, 
                                                 
1 When markets where perfect this would not be an issue; divisions would raise financing themselves and they 
would recruit employees from other divisions and externally, so that each manager ended up in the place 
within the firm where he could add the most value – markets are not perfect though and the corporate centre 
plays a correctional role. Internal resource allocation can also take place faster than the external markets. 
2 There are relatively few corporate assets (such as brand names), which are genuinely independent. 
3 This may take place when the firm believes that the corporate centre provides services more cost effectively 
than any other provider. One has to take into account though that a third party supplier stands or falls by its 
ability to provide a client-focused service, and usually has far greater scale and experience than an in-house 
department can provide. An outside supplier is also less likely to be defeated by corporate politics. 
4 Details of transactions and implementations should be left to the divisions though. 
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and 3) supporting systems and procedures: compatibility of division systems, showing 
the synergy potential, is most important here; included are information systems but also 
human resource policies, incentive systems, the inclusion of synergy in planning 
processes, and financial systems such as internal allocation of costs and revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Contribution of the corporate centre 
Figure 24 shows some possible interrelationships, which could exist between the 
commercial, and wholesale banking, and capital markets divisions of a financial 
conglomerate (Canals, 1997, p.287ff). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Interrelationships between divisions 
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b) Obstacles to synergy 
 
When the corporate centre becomes active on synergies, the (perceived) costs1 for 
achieving these synergies might outweigh the benefits. Further obstacles to the 
implementation of synergy include: 1) classic strategic planning approach: little 
attention is paid to coordinating division strategies; inconsistent directions making 
interrelationships more difficult to achieve, 2) predominant vertical structures, which 
are the dominant way through which top management directs activities of divisions; 
information, decisions and resources tend to flow only vertically; sub-units in between 
are designed to oversee this vertical process and reduce span of control of the corporate 
centre, 3) vertical organisational boundaries lead to strong identities in different 
divisions, and 4) symmetric benefits in interrelationships are hard to realise: this needs 
adjustments of incentive systems to avoid conflicts. 
 
c) Organisational stickiness 
 
Creating synergy by transferring best practices can be hampered by what Szulanski calls 
stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). This can be blamed on motivational factors, such as 
interdivisional jealousy, lack of incentives, an inclination to reinvent the wheel, 
resistance to change, fear to lose autonomy, fear for unfair blame for poor performance 
and lack of commitment. The corporate centre could reduce these barriers by adjusting 
its roles. Besides motivational factors major barriers to the transfer of best practices are 
knowledge related factors such as causal ambiguity, difficulty in establishing relations, 
lack of capacity to absorb new knowledge, and a difficult relationship between the 
source and the recipient of the knowledge. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Costs include direct costs for establishing systems to realise synergies but also  senior management time, loss 
of focus and feelings of disempowerment on the part of divisional managers. 
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B. Organisation and activities of the corporate centre  
 
I. Managerial issues in governing a conglomerate 
 
1.  Business environment of the corporate centre 
 
Although local history, institutions, and culture influence corporate centres and 
although there are some national differences between corporate centres in Europe, there 
has been substantial convergence in their size and composition (Young et al, 2000, 
p.77). More and more, historical and cultural differences fade and the corporate centre 
has to take into account factors, primarily affecting the different business divisions, as 
these factors influence corporate centre strategy and activities. One dominant trend, 
which we have discussed discuss in paragraph 1.C.I, is the upcoming interest in the 
concept of the creation of shareholder value. Here divisions and the corporate centre are 
being judged based on their contribution to the creation of shareholder value. What also 
are impacting the corporate centre are the changes in the business environment at large 
(Hungenberg, 1993, p.62): 1) increasingly, companies are active globally while at the 
same time companies much get closer to their customers. Corporate centres are often 
(too) far away from clients and from competitive relevant information to come to fast 
and business-oriented decisions. This implies that decisions on business issues must lie 
with the divisions, 2) the application of new technologies in order to develop markets 
develops faster and faster. This means that decisions dealing with these developments 
more and more have to be taken by the divisions instead of the corporate centre, 3) 
managers and employees strive for more responsibility and entrepreneurial freedom and 
are less willing to accept influence from a far away corporate centre. This influence 
could disorder business operations and would have a negative impact on the motivation 
divisional managers, and 4) the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with 
business issues increases enormously. Also, this knowledge has to build up in shorter 
times. This means that the knowledge in the corporate centre might not match the 
knowledge needs of the divisional managers. Here it would be better to have the 
knowledge centres close to the business within the divisions. A special case occurs 
when companies are active in a regulated industry, such as financial services. Regulated 
companies are subject to influence by (quasi-) governmental bodies and it is noticeable 
that they tend to have larger corporate centres: the corporate centres of regulated 
companies are around 30 percent larger than those of non-regulated publicly quoted 
companies (Young et al, 2000, p.67ff)12. Executive managers in financial services 
                                                 
1 Young et al (2000, p.67) note though that in their survey this difference was not statistically significant. 
2 E.g. in Germany median staffing of corporate centres of financial services companies was 140 per 1000 
employees against only 4.5 per 1000 for industrial companies; legal, financial reporting and control, human 
resources and information systems functions contribute substantially (see also paragraph 2.B.III.3). 
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companies have to be approved by regulatory authorities and financial soundness is 
subject to constant supervision. It may be easier to respond to these regulatory needs 
through a centralised management structure. (Quasi) government supervision introduces 
additional administrative overheads, and the lack of competition associated with 
operation in regulated industries tends to permit higher costs. 
 
2. Organisational problems with governance 
 
a) Agency, moral hazard and coordination 
  
Canals (1997, p.115ff) discusses different governance problems with financial 
conglomerates from the standpoint of Organisational Economics1. A first specific 
problem of conglomerates is the agency problem, which is generated between corporate 
centre managers and division managers. In general, agency problems appear as soon as 
there is a separation between the owner and the manager or employee who must carry 
out the plans drawn up by the owner or the top manager2. Moral hazard  may arise 
between the divisions and the corporate centre. An example is where financial 
operations requiring fast decisions and a great deal of decentralisation are required, with 
funds being allocated to the various units to handle autonomously3. A third  
organisational problem faced by conglomerates is that of the costs of coordinating the 
various divisions. In general, coordination problems arise as a result of specialised work 
performed by different people or different units within an organisation4. 
                                                 
1 A term introduced by Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
2 The principal offers the agent a contract so that the latter may carry out a certain activity. In turn, the agent 
may have information that the principal does not have. There can be two t ypes of asymmetric information 
problems. The first is that the agent has private information, which leads to adverse selection problems. The 
second is that the principal cannot control the agent’s actions, which generates the problem called moral 
hazard. As a comparison, in a specialised bank the agency problem is that the incentives of the managers of 
each of the financial conglomerate’s divisions may or may not be compatible with the corporate centre’s 
general objectives. The agency costs in financial conglomerates consists of the costs of designing the explicit 
contracts between the corporate centre and the divisions, the cost of supervising them, and the cost of ensuring 
fulfilment of the commitments that have been taken on. Such contracts do not have any legal force but rather 
are involved with e.g. the creation of goals and policy systems, which the corporate centre decides to apply. 
3 This case raises two different aspects of the moral hazard problem: 1) the nature of the information that 
flows from the division to the corporate centre. The problem is that this information is usually conveyed after 
the operations have been carried out. Therefore, once the operations have been executed, the decisions are 
already irreversible and can only be offset, if negative, by better operations in the future, and 2) the division’s 
agent usually earns an additional bonus linked to profits gained from his operations, while he does not lose 
part of his salary if the operations lose money. In other words, his income structure is asymmetrical and 
benefits from making high-yield decisions, which are those that bear most risk. However, the consequences of 
negative results in high -risk operations are borne not by the agent or the unit in which the agent works, but by 
the financial conglomerate as a whole; this problem also exists in specialised banks but financial 
conglomerates have a higher complexity. 
4 Each person or unit usually has partial or incomplete information about the rest of the organisation. 
Consequently, it is vital to find formulas that enable this information to be shared and achieve efficient 
actions. One of the specific goals of this coordination in a financial conglomerate is to use the supposed 
synergies that exist between the different divisions to achieve concrete results such as a lower general cost 
level or increased revenues. The coordination problem has particular aspects in financial conglomerates that 
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b) Design, motivation and the cost of influence 
 
A fourth organisational problem is related to the coordination problem. This is the so-
called organisational problem with design attributes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, Bolton 
& Farrell, 1990). Business problems with design attributes are those that occur in any 
organisation when the information available to make reasonably good decisions is very 
abundant and, furthermore, when the cost of not making the right decision, or of not 
achieving the right degree of coordination between the various individuals taking part in 
it, can be very high1. A fifth organisational problem in a financial conglomerate is the 
motivation problem, which occurs on two organisational levels. The first is between 
employees in the same division. This is a common problem in any specialised bank, so 
we will not discuss it here. The second is the problem of the compensation systems and 
career patterns followed by managers with the same ability and training in different 
units, e.g. the commercial bank and the investment bank2. Finally, there is an additional 
problem that occurs in financial conglomerates, typical for complex organisations. This 
is the so-called influence cost and belongs to the general problem of rent-seeking 
activities: those activities that are not productive and which seek to modify income 
distribution between different groups3. In financial conglomerates influence costs arise 
in those activities or decisions that seek to transfer costs or income 4. 
 
c) Focus of managerial concern 
 
In order to solve these complex organisational decision problems facing financial 
conglomerates, it is necessary to combine two indispensable elements. The first consists 
of using those organisational forms that minimise, a priori, the costs deriving from the 
inefficiencies described above. One concrete way of doing this is through a holding 
                                                                                                                       
make it different from the coordination problem within a specialised bank. There are several types of solution 
to coordination problems: an organisational design that takes into account the different information 
requirements of each of the agents involved in the process, correctly allocating each agent’s responsibilities, 
creating formal communications channels between the various agents involved, and setting up control and 
compensation mechanisms.  
1 In such cases, highly decentralised solutions do not work well. At the divisional level, problems with design 
attributes arise when economies of scale, economies of scope, or complementary qualities are obtained 
between the products offered (Bulow et al, 1985). When any of these circumstances exists, the best solution 
usually consists of centralising activities in an organisation. 
2 These divisions have different competitive features and different skill demands. It is therefore logical that the 
motivations be different. However, these differences could generate a certain amount of distrust between 
managers in different divisions, which could destroy any possibilities of co-operation between different 
divisions. In general, designing compensation systems designed to avoid opportunistic behaviour by decision-
makers proves difficult. 
3 An example: the defence of protectionist interests for certain sectors of the economy. 
4 For influence costs to be incurred in an organisation, there must be decisions that establish ways of 
distributing costs and profits within the organisation as a whole. If influence costs are inevitable, the question 
raised is whether they can be controlled or their impact minimised. There are some general criteria for 
achieving this objective: decentralise the resource-allocation and decision-making process as much as 
possible; try to limit the negative consequences of possible income redistributio ns.  
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organisation structure in which each business becomes a unit with a high degree of 
autonomy but with certain performance measurement systems and reward and internal 
promotion mechanisms that facilitate co-operation between divisions; in other words, 
the aim is to design systems that truly enable benefits to be gained from the possible 
synergies that (may) exist within a financial conglomerate. The second element required 
is the eradication of those inefficiencies. The only way to achieve this goal is for the 
organisation’s top management to create the conditions so that the financial 
conglomerate has opportunities not only to earn money but also to learn and work in an 
atmosphere of trust. Historically, in companies where the primary concern has been the 
ability of the corporate centre to support strategy the overall trend has been to increase 
the scope of corporate centre activities (Young et al, 2000, p.44). In contrast, where the 
primary concern has been the cost-effectiveness of corporate centres the broad trend has 
been to reduce the scope of the corporate centre.  
 
3. Drivers of change for the corporate centre 
 
a) Different change agents  
 
Regarding anticipated changes corporate centre’s size, Young et al (2000, p.40ff) found 
that factors, which drive this include change in the overall size of the company, in the 
level of influence corporate managers have over divisional decisions, in the level of 
services provided to the business divisions, and concern about the cost-effectiveness of 
the corporate centre (see also Table 16). Costs, number of staff and number of corporate 
centre functions all appear to be falling in Europe and Japan (Young et al, 2000, p.39ff). 
In contrast, managers in the United States believe that their corporate centres are getting 
larger. With the exception of Japan, outsourcing is widely believed to be increasing. The 
tendency is for corporate managers to have a stronger influence over decision-making, 
and for more services to be provided by the corporate centre. Central service provision 
is growing most widely in the United States. According to Young et al (2000) change 
driven by concern about corporate centre’s cost-effectiveness tends to lead to reductions 
in the scope and staffing of corporate centre activities. Change driven by concern about 
corporate centre’ ability centre to support strategy often leads to increases in the scope 
and staffing of the corporate centre. Drivers for change in 1995-2000 were the change in 
the portfolio of businesses and in corporate strategies. For the years 2000-2005 staff 
numbers are expected to fall while the influence of corporate centres on divisional 
decisions and services provided to the divisions are expected to increase. Tables 17 and 
18 show the developments1. 
                                                 
1 E.g.: in European companies where the primary concern is corporate centre’ ability to support strategy 12% 
of those companies respond that they will reduce the number of corporate centre headcount; based on Young 
et al (2000, p.42ff), own calculations. 
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% of companies where driver is of major importance Europe USA Japan 
Drivers of past change were    
Change in portfolio of businesses 27 34 29 
Change in corporate strategy  45 33 26 
Ability of the corporate centre to support strategy  42 29 N/A 
Cost-effectiveness of the corporate centre 40 34 71 
Drivers of future change are    
Overall effectiveness of the corporate centre 71 39 73 
Corporate strategy effectiveness 55 N/A N/A 
Ability of the corporate centre to support strategy  64 37 N/A 
Cost-effectiveness of the corporate centre 65 47 N/A 
Table 16: Drivers of change for the corporate centre1 
 
  Europe  USA  Japan  
Change realised  expected realised expected realised expected 
% of companies de- or increasing 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
# corporate centre staff -21 -26 19 -13 -39 -70 
Services bought by corporate centre 32 28 37 40 -3 10 
Influence of the corporate centre 15 14 27 20 N/A N/A 
Services provided by corporate centre 14 7 36 30 7 8 
Table 17: Change in corporate centre staffing in different regions2 
 
 Companies where primaryb
concern isb
bAbility to support 
bstrategy  
  bCost-
beffectiveness 
  
% of companies de- or increasing Europe USA Europe USA 
# corporate centre staff -12 -7 -41 0 
Services bought-in by the corporate centre 12 71 36 50 
Influence of the corporate centre 19 29 4 25 
Services provided by the corporate centre 9 29 7 42 
Table 18: Expected corporate centre’s change with varying focus 
                                                 
1 E.g.: in Europe 27% of the firms in this research answered that change in the portfolio of businesses was a 
driver of change 
2 E.g.: in Europe, 21% of the firms realised a decrease in corporate centre staff in the period 1995-2000 
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b) Operational difficulties 
 
In pursing corporate centre goals, management will run into different difficulties. These 
difficulties are depicted in Figure 25 (Pettifer, 1998b, p.14). Operationally, difficulties 
encountered with the corporate centre include 1) excessive costs: corporate centres are 
often too large because of functional empire building and senior management requests 
for information based on historical reasons, 2) lost opportunities: seeking opportunities 
for value creation should be the essential role of the corporate centre, and 3) damaging 
influences: corporate centre management exercises significant influence over divisions; 
because of this, thought needs to be given to the way such influence is employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Corporate centre issues and their importance 
 
II. Corporate centre management styles 
 
1. Existence of styles and mechanisms  
 
In assessing the effectiveness of the corporate centre, Campbell & Goold (1998) made a 
distinction in terms of management style. They defined three styles used by the 
corporate centre: 1) Strategic Planning, 2) Strategic Control, and 3) Financial Control. 
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The different styles cause value to be added in different ways1; none has proven to be 
inherently best. The three styles form part of a continuum of ways the corporate centre 
can influence divisions. The continuum has two dimensions:  1) the planning influence, 
which expresses the degree to which strategy is centralised, and 2) the control influence, 
which shows the importance firms attach to short-term financial targets. For corporate 
level managers, managing a multiple-business company, five trade-offs or areas of 
tension can be identified: 1) leadership versus autonomy, 2) coordination and co-
operation versus clear responsibilities and accountability, 3) thorough analysis and 
planning versus entrepreneurial speed and responsiveness, 4)  long-term strategic targets 
versus short-term financial targets, and 5) flexible strategies versus tight controls. The 
three management styles exist as a result of the development of three different 
positionings against these tensions. In Figure 26, firms that fall in the bottom left-hand 
corner are labelled holding companies. In such organisations, the corporate centre has 
little influence over the subsidiaries. The top right-hand corner of the matrix is blank 
because this style appears to be infeasible 2. In having influence in assessing divisional 
performance, Young et al (2000, p.31) define the different stages as follows: 1) flexible 
strategic: some weight given to achievement of budgeted targets, but substantial weight 
given to other criteria, including progress towards longer-term, non-financial targets, 2) 
tight strategic: primary focus on budgeted targets, but some weight given to other 
criteria, including longer-term, non-financial targets, and 3) tight financial: predominant 
focus on achievement of budgeted targets. Along these lines, Young et al (2000) found 
how corporate centres managed the groups as shown in Figure 273.  
 
Campbell & Goold (1998, p.485) defined eight mechanisms through which the various 
corporate centre management styles can de effective4. These mechanisms are tools that 
the corporate centre uses to influence strategy and actions. They are 1) the organisation 
structure, 2) the planning process, 3) the use of themes, thrusts, or suggestions to guide 
managers, 4) the degree to which the corporate centre manages overlap between the 
units, 5) the resource allocation decisions taken by the corporate centre, 6) the 
objectives set for each unit, 7) the closeness of monitoring results against objectives, 
and 8) the types of incentives applied to managers who meet or fail targets. Each style 
uses these mechanisms in different ways and extent. 
 
                                                 
1 Each adds value in  a specific way and each can subtract value. 
2 Some companies have tried to combine a high degree of planning influence with tight short-term controls, 
but they have moved away from it. A seemingly oppressive corporate centre demotivated either divisional 
managers, or the corporate centre failed to maintain sufficient objectivity to keep the controls tight. 
3 Own calculations. 
4 The assumption here is that the corporate centre can only be effective if it successfully influences the 
strategies and actions of divisional managers for the better. 
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Figure 26: Assessment of divisional 
performance 
Figure 27: Figures styles matrix 
 
2. Strategic Planning 
 
a) Organisation structure, planning process and leadership 
 
The complex and overlapping organisational structures of these companies ensure that 
a variety of views on strategy will be expressed. They also allow the corporate centre to 
inject its ideas into the formulation of strategy, a wider discussion of issues and a more 
comprehensive search for new strategic options than would occur in an independent 
company. Co-ordinating committees also allow strategies to be drawn together across a 
variety of businesses (or countries) to achieve benefits of synergy and integration that 
would not be available to separate companies. And strong staff groups at the corporate 
centre allow economies of scope in the provision of central services. The drawback of 
this structure and the emphasis on co-operation and co-ordination is that divisional 
managers have less clear-cut individual responsibilities. The inevitable price or multiple 
viewpoints and synergy is some loss of autonomy. This, in turn, can reduce motivation, 
unless a shared purpose compensates for the loss of individual responsibility. The 
extensive planning processes of the Strategic Planning (SP) companies are an important 
means for getting different views aired. They are a test of divisional thinking, and can 
help to prevent businesses from falling into outdated or inappropriate strategy patterns. 
The questions posed by the central management should be much more informed, much 
more strategic, than is possible for the outside investors to whom the independent 
company reports. This is a prime value of the planning process of the SP-company. The 
need to communicate and justify plans to the corporate centre inhibits freedom of 
action, slows down the decision process, and takes some ownership from lower levels of 
management. The independent company can be swifter and more entrepreneurial. 
Furthermore, SP-processes are often cumbersome and confusing rather than probing and 
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insightful. The drawbacks of bureaucracy in planning may not be intrinsic to this style, 
but it is a potential pitfall. By providing strong central leadership  through themes 
thrusts, and suggestions, the companies are able to embark on bolder, more aggressive 
strategies than would otherwise emerge. Central sponsorship can enlarge the ambitions 
of business management, ensure that resources are available to support investments and 
help to overcome risk aversion. Close involvement by the corporate centre in strategy 
development inevitably reduces both the objectivity of the corporate centre in reviewing 
strategy, and the sense of personal ownership at the divisional level. Strong leadership 
can be seen as autocratic or ill-informed interference that overrules division-level ideas. 
 
b) Resource allocation and control system 
 
Resource allocation and objective setting  in the SP-companies are aimed at the long-
term development of the business. The corporate centre acts as a sort of buffer to the 
capital market, protecting the divisions from the need to satisfy he short-term 
performance criteria applied by the outside investor. Too much emphasis on strategy 
and the long-term endangers short-term issues in that they might be overlooked having a 
negative profit impact. For long-term performance defining and monitoring clear, 
objective and measurable goals is difficult and this opens up the possibility of excuses. 
Linked to this is that SP-companies are prone to undue optimism about the future or to 
personal incentives that are not linked to strategies. Lacking market disciplines and 
clear internal targets, the atmosphere can become too cosy. This can mean that 
flexibility becomes tolerance, and tolerance becomes looseness. Motivation to perform 
is then at risk. Furthermore, replacing the verdict of the stock market with subjective 
corporate assessments of strategic progress may not be an unmitigated gain. It is in 
these circumstances that corporate 'politics' flourish, with decisions taken to reinforce 
personal positions in the hierarchy, rather than to improve the strategies of the business. 
Finally, the flexible control system in the SP-companies adds value. By accepting that 
precise, short-term targets may have to be compromised in order to stay on track to 
build a business, it encourages a more tenacious pursuit of long-term goals. The 
corporate centre in the SP-company is more sympathetic than the capital market to the 
manager who is struggling to create a major new business in a highly competitive and 
uncertain world. Flexible controls, however, can never provide clear and objective 
standards of performance. Hence it is harder for both the corporate centre and the 
divisional manager to know whether results are on target. The price of flexibility is 
ambiguous performance measures and a reduced sense of personal accountability. The 
SP-style is characterised by an emphasis on strategy, long-term objectives, and on a co-
operative flexible management approach.  
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c) Conclusion on the Strategic Planning style 
 
Table 19 summarises the key features and the added and subtracted value of the SP-
style. The negative features of this style can be minimised by sensitive, flexible, and 
selective planning processes, leadership, well-informed central management, shared 
commitment, avoiding over optimism, strategy-aligned incentives, and strenuous efforts 
to identify, measure, and act on strategic milestones. 
 
Key 
features 
Added value Intrinsic subtracted 
value 
Pitfalls 
Complex, 
co-
ordinated 
structure 
Wider discussion of 
issues 
Synergy  
Central services 
Less individual 
responsibility and 
authority 
Can reduce motivation 
Extensive 
strategic 
planning 
process 
More thorough search 
for best strategies 
Less freedom of action 
Slower decisions 
Can be cumbersome, 
confusing or bureaucratic 
Strong 
central 
leadership 
Bolder strategies 
Shared purpose and 
commitment 
Less ownership by 
business 
Less objectivity by 
corporate centre 
Can become interference 
Can lead to risky and 
over ambitious strategies 
Long-
term 
criteria 
Building core 
businesses 
Buffer to capital 
market 
Slower reactions to 
adversity 
Less clear targets 
Can lead to over 
optimism, 'lip service' 
Flexible 
controls 
More tenacious pursuit 
of long-term goals 
More innovative, 
responsive strategies 
Subjective assessments 
Less accountability 
Can lead to politics 
Table 19: Summary of the Strategic Planning style 
 
3. Financial Control 
 
a) Organisation structure, planning process and leadership 
 
At the opposite extreme to Strategic Planning lies Financial Control (FC). The 
organisational structures of the FC-companies stress multiple, separate profit centres, 
each with independent responsibilities. As far as possible, these structures replicate, for 
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the profit centres, the circumstances of independent companies. The profit centres are 
set up so as to overlap as little as possible, and no attemp t is made by the corporate 
centre to co-ordinate between them. The profit centre manager is largely free to run his 
department without interference from other parts of the company. It gives early general 
management responsibility, thereby developing the skills needed for the long-term 
success of the company. But the structure is less ambitious than that of the Strategic 
Planning companies. It adds no value in comparison to the independent company 
situation but at least it avoids the negatives that are also associated with the more 
complex structures of Strategic Planning companies. The planning process in the FC-
companies concentrates on budgets. The emphasis is on the short term, and on agreeing 
targets rather than on the means. As with Strategic Planning companies, the corporate 
centre probes the plans of divisional managers, but the nature of questioning is very 
different. For FC-companies the primary value arises from the pressure it creates for 
high-level standards of profitability and growth of profits, not from probing underlying 
strategic logic. The FC-companies add value by asking for performance that is more 
demanding than that insisted on by stockholders, and they exert pressure for 
performance much more continuously. As a by-product of the tight budgeting process, 
managers may also have to think again about the validity of the strategies they are 
following. If they are unable to satisfy corporate requirements, they may be forced to 
consider changes of direction. But the corporate centre will not typically question 
strategies directly, or expect to make much contribution to the definition of new and 
preferable strategic options. And the emphasis is on next year's results, not the long 
term. The focus on results-not-strategies leaves managers more free to make their own 
decisions, provided they turn in the required performance.  
 
Furthermore, the planning process can be simpler and therefore less prone to 
bureaucracy than in Strategic Planning companies. The major drawback of the planning 
process is that it cannot claim to add much value to the business manager in probing and 
thinking through his strategic options. Indeed, the short-term results orientation may 
distract him from tackling long-term issues. If the stock market is felt to create an 
unduly short-term orientation, the FC-style serves to reinforce this bias. Taken to 
extremes, the style can encourage managers to milk their business by cutting back too 
far on investment. Although the corporate centre may make occasional suggestions, 
business autonomy  is preserved in the FC-companies, by insisting that the final decision 
rests with divisional management and by avoiding any broad top-down corporate 
themes, missions, or thrusts. This philosophy attempts to replicate the freedom of the 
independent company and hence can obviously add little value when compared to it. If, 
however, constructive suggestions are made, but not imposed, the divisional manager 
may gain something that is denied to his fully independent counterpart. Nevertheless, it 
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is clear that FC-does not attempt to add as much value in this respect as Strategic 
Planning; equally, however, it runs fewer risks of subtracting value.  
 
b) Resource allocation and control system 
 
The resource allocation process in the FC-companies adopts objectives and criteria 
similar to the capital market. There is no attempt to buffer the businesses from 
requirements for short-term profit. Rather, capital market criteria give confidence in 
ability to deliver. The system reviews each investment on its merits, rather than as part 
of a long-term business strategy. It adds value by insisting that proposals will only be 
funded if they project high returns and fast paybacks, and if divisional managers appear 
committed to achieving their forecasts and have a track record of doing so in the past. 
The corporate centre does not pretend to have a detailed knowledge of each division's 
business, or to be able to criticise, shape and add value to the strategies behind the 
investment proposals. The corporate centre is more directly active in acquisitions and 
divestments. Value is added to these acquisitions by increasing their profitability 
through the application of FC-disciplines. Conversely, divestments are made of 
businesses that do not respond to these criteria. The emphasis on short-term profit 
objectives in resource allocation and acquisitions simplifies the management task, but it 
can result in missed opportunities. The tension remains and means that the FC-style will 
always create problems in businesses where long time scales are needed.  
 
The main strength of the FC-style is in the tight controls it imposes. Not only are 
budgets stretching, and do investments demand short paybacks, but also the monitoring 
of results achieved and the feedback from the corporate centre create strong incentives 
to deliver. The knowledge that there will be a speedy reaction to under (or over-) 
achievement of (monthly) targets does create increased motivation. The simplicity of 
the criteria for judging performance also makes it easier for line managers to know 
where to focus their attention. This is one of the prime motivating factors for successful 
managers in the FC-companies and has two benefits. It makes for a more open 
discussion of business issues with the corporate centre, since the line manager can rely 
on his results rather than his words to impress the corporate centre; and it creates a 
'winner's' psychology among divisional managers which makes them feel more capable 
of overcoming obstacles and pushing on to further peaks of performance. But the tight 
control process also has its downside. It can stifle creativity, snuff out experimentation, 
and eliminate the entrepreneurial skunk works activities. There is less flexibility to 
respond to opportunities. At its worst, tight control can mean that everything is 
sacrificed to meeting specified control objectives at whatever cost to the underlying 
health of the business.  
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c) Conclusion on the Financial Control style 
 
Table 20 summarises the key features and the value contribution of the Financial 
Control style. The negative features of this style can be minimised by: targets that 
require year-on-year profit growth, employing divisional managers long enough so as to 
confront them with the consequences of their strategies, informed central managers who 
offer suggestions without imposing their views, willingness to override objectives if it is 
clear that they damage the health of the business, a winner's psychology to maintain 
growth momentum, and acceptance that, sometimes, this style may be inappropriate. 
 
Key features Added value Intrinsic 
subtracted value 
Pitfalls 
Separate profit 
centres 
Simplifies task 
Early general management 
responsibility 
No coordination 
synergy  
 
Budgetary 
planning  
Higher standards 
Challenges that won't deliver 
Avoids 'potholes' 
Distracts from 
strategic issues 
Can encourage 
milking the 
business 
Business 
autonomy 
Advice, not instructions No co-operation, no 
'help' for divisions 
 
Short-term 
criteria 
Clearer criteria 
'Efficient' internal capital 
market 
Missed 
opportunities 
'Control games' 
 
Tight controls Faster reaction 
More motivation 
'Winner's' psychology  
Less flexibility and 
creativity 
Can become a 
straitjacket 
Table 20: Summary of the Financial Control style 
 
4. Strategic Control 
 
a) Organisation structure, planning process and leadership 
 
The Strategic Control (SC)-style is a blend of the features found in the Strategic 
Planning and Financial Control styles. By structuring themselves around individual 
profit centre businesses that are grouped into divisions, SC-companies claim to achieve 
the motivational benefits of decentralisation, while allowing important business 
overlaps to be managed at the divisional level. There is some added value from 
divisional coordination, but a minimum of interference with divisional managers. But 
even if the divisional level is able to achieve synergies between divisions that would not 
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be achieved independently, it is less clear how the corporate level adds value, 
structurally, to the divisions. As in Financial Control companies, the decentralised 
structure leaves little room for the corporate centre to orchestrate the several divisions in 
the portfolio. SC-companies argue that they have a prime contribution to divisional 
thinking via the quality controls in the strategic review process. The disciplines provide 
a continuing challenge that sharpens the thinking in the divisions and businesses. By its 
probing, the corporate centre raises minimum standards of thinking and analysis, and 
prevents 'habits of mind' from forming. The intention is similar to that of Strategic 
Planning companies, although SC-companies limit themselves to a questioning role, and 
do not propose their own views from the corporate centre. Extensive planning processes 
can run into the same problem of acting as a constraint that was described for the 
Strategic Planning companies. Moreover, bureaucracy grows quickly in SC-companies 
because the corporate centre is that much more distant from the business. The corporate 
centre may fail to be well enough informed to ask useful questions or that any benefits 
may be more than offset by the time -consuming and costly processes that they involve. 
Corporate planning processes do not always deliver net added value. Only if these 
processes are sensitively designed and adminis trated, and if the businesses in the 
portfolio are likely to respond to a second view can value be added by the corporate 
centre. SC-companies generally avoid major suggestions and initiatives and are not 
active in co-ordinating between divisions or businesses. Also they recognise that 
direction from the corporate centre can subtract value. They stress the responsibility and 
independence of the divisional manager. Where ad hoc interventions do take place, 
research indicated that value was subtracted at least as often as it was added. 
 
b) Resource allocation and control system 
 
It is in a resource allocation process that balances long- and short-term goals that the 
corporate centre of many SC-companies add the most value. The corporate centre 
provides access to a pool of resources, which can be made available for investment in 
long-term, large or risky projects. These projects might be turned down by outside 
investors, who have little knowledge of the business and who are often short-term or 
fashion driven in their attitudes, focusing more on past results that future prospects, and 
failing to assess technically complex or strategically innovative ideas. The downside of 
the long-term investment attitude is the same as in the Strategic Planning companies: a 
danger of undervaluing the importance of next year's profits. But the SC-companies 
attend to defend against this problem by balancing long-term objectives with short-term 
profit pressures. The ability of companies to cut back drastically in some their 
portfolios, while preserving growth momentum elsewhere, is evidence of their ability to 
make trade-offs. Indeed, major corporate resource allocation decisions in the SC-
companies have concentrated at least as much on portfolio rationalisation and 
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profitability improvement as on long-term investment. In practice, there are numerous 
difficulties in achieving the right balance of objectives. Assessing more speculative, 
longer-term investments is hard. If the corporate centre lacks close familiarity with the 
business, it may be forced to rely on the credibility of the sponsoring management team 
together with formal financial evaluations - much the same criteria as used by the 
outside investor. Where the corporate centre backs long-term projects, the reason may 
be personal commitments to a business rather than clear-sighted strategic thinking. 
Reliance on corporate funds for investment can also be a source of problems since 
capital scarcity can cut out investments that might have been funded by the outside 
market. Although portfolio rationalisation improves profitability ratios for the SC-
companies, it is less clear that divisions of these companies would have moved any less 
speedily to take corrective measures had they been independent. SC-companies may 
move more decisively on rationalisation and exit decisions than Strategic Planning 
companies, but the discipline of the outside capital markets would in some cases have 
been more pressing than that provided by corporate management. The resource 
allocation process in the SC-comp anies therefore attempts to combine the buffer 
function of the Strategic Planning companies and the efficiency function of the 
Financial Control companies. In some respects this achieves the best of both worlds, but 
in others it encounters the disadvantages that come from the lack of a clear commitment 
to either. This follows from the more basic tension between short- and long-term goals. 
Furthermore, uninformed long-term investments, naïve portfolio pruning, and partisan 
preference for particular businesses are all potential, if avoidable, pitfalls for SC-
companies. It is therefore only if the corporate centre is genuinely better informed, close 
to the business, and as objective as the outside investor that value is likely to be added. 
Detailed monitoring and reporting allow the corporate centre to pinpoint shortcomings 
more precisely; and incentives and tight strategic and financial controls create personal 
motivation in a much less blunt fashion that the outside capital market, where take -overs 
or palace revolutions are effectively the only sanctions against non-performing 
management. So, provided that the control objectives are conducive to the prosperity of 
the business, SC adds value.  
 
c) Conclusion on the Strategic Control style 
 
Table 21 summarises the key features and the contributed value of the Strategic Control 
style. The negative features of the style can be minimised by flexible planning 
processes, willingness by the corporate centre to spend time to get close to divisional 
strategies, to be knowledgeable about competitive environments, avoiding over 
optimism, personal incentives aligned with strategy, and strenuous efforts to identify, 
measure, and act on strategic milestones. 
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Key features Added value Intrinsic subtracted value Pitfalls 
Decentralised 
profit centres 
Divisional 
coordination 
Little by corporate centre No central coordination  
Extensive 
strategic 
planning 
process 
Raises minimum standards of 
thinking 
Challenging habits of mind 
Constraining Can be 
bureaucratic; 
add cost, but 
little value 
Business 
autonomy 
  Gratuitous 
suggestions 
Long- and 
short-term 
criteria 
Acceptance of longer-term 
investments 
Balanced objectives 
Ambiguous objectives Tolerance for 
low 
performers 
Capital 
rationing 
Uninformed 
investments 
Tight 
controls 
More motivation to perform Risk aversion 
Subjective balancing of 
objectives 
'Politics' 
'Lip service' 
Table 21: Summary of the Strategic Control style 
 
III. Corporate centre activities and staffing 
 
1. Conception of the corporate centre 
 
a) Possible activit ies 
 
Bühner (1996) found that a corporate centre consists of two distinct parts 1) the group 
executive board, and 2) centralised departments. A closer look learns that the 
responsibilities of the group executive board can be distinguished as follows: 1) 
management activities: here the activities are aimed at supporting the business, both at 
present and in the future. The activities are strategic in nature and deal with the build up 
and fostering of new sources of profits within the group1 , 2) synergy activities: here 
the activities are aimed at creating added value by centralising know how or non-
divisible resources and lowering costs, and 3) coordination and control activities: these 
                                                 
1 One way of building this new business internally is the transfer of know-how within the group. Transferring 
external know how, e.g. by takeovers, also supports this goal. 
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activities are aimed at the steering of divisions among themselves, and the tuning of 
their activities towards corporate goals. Over time, Bühner (1996, p.15) sees a shift in 
the notion of the corporate centre services. Table 22 explains this. Corporate centre 
functions are especially organised in centralised departments to deliver management 
services, management support or implementation support, separately from the divisions 
(Hungenberg, 1995, p.250). Aim is the uniform approach to group management. 
 
Characteristic Traditional notion Progressive notion 
Priority goal of the 
corporate centre 
Realising synergies 
Management support 
Creation of added value 
by increasing demands 
on divisions 
Tendency to centralise High, because of stable business 
environment 
Low, because of 
unstable business 
environment 
Responsibility for 
central services cost 
Not present  Present by 
distinguishing between 
cost, service and profit 
centre 
Option for the 
corporate centre to 
offer services to third 
parties 
Not present  In principle the market 
option exist 
Option for division to 
acquire central 
services externally 
Divisions are required to use internal 
services 
In principle the market 
option exist 
Benchmarking of 
central services to 
external suppliers 
Not present  Present 
Table 22: Traditional versus progressive notion of central services 
 
b) Design of the corporate centre 
 
In designing a corporate centre, it is useful to start with the core role. Here, this core 
role is a matter of ensuring that all corporate obligations can be professionally 
discharged, while weeding out unnecessary activities that may be value destroying. The 
second step is to identify the major intended sources of value added by the corporate 
centre, each of which should have the potential to make a measurable impact on 
corporate results. Staffing and support processes are essential. Companies that can find 
no major value added opportunities should consider to demerge, or to retrench the 
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corporate centre to the core role only. The third  step is to focus attention on shared 
services. In order to decide which activities are appropriate for concentration in a 
shared-services unit, an analysis is needed on what activities are unique to the division 
and strategic to the division’s relationship with its customers, and what activities are 
common to all divisions and non-strategic. 
 
c) A note on shared services  
 
Combining shared services can result in cost savings of 20 to 50 percent while 
improving service levels (Gunn, in: Goold et al, 2001, p.88). Also, according to 
Schulman et al (1999, p.38), 20 percent of Fortune 500 companies are actively pursuing 
shared services. In order to manage shared services in the corporate centre, the mindset 
has to be established that it is a business. This means that there must be (Schulman, 
1999, p.32) a strategic plan, a notion of delivery channels and cycle times, a product 
plan, key metrics, continuous benchmarking, an internal customer and results focus, 
competitive conditions, a focus on revenue and profit, active marketing, and a focus on 
the value chain of the shared service1. Divisions should be allowed to opt out if they are 
not satisfied with the services2. 
 
2. Functions in the corporate centre 
 
a) Review of corporate centre functions 
 
Case study research (Bühner, 1996, p.23ff) suggests that companies had the following 
functions in the corporate centre as in Table 23. It must be noted though that not all 
groups of companies have the listed functions, or that the list is exhaustive3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Schulman et al (1999) offer a detailed approach to implement shared services 
2 The services that are most part of shared services are Finance, Information Systems Management, Human 
Resources, Legal, Communications, and Supply Management (Schulman et al, 1999, p.7). 
3 Here we left out Distribution and Technological R&D as this applies differently for financial service firms 
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Function Separated in Main activities % of 
companies 
Finance and 
control 
Finance, 
controlling, 
accounting 
Mergers & acquisitions, 
participations, liquidity management, 
strategic investment planning and 
control, financial resource allocation 
and control, financing of subsidiaries, 
analysis of results and deviations, 
information systems, group wide 
planning & control, cost structure 
analysis, P&L-planning, annual 
reporting, ruling on capitalising of 
assets, consolidation 
100 
Human resources  Human resource development, 
coordination of group wide human 
resource marketing, management 
standards, assessment centres, 
meetings with employees, 
administrative services for 
subsidiaries, strategic, contract and 
social issues 
75 
Management 
development 
 Management development of senior 
officers 
31 
Group 
administration 
Tax, legal, 
audit, 
insurance, 
patents 
All audit issues, group wide 
insurance, legal counselling for 
subsidiaries, tax consulting for 
subsidiaries, tax optimisation of the 
group, group wide management of 
own patents and licenses 
100 
Public relations  Coordination of public and investor 
relations affairs 
94 
Group strategy 
development 
 Setting of strategic direction 
supported by planning instruments 
and strategic goals for subsidiaries 
81 
Marketing  Market and competitor analysis, 
coordination of marketing activities 
of subsidiaries, analysis of product 
life cycles, new product introductions 
 
 
31 
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Function Separated in Main activities % of 
companies 
Information 
technology 1 
 Activities are industry specific and 
can be very diverse; examples 
include know-how transfer, security, 
maintenance and consulting, 
coordination of hardware 
deployment, centralised data 
processing 
25 
Procurement  Centralised purchasing strategies and 
logistics 
31 
Others  Coordination of corporate type 
services within subsidiaries, real 
estate services, trade relations 
75 
Table 23: Basic functions in a corporate centre and their frequency of occurrence 
 
Individual features of divisions have decisive influence on the distribution of functions 
between the corporate centre and the divisions (Canals, 1998, p.631).  Bühner (1996) 
found that different industries2 showed different frequencies of occurrence for 
functions. In their research Young et al (2000) found the functions in the corporate 
centre of financial services firms as shown in Table 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The activities in this field are very varied as they depend on the industry in which the company operates. A 
straightforward comparison is hard to make. 
2 He looked at trade, industrial and mixed groups. 
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% of companiesb
corporateb
including function in  
centres 
Function Europe USA 
Legal & company secretary 92 100 
Treasury 70 100 
Financial reporting & control 100 83 
Taxation 96 100 
HR-policies & management development 90 100 
Government & public relations 87 100 
Internal audit 94 100 
Information systems & telecoms 69 100 
Pensions, payroll administration 70 100 
Corporate planning & development 90 100 
Training & education 67 100 
Accounting for business 45 100 
Property services 21 100 
Purchasing 48 67 
Office services 23 83 
Marketing 36 50 
Research and development 15 17 
Distribution 16 50 
Other corporate staff 37 33 
Risk management & insurance 24 50 
Health, safety & environment 6 17 
Security 6 17 
In-house communications 0 50 
Table 24: Corporate centre functions in financial conglomerates 
 
So, in designing the corporate centre functionally, we can benchmark our results against 
these findings. 
 
b) Outsourcing of corporate centre functions 
 
If we depart from the notion that a corporate centre has all corporate centre functions in-
house, then outsourcing might form an opportunity to financial services firms’ corporate 
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centres1. An advantage is usually derived from outstanding depth in selected human 
skills, knowledge bases, or other service strengths that competitors cannot reproduce 
and that lead to greater demonstrable value for the customer (Quinn et al, 1990, p. 60). 
An element of competition is introduced, when outsourcing is based on competitive 
conditions. In sourcing professional services from outside firms, four selection criteria 
apply to the selection decision (Day & Barksdale, 1992, p.86): 1) perceived experience, 
expertise, and competence of the service provider, 2) The provider’s understanding of 
the firm’s needs and interests, 3) the professional service provider’s relationship and 
communication skills, and 4) the likelihood of the professional service provider 
conforming to contractual and administrative requirements. 
 
The main idea is not to use the threat of outsourcing to force employees into submission 
so much as to develop a clear and shared understanding of internal competencies, a 
common understanding of the departments vital to the corporate centre, and an urgency 
around the need for improvement. In determining outsourcing the following steps have 
to be taken (Quinn et al, 1990, p.64): 1) defining each activity as a service that can 
either be produced internally or sourced externally, 2) answer the questions if the 
financial conglomerate has or is able to achieve the needed level of capabilities for this 
service; if so, should the firm make it a part of its strategy, if not, what possibilities exist 
for outsourcing the activity or forming an alliance with another firm which does have 
superior capabilities, and 3) focus on two sets of activities: those where it can create 
unique value and those it must control to maintain its supremacy in managing the 
critical elements.  Already now, firms outsource corporate centre functions2. These 
functions now have changed from back-office to front-office staff, focused on output 
instead of input and are motivated by profit targets (The Economist, 2001, p.56). There 
are indications that savings range from 20 to 50 per cent, based on lower headcount, 
increased process efficiencies and the change from fixed cost to variable cost of the 
outsourced activity. In looking at costs (savings) over the period of a potential 
functional outsourcing contract, it may seem logical to use the function’s total cost from 
the accounting records, apply some future inflation rate, and estimate the future costs. 
There are risks to this shortcut (Greaver, 1999, p.130ff): 
× The nature of current and/or future costs within the function may vary by activity 
× The nature of current and/or future external costs, related to the function, may vary 
by activity 
                                                 
1 Outsourcing tendencies might lead to an increase in what can be called contract banking (Llewellyn, 1999). 
In contract banking, banking services and processes are being subcontracted to external companies, with the 
financial services firm being a manager of a set of in- and external contracts. A financial services firm 
becomes a broker between the customer and a set of outside contractors whose activities make up the range of 
financial products and services (Llewellyn, 1999, p.37ff). 
2 According to Gartner Dataquest, the worldwide finance and accounting outsourcing market could grow from 
US$ 12 bn in 1999 to almost US$ 38 bn by 2004, with contracts covering increasingly sophisticated services. 
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× Seldom does it occur that all of a function’s activities get outsourced or disappear 
when outsourcing occurs  
× Seldom does it occur that there are not additional, supplemental costs that result 
from outsourcing, which may vary by activity. 
 
Unless the nature of the costs are analysed at the activity level, these nuances are likely 
to be missed, which can have the impact that targeted cost savings cannot be realised. 
Generally, not all costs of the function’s activities does not get outsourced: the nature of 
the function’s management activities may change, from managing people to managing a 
provider relationship, but a managing activity still exists1. Outsourcing can bring also 
additional costs or even poor performance2. In their survey, Young et al (2000, p.34) 
found to what extent companies already outsource their corporate centre functions; this 
is shown in Table 253. 
 
Function 
% of companies where cost of 
bought-in services exceeds cost of 
own staff  
  Europe USA 
Accounting for business 6 0 
Corporate planning and development 20 9 
Distribution 4 0 
Financial reporting and control 10 19 
Government and public relations 19 9 
Health, safety and environment 3 0 
Human resources policies and management development 6 20 
Information systems and telecoms 28 16 
In-house communications 0 0 
Internal audit 8 40 
Legal and company secretary 13 15 
Marketing 17 0 
                                                 
1 The costs of managing outsourced services have recently declined, thanks to cheaper communication, the 
standardisation of web-based tools and the speed with which companies are automating their own data 
services (Auguste et al, 2002). 
2 The functions, which are seen to qualify best for an outsourcing analysis include Legal, Taxation, Internal 
Audit, Training & Education, Corporate Planning and Development, Government & Public Relations, 
Information Systems, and Property Services. 
3 A successful example comes from Canada, where in 1996, the Royal Bank Financial Group, Bank of 
Montreal, and Toronto Dominion Bank formed a shared document processing organisation called Symcor. 
Co-ventures offer organisations more direct control and say over how the services are performed and are 
likely to be a good long-term strategy, a function of size and magnitude, to minimise the risk of turning over 
services wholly to a third party (Quinn, 2000, p.15). The scale has to be present to justify the capital 
investment but is well worth considering since it offers cost savings, leveraging economies of scale and still 
retaining a say in how the operation runs. 
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Function  
% of companies where cost of 
bought-in services exceeds cost of 
own staff  
  Europe USA 
Office services 5 50 
Other corporate staff 8 0 
Pensions, payroll, benefit administration 8 19 
Property services 9 27 
Purchasing 11 0 
Research and development 13 0 
Risk management and insurance 10 0 
Security 5 0 
Taxation 17 13 
Training and education 27 38 
Treasury 4 7 
Table 25: Outsourcing of corporate centre functions1 
Corporate centre functions that outsource a greater proportion of their activities tend to 
employ fewer staff. Notwithstanding this, they are not as small as might be expected 
(Young et al, 2000, p.33). In Europe, departments for which the cost of bought-in 
services is the same as the cost of their own staff, have between 25 and 30 percent fewer 
staff instead of 50 percent fewer staff. (Young et al, 2000, p.74). Figure 28 on page 115 
shows the relation between outsourcing and corporate centre staffing levels: it becomes 
clear that as outsourcing increases, the net positive effect in staff levels decreases. 
 
3. Corporate centre staffing 
 
a) Relations in staffing levels 
 
On a micro-level, staffing levels are results of managerial decisions. However, in their 
study, Young et al (2000) found the following relations.  For Europe the core role, 
which is defined as the joint activities needed to enable the company to exist as a single 
legal entity, typically accounts for around 40 percent of corporate centre’ staff, whereas 
in the USA it accounts for around 25 to 40 percent, and in Japan around 20 percent. In 
different countries the staffing levels for the discretionary roles (added value and shared 
services) tend to be higher than for the core role and have much wider ranges. In the 
                                                 
1 As an example: in Europe 20 percent of the firms have costs for outside corporate planning and development 
services, which is higher than if performed in house. 
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United Kingdom, shared services consists of 43 percent of total corporate centre staff. 
Larger companies tend to have larger corporate centres1,2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Outsourcing and corporate centre staff levels 
Total # 
employees     
Corporate 
centre staff    
Staff per 1000 
employees   
in the company 
# of 
firms  
lo
w
er
 
qu
ar
til
e 
M
ed
ia
n 
up
pe
r 
qu
ar
til
e 
lo
w
er
 
qu
ar
til
e 
M
ed
ia
n 
up
pe
r 
qu
ar
til
e 
< 5,000 46 16 28 93 5.2 9.7 26.9 
5 – 10,000 38 24 38 91 3.3 5.4 11.8 
10 – 20,000 31 65 100 290 4.7 6.7 20.0 
20 – 50,000 26 90 144 254 3.3 5.8 9.0 
> 50,000 37 182 350 725 1.7 3.1 8.0 
All 178 33 96 228 3.4 6.2 13.9 
Table 26: Corporate centre staffing vs. firm size (Europe) 
                                                 
1 For example, Young et al found that in Europe the median headquarters staffing for 46 companies with 
fewer than 5,000 employees was 28, but for the 37 companies with more than 50,000 employees the median 
was 350, more than ten times higher. 
2 Total numbers of corporate centre staff can be misleading when making comparisons between firms of 
different sizes. Expressing staff levels as a proportion of total staff employed in the firm helps to make the 
comparisons more meaningful. 
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Corporate centres that place greater emphasis on non-financial criteria tend to be larger 
(see Figure 29). It may be that assessing a broader range of non-financial criteria 
requires mo re corporate centre staff across a range of disciplines. The extent to which 
the corporate centre provides services to divisions has a substantial influence on 
corporate centre staffing. Typically, corporate centres that have more than 40 percent 
service staff have around three times the number of staff as those with fewer than 20 
percent service staff. This factor is 1.7 for service staffing ranging from 20 to 40 percent 
(see Figure 30). As the company size doubles, the size of the minimum corporate parent 
staff tends to increase by no more than about 50 percent with each doubling, which 
indicates that significant economies of scale in core role activities are possible. The 
corporate centres of highly diversified conglomerates are around half the size of those 
of manufacturing companies, suggesting a more decentralised approach to corporate 
management.  On average, commercial financial service companies have three times 
and pure retail financial service companies four times the corporate centre staff as 
manufacturing companies. Although firms in the financial services industry have more 
linkages between divisions (see Figure 31), it is unlikely that this accounts for the larger 
corporate centre by itself. Goold et al (2001, p.87) found that the level and nature of 
corporate centre functional influence is a driving factor in shaping the number of 
corporate centre staff. Large corporate centre staffs are not generally rated more 
effective in supporting corporate strategy than small ones. It is the skills of the staffs 
and the value-added from their activities that matter more than their numbers or cost. At 
the same time, large corporate centre staffs are fully justified provided that they are 
genuinely needed to support value creation. Interestingly, as opposed to industrial firms, 
in financial services firms, staff in e.g. treasury, risk management and information 
systems, to some extent unique to financial services firms, are often regarded as being 
part of the corporate centre and therefore corporate centre staffing can be substantially 
higher in financial services firms than in industrial firms (Young et al, 2000, p.109ff). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Corporate centre staffing versus 
control influence 
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b) Actual staffing of the corporate centre 
 
Young et al (2000) surveyed over 600 companies in Europe, the United States, Japan 
and Chile on corporate centre staffing levels. Distinguishing between the core role and 
the discretionary roles (see also paragraph 2.A.II.3), Young et al1 found the staffing 
levels for financial services companies as shown in Tables 27 and 282. 
 
  Europe USA 
Median corporate centre staff per 1,000 employees 56 80 
# of companies 29 6 
Median minimum parent staff per 1,000 employees 11 13 
# of companies 19 5 
Median discretionary staff per 1,000 employees 41 65 
# of companies 19 5 
Table 27: Corporate centre staffing statistics: financial services firms, Europe/ USA 
 
    
Corporate 
centre staff   
Staff per 
1,000 
employees  
Country 
# of 
firms 
lower 
quartile median 
upper 
quartile 
lower 
quartile median 
upper 
quartile 
France 6 675 1,550 2,213 12 58.7 209.3 
Germany 9 514 1,450 1,825 81.5 140.4 611 
Netherlands 3  80   15.6  
United 
Kingdom 11 106 160 398 7.2 9.2 18.4 
Table 28: Corporate centre staffing in financial services firms within four European countries  
Also, it is interesting to note that Young & Goold (1999, p.19) found for UK-firms a 
staff distribution in three roles as shown in Figure 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 It was the first survey on this topic with this degree of depth and sheds light on corporate centre staffing 
practices. 
2 Partly based on own calculations. 
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Figure 31: Interdivisional linkages and corporate 
centre staffing 
Figure 32: Average part of corporate centre 
staff in three roles 
 
On a more detailed level, Young et al (2000) found the median staffing levels per 
corporate centre function for financial services firms as shown in Table 29. 
 
  Median staff per1 1,000 employees 
Function Europe USA 
Legal and company secretary 2.5 4.6 
Treasury 0.3 1.3 
Financial reporting and control 3.5 1.8 
Taxation 1.0 1.2 
Human resources policies and man. development 2.3 0.7 
Government and public relations 0.7 1.1 
Internal audit 1.3 2.7 
Information systems and telecoms  18.3 34.2 
Pensions, payroll, benefit administration 2.0 1.5 
Corporate planning and development 0.7 0.9 
Training and education 1.3 1.6 
Accounting for business 0.3 4.6 
Property services 1.1 3.9 
Purchasing 0.2 1.9 
Office services 2.1 2.5 
Marketing 0.1 2.0 
Other corporate staff 4.6 0.0 
Risk management and insurance 0.3 0.1 
In-house communications 0.0 0.1 
Table 29: Staffing levels per corporate centre function in financial services firms 
43%
31%
26%
Services Core Influencing & policy making
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c) Approximation of the staffing level in the core function 
 
Since the core role activities are fairly similar from firm to firm, benchmarking the size 
and cost of these functions against other companies is useful. From their survey, Young 
et al (2000, p.111) came up with a simple calculation model for staffing the core role of 
the corporate centre. Table 30 shows an example for a core role of a corporate centre of 
a financial services company1. Although this model, and benchmarking, does give some 
direction on staffing levels, we have to bear in mind that any one firm is unique in its 
structure, business mix and resources. Decisions to staff up a corporate centre have to be 
taken carefully. An example to staffing issues: if two senior corporate centre managers 
want to consult a lawyer at the same time, the legal department might feel it is essential 
to have a lawyer available for each. In fact, the legal department will consider it 
essential to have two lawyers available in case the two senior corporate centre managers 
want to consult a lawyer at the same time. Corporate centre staffing policy can 
contribute to excessive costs in three ways: 1) the sanctity of specialisation inhibits 
evening out the workload, 2) the desire to have capacity for the maximum load leads to 
overstaffing, and 3) the desire to build indispensability leads to elaboration of 
procedural activity. In other words, many of those corporate centre managers may feel it 
essential to be staffed to handle the maximum load they can anticipate, even though 
such load would be abnormal. Managers might expect to receive more criticism for not 
handling promptly all demands placed on them than they do for increasing their 
expenses. Consequently, normal corporate centre staffing policy may be to have 
adequate personnel not to handle average minimum load but to cover maximum load. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Turnover/ employee is based on an industrial firm; safest is to choose the highest turnover.  
Part 2: Discussion of the Corporate Centre  
120 
Company A (USA) 50,000b  employees   
Financial service industry 300,000b  US$ turnover pe r employee  
 Lowb  functional influe nce  
    Model Company A Calculation 
Baseline median financial services firm 87 87 87 
Location Europe 1.00   
  USA 1.27 Choose factor times 
    1.27 1.27 
Employees 2,000 0.34   
  5,000 0.63   
  10,000 1.00   
  20,000 1.59   
  50,000 2.94 Choose factor  
  100,000 4.68  times 
   2.94 2.94 
Turnover per employee in US$ 75,000 0.77   
  150,000 1.00   
  300,000 1.30 Choose factor times 
    1.30 1.30 
Functional influence Low 0.71 Choose factor times 
  Medium 1.00   
  High 1.05   
    0.71 0.71 
Quartiles Europe 0.71  makes 
0.67  1.42  300 
1.5 USA 0.67 0.67 0.67*300=201 
    1.50 1.50 1.50*300=450 
Core role   Lower quartile  201 
Staffing   Upper quartile  450 
Table 30: Model for corporate centre’ core function staffing 
 
This attitude toward staffing is grounded in part in the fundamentally dispensable 
character of corporate centre functions. Because this policy inevitably leads to 
overstaffing for the normal average load, it may result in a situation where there is 
actually insufficient utilisation under usual conditions. 
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C. Corporate centre economics 
 
I. Corporate centre controlling 
 
1. Controlling philosophy 
 
a) Implications for controlling 
 
Control of corporate centre costs should be initiated at the highest level. In the eyes of 
shareholders, ultimate responsibility for profits rests on group management. Control of 
corporate centre costs should not be delegated in full to corporate centre department 
managers. In corporate centre functions is no clear relationship between costs and 
profits as exists in production; the effect of corporate centre costs on profit is only in 
aggregate. Consequently, corporate centre staff has no such direct profit motivation as 
exists in commercial divisions. No company, furthermore, adds staff with the 
expectation that they will affect compensatory savings in corporate centre costs. Control 
of corporate centre costs requires determination of the essentiality of the corporate 
centre activities performed. Group management should make the decision as to 
essentiality, insofar the functions are a regulatory or other group necessity, or by the 
divis ion manager who will be charged with the cost and will be hold accountable for 
results. Each possible category of corporate centre service requires a different approach. 
They are controllable in different ways at various organisational levels. Maybe more 
than in any other important aspect of company operations, effectiveness of corporate 
centre control reflects the attitude and style of senior corporate management.  
 
b) Profit centre orientation 
 
In developing the profit motivation of those in functions not directly related to business 
activities, i.e. in the corporate centre, one way to keep the issue of corporate centre 
expense under consideration is to turn the corporate centre into a profit centre. This 
requires the corporate centre to have revenues (see also paragraphs 2.C.II and 2.C.III); 
these revenues can be allocations based on replicated market-oriented prices. Thus the 
corporate centre can have both revenues and expenses, and the balance can be said to 
represent a profit or loss to its own account. This approach does a great deal to insure a 
consistent attitude toward general corporate centre expense. It permits the adoption of 
the same methods of forecasting and reporting of variances used in the divisions1. 
 
                                                 
1 However, we could expect  every corporate centre function to seek some means of developing external 
sources of income. While such activity would have an important effect on the motivation of people in these 
corporate centre profit centres, the diversity of problems it would bring to senior management would take a 
great deal of attention away from the management of the group. 
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c) Success and challenges of corporate centre controlling 
 
When the controlling organisation has helped to increase line managers' performance, 
then corporate centre controlling can be seen as successful. This implies that the 
controlling function has to be aligned with the corporate strategy and infrastructure. The 
basis for this controlling infrastructure, is formed by (Schierenbeck, 1997) a value-
based cost management philosophy, an organisational responsibility for cost 
management, an institutionalised controlling cycle for cost management, and an 
appropriate cost information system for controlling. Challenges though include striking 
the right balance between effort and usefulness of results, the direct measurement of 
value creation, benchmarking relatively unique holding services, and owning or 
outsourcing certain controlling activities (Fiole & Pop, 2001, p.400). 
 
2. Awarding a controlling mandate 
 
a) Importance of corporate centre controlling 
 
Control of corporate centre costs is not only analysing expenses. It is also the 
application of expenses to strengthen the performance of divisions. This statement can 
even apply in the area of general corporate centre costs, where specialised functions 
often seem to assume the character of separate entities having their own validity 
irrespective of their essentiality of the divisions. The control system itself can have the 
effect of structuring the corporate centre so that cost and control bear on the 
organisation where use is made of it. The area of general corporate centre costs remains 
largely amorphous, and it  is here that supervision assumes a special character. As 
controlling corporate centre cost is more a management than a spending problem 
(Jagersma, 2000) and because of the importance and special nature of this function, an 
especially formed mandate is justified. General corporate centre expense is to be 
supervised by an especially appointed executive, the corporate centre controller 
(CCCL). As supervision takes place over a great diversity of activities, he cannot rely 
on his own knowledge, therefore, either to manage the activities of corporate centre 
departments or to speak for them. It is in the specialised nature of corporate centre 
functions that they must be conducted by those performing them. Supervision of these 
areas, then, is different from supervision in the divisional lines where organisational 
level is normally equivalent to depth of experience in that line. The CCCL provides the 
essential management link required by both senior management and the corporate centre 
department. The CCCL should have a direct reporting line to the Group Controller, who 
is responsible for group-level controlling standards, processes and reporting. 
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b) Corporate centre controlling as a management task 
 
The financial aspects are at the heart of control and the principal element in supervision. 
They are the areas in which the CCCL must be a competent manager: 
× He can be the one to whom managers look to for divisional projection, for budget, 
planning, investment and performance review processes  
× He can be the authority to spend, once plans are approved 
× He can be the one to whom senior management turns for information and 
recommendation in matters of corporate centre costs, and in that area he is expected 
to speak with authority 
× He can be the instrument through which management effects changes in corporate 
centre costs 
× Corporate centre departments look to him, also, as the source of company policy in 
its effects on them, the interpreter of company plans insofar as they affect their own 
planning, and their executive contact for adjudication of interdepartmental matters 
in which they have a position 
× He can be the point at which they apply pressure on management for innovations 
× He can be the source of studies and analyses of more efficient ways to perform 
corporate centre functions, particularly in the area of overlapping procedures 
× He can be the enforcer of a corporate centre cost reduction plan. 
 
The CCCL can expect to be exposed to two opposing forces 1) the need to delegate 
responsibility as the company becomes larger and more complex, and 2) the desire to 
centralise control over the performance of functions at subordinate levels. 
 
c) The corporate centre controlling program 
 
The purposes of a program of corporate centre controlling are to limit costs in corporate 
centre cost categories and to develop efficiencies in the performance of corporate centre 
functions similar to those that have been developed in divisions. The objective is to 
strike the right balance between the corporate centre’s efficiency and effectiveness. The 
functions of planning, control, and supervision of corporate centre costs can be 
delegated only to a level superior to the corporate centre functions themselves. That is 
virtually untenable unless it receives the full support of the most senior level 
management. It is in the areas of the corporate centre that tendencies toward empire 
building can be quite pronounced. 
 
 
 
 
Part 2: Discussion of the Corporate Centre  
124 
3. Controlling activities 
 
a) The core of controlling 
 
Planning and control is an ongoing loop in which both activities are continuously 
performed and intertwined. This loop is the core of the controlling activity. The 
planning & control process has different levels: 1) goals and problem analysis, 2, 3 and 
4) development of decision proposals, 5) decision and implementation, and 6) 
supervision and analysis of deviations. Figure 33 illustrates this process (Schierenbeck 
& Lister, 2001, p.32ff). Controlling, finalising the process, functions as the link between 
planning- decision-, and implementation processes. On level 1, goal and problem 
analysis, the controlling function does not set business goals, but develops these. 
Controlling activities include representation of value-based management in the 
discussions on goal setting, making perceived goals operational and concrete, (initial) 
assessment of the goal system on endurance, consistence and practicability, periodic 
assessment of the goal system and input for overhaul of goals, ad-hoc and situation-
specific problem analysis. Levels 2, 3 and 4 focus on the development of concrete 
decision proposals and include the search for and analysis of alternatives, forecasts and 
assessments. Alternatives might prove difficult because these might only be suitable 
independently or in conjunction with other measures. Also, suitability might change 
over time, which would require constant attention. Furthermore, environmental 
dependencies might influence the alternative’s feasibility. Forecasts deal with scenarios 
and picture possible outcomes in case of a choice for an alternative. Controlling 
activities here include: 1) limiting the forecast issue in terms of the required level of 
precision both and time span, and criteria of virtue such as verity, probability, level of 
confirmation etc., 2) cleaning of relevant data and analysis of causes, 3) development of 
a forecast model, testing its practicability, delivery and use of information, production 
of a forecast and clarification under which circumstances the forecast is valid, 4) 
development of forecasts of different alternatives, appreciation of the alternatives, 
choice for forecast, which fulfils quality criteria best, 5) estimation of the probabilities 
of forecasts, and 6) test of forecasts with respect to practicability. 
 
What cannot be solved is the discrepancy between demands on the quality of the 
forecast and the limited possibilities for arrival at informative and definite forecasts. A 
comparing assessment of these forecasts is necessary to distinguish to what extent the 
alternatives reach their goals. The goals need to be stated in measurable criteria. The 
comparison takes place after weighing these criteria and choosing a measurement scale. 
As normally more goals are pursued simultaneously, a synthesis has to take place in 
which all these goals and criteria are ranked. As probability is a central element of any 
alternative, risk analysis, as part of the assessment of alternatives, is an absolute 
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necessity. On level 5, controlling prepares and supports decision-making, which is done 
by division management. Also implementation is an issue for division management. 
Controlling can provide support when needed but does not play any major role. Level 6, 
supervision and analysis of deviations are core elements of controlling1. Supervision can 
appear in three ways: 1) check of assumptions: this serves to assess the correctness of 
the basis for decision-making, given changing conditions, 2) check on results: this is 
necessary to (also intermediately) compare budgeted values to actual values and to 
identify deviations, and 3) check on processes and conduct: this confronts the methods 
used in the planning process and the actual decisions and implementation with the 
intended processes and conduct. The analysis of deviation fulfils different functions: 
early warning on deviation of plans, allowing for timely and focused adjustments, 
support for coordination, motivation and evaluation of employees, clarification and 
reduction of weaknesses in the planning process, and connection to and input for 
following subsequent planning processes. All outcomes of these levels should be 
presented by the controlling function so as to achieve maximum impact. 
 
b) Focus on business planning 
 
A central element in controlling is business planning. Planning contributes in three ways 
(Johnson & Scholes, 1986, p.30): 1) assisting in the adaptation of the organisation to its 
environment by means of monitoring changes in the environment, formulating 
environmental and strategic scenarios, 2) providing an integration role in an 
organisation in the sense of acting as a communication channel and 3) providing a 
control mechanism to monitor performance of (parts of) the organisation against 
priorities. Planning can be done in three ways: 1) top-down, 2) bottom-up or 3) a 
combination of these two (the so-called counter flow process) (Schierenbeck & Lister, 
2001, p.38ff)2. Planning takes place along different principles. Schierenbeck & Lister 
(2001, p.39ff) distinguish between strategic and operative planning, revolving planning, 
flexible and elastic planning, and avoidance of manipulation. Table 31 shows how 
strategic and operative planning differ. 
 
                                                 
1 As planning is future-oriented, there is a need to control business developments in current conditions. 
Without this check, planning might base itself on false starting points. 
2 In the first approach, top management sets the corporate goals, which are translated down in the 
organisational hierarchy. The second approach is characterised by the aggregation of division or divisional 
plan into a corporate plan. In the last approach, top management sets some preliminary goals after which 
divisions and divisions can modify these goals. Top management finally decides on the end result. The 
counter flow process overcomes disadvantages of the first two approaches, as every manager should plan his 
activities for which he is responsible and manage integrate planning on subordinate levels, as planning should 
result in a division of labour and should be delegated in order to use the present knowledge in an optimal 
manner, and as development of plans should be separated from the coordination, integration, decision and 
implementation of plans.  
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Figure 33: Process functions in controlling 
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Characteristic Strategic planning Operative planning 
Hierarchical level Focus on highest management 
level 
Involvement of all levels with 
focus on middle management 
levels 
Uncertainty Larger Smaller 
Type of issues Mostly unstructured Well-structured and often 
repetitive 
Time horizon Mainly longer-term, but short- and 
middle term possible 
Mainly short- and middle term 
Information needs Primarily external Primarily internal 
Alternatives Wider range Smaller range 
Magnitude Concentration on single important 
issues 
Comprises all functional areas 
and integrates all piece plans 
Level of detail Broader and less detailed More detailed 
Table 31:  Characteristics of strategic and operative planning 
 
Revolving planning , also known as rolling forecasting, integrates two important 
planning elements: 1) the need for a forecast, which on an ongoing basis only changes 
in so far as circumstances demand, and 2) the integration of partial plans into an 
aggregate plan. In revolving planning, the time horizon stays constant as time 
progresses. At any point in time there is a plan looking into the future for a fixed time 
horizon. Flexible and elastic planning takes into account the possibility that reserves 
might be needed. Also, decisions of an irreversible nature are being scrutinised. Further, 
a decision tree can be designed dealing with possible decisions and possible outcomes. 
This implies continued flexibility when implementing the plan. Avoidance of 
manipulation becomes important when departments or individual managers try to 
secure their personal interests in the planning process: this can have an adverse impact. 
In order to avoid manipulation different measures can be taken (Kormann, 1974): 
analysis of interests of subordinate levels, standardization of planning and control 
systems, implementation of comparisons, development of alternatives, emphasis on 
reports on causes in stead of on effects, separated budgeting and approval permission in 
case of changes, continuous forecasts of budget deviations, creation of decentral 
controlling units reporting to a central controlling unit, analyses of profit potential of 
divisions, management audits, distribution of reporting and control responsibilities over 
independent departments, and complementing written reports with verbal comments. 
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c) Notes on budgeting 
 
Taking financial goals to a shorter term, we arrive at budgets. Budgets, amounts for 
revenues and/or costs, which are fixed for an organisational unit for a period of time, 
form a guideline for decisions and activities of organisational units (Schierenbeck & 
Lister, 2001, p.59ff). General goals for budgeting are to early identify and analyse 
deviations of the plan, to take corrective action to re-orientate towards the plan, to 
manage employee behaviour, and to generate a fixed and accepted benchmark for 
performance measurement. Budgeting therefore, fulfils different functions: coordination 
of organisational units, planning to realise strategy, motivation as a managers have 
room to manoeuvre within the budget, allocation of resources, goal-setting function, 
launching of activities, and controlling as a budget allows for analysis of deviations. 
Budgeting can be successful if the results of the process are in an acceptable proportion 
to the efforts, if the contents remain consistent with corporate goals, and if the budget 
does not lead to wrong decisions. In order to achieve this goals should be agreed upon, 
priorities should be clear, budgeted costs should be manageable by the corresponding 
manager, who should be responsible for the budget, and budgets should remain fixed as 
long as basic assumptions do not change. 
 
II. Performance measurement 
 
1. Corporate centre costs and revenues 
 
a) Nature and optimisation of corporate centre costs  
 
In the corporate centre we know three kinds of costs: 1) costs for shared services, 2) 
costs for value added activities, and 3) costs for the core function (see also 2.B.II.1.b). 
The latter is often called overhead cost, as they are not directly linked to the production 
of (end user) services and which can only be allocated by a key which in itself also is 
not related to the production of (end user) services (Schierenbeck, 1997a, p.385). 
Reducing corporate centre costs can be difficult as corporate centre services are often of 
an intellectual nature, have a high level of complexity and are non-repetitive; also, when 
corporate centre departments have no comparable external market, there will be no 
competitive pressure to keep costs low; last but not least does resistance exist with 
corporate centre managers, often based on historical issues, bad experiences or 
overrating of their own capacities (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.555ff). This implies that 
besides corporate centre controlling, extra measures are appropriate: 1) general cost 
awareness and a continuous overhaul to keep structures lean, 2) comparison of resource 
use in the corporate centre and divisions1, 3) continuous process improvements, 4) 
                                                 
1 Cole (1995, p.43ff) distinguishes between several approaches: 
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periodical check on the economics of in- and outsourcing, 5) implementation of 
standardised relationships, and 6) continuous activity analysis (see Figure 34). The 
corporate centres of companies that thought cost-effectiveness needed improving in 
many areas were, on average, around 2.5 times larger and those that need improving in 
some areas around 1.8 times larger than those that were rated good in most areas 
(Young et al, 2000, p.46). However, this relationship does not necessarily imp ly that 
larger corporate centres are less cost-effective. It may be that corporate managers are 
conscious of the high staffing in their corporate centres and infer poor cost-
effectiveness. To have an idea of how substantial corporate centre costs can be, we use 
the survey conducted by Young et al (2000). They found the costs a percentage of 
turnover as shown in Table 321.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Continuous task analysis 
                                                                                                                       
× Historical averaging: this is used when the one wishes to avoid disturbing the workers at their 
stations or when there is a only a need for information based on historical relationships; it involves 
comparing relationships of previously recorded data in order to draw inferences on the 
measurements of tasks 
× Self-logging or tim e ladders: this method relies on the workers to account for their individual time 
× Relative values: here task or activity values are assigned by relative weight to one another; usually 
the lowest time is assigned a weight of 1.0; the weights are determined through a one-time analysis 
× Work sampling: this is the process of surveying the work distribution through a form of sampling, 
such as randomly spaced visits; this is most useful in sorting out multiple task times in a work unit  
× Stopwatch: standard times may be developed using a stopwatch; sample observations are made and 
tasks are timed 
× Predetermined time standards: these are defined as the arrangement and classification of 
movements with the assignment of associated time values. 
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    Cost as % of turnover  
Country # of companies lower quartile median upper quartile  
France 15 0.67 1.31 2.74 
Germany 13 0.40 0.60 1.18 
Netherlands 31 0.42 0.71 1.27 
United Kingdom 50 0.37 0.65 1.11 
USA 50 0.78 1.47 3.35 
Table 32: Corporate centre cost as percentage of turnover 
 
Making it tangible, we show the cost per corporate centre staff member in Table 331. 
   Cost per corporate centre staff member (kUS$) 
Country # of companies lower quartile median upper quartile 
France 15 180 241 446 
Germany 14 135 234 321 
Netherlands 31 127 177 234 
United Kingdom 50 141 224 293 
USA 50 125 209 340 
Table 33: Costs per corporate centre staff member 
Caution must be expressed: it turns out that there does not appear to be any support for 
the idea that corporate centre with fewer staff typically has greater financial success. 
The corporate centres of companies that had profitability and shareholder value return 
above the average for their country were, in terms of staffing, around 20 percent larger 
than those of companies with below average profitability. Young et al, 2000, p.47)2. 
Different ways to optimise corporate centre cost are overhead value analysis and zero-
based budgeting (Schierenbeck, 1997b, p.559ff, Voegelin, 1999, p.233ff). The first 
method is aimed at creating transparency in the costs produced and the required services 
and the potential mismatch between those two. This transparency then can lead to a 
decrease in costs3. Note that this is a one-off exercise and might therefore be disruptive 
for the future4. The overhead value analysis results in less bureaucracy, increased 
                                                 
1 Note that these numbers do not say anything about the distribution of these costs.  
2 Caution is appropriate, as although the evidence suggests that corporate centre’s size may be positively 
associated with both profitability and shareholder return, the statistical analyses do not demonstrate a causal 
link. It may be that companies with more corporate centre staff are more successful at creating value, or that 
companies with better financial performance find it easier to live with larger corporate centres. 
3 Roever (in Voegelin, 1999, p.233) estimates cost savings between 10 and 20%. 
4 The exercise consists of three phases: the first phase consists of making a catalogue of present services 
including their frequency of use, the effort for producing them, prices, and end users. In the second phase, the 
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motivation of participants, increased transparency, transfer of knowledge between 
divisions, and collection of ideas for improvements other than cost savings1. Zero-based 
budgeting als o forms a fundamental way of analysing corporate centre cost. First, 
departmental goals are set, after which resource allocation takes place. In the allocation 
process costs get great scrutiny, which may lead to decrease of spending levels. As this 
is a recurring analysis, which is also broader than overhead value analysis, zero-based 
budgeting is a more fundamental approach. Transparency and the focused goals are 
other advantages. Difficulties could include lacking employee motivation, 
underestimation of the effort needed to explore alternatives and the approximation of 
cost increases when services have to change. 
 
b) Asset and Liability Management 
 
The corporate centre should house a group treasury function, as part of the group’s risk 
management efforts (Schierenbeck & Wiedemann, 1995, p.4). We can distinguish 
between the management of the balance sheet structure, influenced by market 
conditions and the maximum acceptable risk, and the trade function, delivering market 
information and transaction services (Schierenbeck & Wiedemann, 1995, p.16). Group 
treasury fulfils the following functions (Schierenbeck & Wiedemann, 1995, p.5ff): 1) 
transformation: focus on transformation of currencies, durations and interest rates, 2) 
pricing, setting of prices for financial resources allocated to divisions. By using 
opportunity costs, a comparison can be made between a client trade and a trade in the 
capital markets, 3) trade, financial assets are short term traded for the bank’s own 
accounts, which are separate from client accounts, 4) liquidity management, aim is to be 
able to fulfil (short-term) payment obligations by creating sufficient liquidity buffers, 
and 5) coordination, focus on the necessity of the integrated management of the treasury 
function. To fulfil these functions, the group treasury function should cover the 
following activities: oversight of the group’s balance sheet structure and liquidity 
management, and execute capital market operations for the group’s balance sheet. 
However, group treasury operations can also include daily clearing of payments, daily 
capital market operations for clearing and arbitration, and trade in financial instruments. 
Given the complexities in and changes of the capital markets, it is useful to form an 
asset and liability committee in which matters of more fundamental balance sheet 
structure are discussed (Schierenbeck & Wiedemann, 1995, p.18)2. The controlling 
department analyses the treasury risks and decides on the valuation methodologies. The 
                                                                                                                       
producer makes suggestions for cost savings. These suggestions should yield substantial savings and its 
implementation should be time-bound. Phase three consists of the assessment and ranking by participants of 
the proposals and the expected yield. 
1 Of the cost savings, the largest part (85%) is achieved on human resources. 
2 Topics can include the prevailing structures on the capital markets and the expectation on how they will 
develop, an assessment of the chances and risks of changing capital markets for the firm, and the development 
of correcting measures, which will be implemented by appropriate departments. 
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results of the asset and liability management function is the sum of the treasury result, 
the trading result and other results, as shown in Equation 5 (Schierenbeck, 2000b): 
 
Treasury result = earnings from yield curve spreads – direct cost 
Trading result  = profit contributions trading – direct cost 
Other result = profit from contributions of fixed and financial assets – direct cost 
Total is Result Asset and Liability Management function 
Equation 5: Asset and Liability Management result 
As the treasury manages the financial conglomerate’s capital , it is clear that substantial 
results can be achieved with this function. These results should be reported 
transparently so they cannot be mixed with results from client-driven trading and with 
irrelevant corporate centre cost. The treasury result can be calculated as in Figure 35: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Detailed calculation of treasury result 
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c) Direct measure of corporate centre value 
 
Seeing the corporate centre as a profit centre, with allocations and ‘real’ profits as 
revenues enables to calculate value creation in a direct manner as discussed in 
paragraph 1.C.I.1.a (see also Equation 2). The corporate centre would have an own 
balance sheet and profit and loss account. 
 
2. Benchmarking the corporate centre 
 
The goal of benchmarking is to have an instrument to measure (improvements in) 
performance and to identify problem areas when goals are not reached. Benchmarks can 
be used statically, when the benchmark is used for a specific point in time, and 
dynamically, when a benchmark is used over a time period. Trends can be discovered 
when dynamic benchmarks are used. Often, benchmarks are based on financial ratios, 
derived from the management accounts. However, benchmarks can be derived from 
financial as well as non-financial information and can or even should be a result of 
combining the dimensions of the Balanced Scorecard (see also paragraph 1.C.II.3) 
reflecting strategy (Kajüter, 2000, p.113). Vague benchmarks open the way for internal 
politics and should be avoided; better are transparent objective or agreed upon 
subjective benchmarks1. Due to the lack of reliable data and the differences between 
firms comparisons prove difficult. Benchmarking against theory and models might be 
the only possible way. For financial conglomerates it is not important that they reach the 
benchmark, but that they understand why they differ from the benchmark, pass 
judgment t what extent that variation is justified and which, if at all, corrective actions 
should be taken. In benchmarking against other corporate centres, staffing numbers may 
be more appropriate than benchmarking corporate centre costs. Because of the 
relationship between people and corporate centre cost, policies and practices in regard 
to staffing have a direct bearing on corporate centre costs2.  
 
                                                 
1 As the Balanced Scorecard is different for different levels in an organisation, benchmarks are different as 
well. Requirements on benchmarks include consistency and applicability over time, comparability with best 
practices of internal and external service providers, measuring the intended effect (Burchard & Von Mende, 
2001, p.480), and a link to the incentive sy stem to support motivation. Benchmarking can be done on different 
levels: characteristics of corporate centres as such can be compared (as done by Young et al, 2000); core, 
added value or shared services can be compared, and individual departments, processes and services can be 
compared. The benchmarking can take the form of comparison with other financial conglomerates; this will 
be increasingly possible as more financial conglomerates move towards the same structure, with other 
conglomerate firms, and wit h outside service providers, comparison to itself in past situations, or against 
models and theory. 
2 Accurate cost figures may be more representative of true corporate centre activity given that highly qualified 
staff cannot be distinguished from lower grade support staff. Staff numbers though, take less to identify and 
are easier to check that they are accurate and have been gathered in a standardised way. Also, it is easier to 
provide detailed breakdowns for different areas of the organisation (Young et al, 2000, p.21). 
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3. Non-financial performance measures 
 
Non- or part-financial control measurements compare outputs to a predetermined 
measurement scale and focus on errors and shortfalls against goals. Ideally, control 
measures should be objective, complete and responsive; a measure is objective when it 
is independently verifiable, complete when it captures all relevant actions or behaviours, 
and responsive when it reflects the efforts or actions of the individual being measured12. 
These attributes are seldom achieved. Figure 36 summarises the major dilemmas 
inherent in designing measures for motivational purposes. Objective measures provide 
clear guidelines about what outcomes are desired. Because objective measures are 
derived from known formulas, there is little ambiguity about desired results. From a 
motivational perspective objective measures reduce the risks of perceived unfairness. 
Subjective measures rely on the personal judgment of superiors and will be effective 
motivators only if the superior is capable of making an accurate judgment about the 
actions of the subordinate and only if trust between superior and subordinate is high. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Characteristics of control measures 
                                                 
1 Measures can be based on nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales.  
2 In fact, control systems are often negative feedback systems2 (Simons, 1995, p.75ff). 
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Measures may also vary in their degree of completeness. Incomplete measures can lead 
to dysfunctional behaviour. At the same time, the more complete the measure, the 
greater the chance that it is not responsive to individual efforts. Using this measure, 
managers may feel that doing an outstanding job will not have a noticeable effect on 
corporate performance. Objective, complete, and responsive measures can be achieved 
for lower level jobs where complexity, trade-offs, and uncontrollable events are at a 
minimum. For higher-level managerial jobs, however, finding the right balance between 
objectivity, completeness, and responsiveness is more difficult. Failure to strike the 
right balance can result in limited control of important processes, dysfunctional 
behaviour on the part of those being measured, and disregard for the measure altogether. 
 
III. Allocation of corporate centre costs 
 
1. Basis of cost allocation 
 
a) Practice of cost allocation 
 
Given complexity, no cost allocations would be easier but would result in management 
accounts not portraying true economics. That the practice of allocations, especially for 
shared services, is widespread. Figure 37 shows this (Young & Goold, 1999, p.22)1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Direct charging versus number of staff1 
                                                 
1 As measured in conglomerate firms in the United Kingdom. 
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Companies allocating
Motivation  
for allocation 
all cost (%) part cost (%) no cost (%) 
Performance evaluation 57 23 20 
Cost-based pricing 49 15 36 
Decision analysis 43 21 36 
Financial reporting 48 21 31 
Table 34: Percentage of firms allocating corporate centre costs2 
 
Fremgen & Liao, (1981, p.41) found that corporate centre cost allocation for 
performance evaluation was the most important motive (see also Table 34). In 
surveying managers for their motives on cost allocation, Atkinson (1987) found the 
results as show in Table 353. 
 
Primary objective  Respondents (in %)  
To motivate managers and employees 42 
To make economic decisions for resource allocation 32 
To justify costs or compute reimbursement 19 
Other 7 
Table 35: Motivation for cost allocation 
b) Allocation for decision-making 
 
Further on internal corporate decisions, Shubik4 (1985, p.89) suggested a partial list of 
relevant decisions that might be aided by an appropriate allocation procedure. They 
                                                                                                                       
1 E.g.: 40% of corporate centre departments uses direct charging although departments have a number of 
service staff of 20 to 50. 
2 E.g.: if the motivation for allocation is performance evaluation 57% of respondents allocate all costs 
3 This matches with what Horngren & Foster (1991, p.458) define as the purposes for cost allocation: to make 
economic decisions for resource allocation, to motivate managers and employees, to measure income and 
assets for reporting to internal and external parties, and to justify costs or compute reimbursement. 
4 As an analogy, in terms of profit allocation, Shubik (discussed in Young, 1985, p.40ff) suggested that an 
allocation scheme should provide incentives for joint action, which would maximise firm-wide profits, as the 
actions taken by one division can affect the profits, realised by others. In addition, given the level of autonomy 
assumed by Shubik, each division participating in the joint activity should be allocated profits at least as large 
as it could earn independently. He stated the following properties: 
1. The profit allocated to a given division depends only upon the various profits which can be earned by all 
possible combinations of one or more divisions acting in unison (called domain axiom) 
2. The allocated profit depends symmetrically upon all divisions (called symmetry, anonymity or fairness) 
3. The procedure allocates all profits earned by the firm 
4. A division whose presence adds nothing to the profits of any coalition should be allocated no profit 
(called dummy axiom) 
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were: decision on major investment, liquidation of a department, abolition of a product 
line, introduction of a new product, other innovations, the merger of several 
departments, the splitting of a department in several entities, pricing, purchase of raw 
materials, and sales of final products. 
 
c) Criteria for allocation 
Given motivations, a criterion must be chosen. Horngren & Foster (1991, p.460) and 
Fremgen & Liao (1981, p.47) offer six criteria: 1) cause-and-effect: using this criterion, 
managers identify variables that cause objects to incur costs; cost allocations based on 
this criterion are likely to be most credible, 2) benefits received: using this criterion, 
managers identify the beneficiaries of the outputs of the cost object. The costs of the 
cost object are allocated among the beneficiaries in proportion to benefits received. The 
rationale behind this allocation is the belief that some charged divisions benefited more 
from delivered services (such as advertisement) than others, 3) fairness or equity: this 
criterion can be achieved where objective data is at hand and the problem is to devise an 
appropriate formula for making an allocation, or with a procedural approach where a 
procedure which seems fair is used, e.g. an arbitration rule, an auction or a competitive 
market, 4) ability to bear: this criterion advocates allocating costs in proportion to the 
cost object's ability to bear them; the presumption is: the more profitable divisions, the 
greater the ability  to absorb costs, 5) independence of cost objectives: here the 
allocation method should be designed so that the amount of cost allocated to one cost 
objective is not affected by actions or events in other cost objectives during the 
allocation period, and 6) neutrality: here indirect costs get allocated where the allocation 
methodology is the best for avoiding misleading information and thus prevent 
inappropriate decisions and inefficient disputes; the difficulty is that a method neutral to 
one decision might not be neutral to another. Table 36 shows that (Fremgen & Liao, 
1981, p.48) most companies allocated based on cause-and-effect. In many cases costs 
stay in the corporate centre (see Figure 38, Young & Goold, 1999, p.23). 
 
Allocation based on Cause and effect Benefits received Fairness Ability to 
bear 
Neutrality Other 
% of companies 79 73 66 17 17 10 
Table 36: Criteria used in choosing allocation bases 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
5. If two independent allocation problems are combined into one problem, then for each division the profit 
allocated under the combined allocation is the sum of the allocations under the two individual problems 
(called additivity). 
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Figure 38: Charging costs for corporate centre functions 
 
2. Application of allocation 
 
a) Functions of allocation 
 
Different motivations lead to different functionalities of allocations. Functions of 
allocation for shared services include (Voegelin, 1999, p.81): 1) transaction function, in 
the case of internal supply of services effecting the group balance sheet and income 
statement1, 2) planning function, to supply prices to be used in planning processes, 3) 
management function, to set prices to be used in capacity utilisation and resource 
allocation, so as to fulfil organisational goals, 4) result allocation function, in order to 
distribute the group result to decentralised divisions, 5) motivational function, in case of 
prices being influential on managerial incentives, and 6) influence behaviour function, 
where decisions are always made in the interest of the group. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board stated that indirect costs should be allocated on a reasonable basis 
among the divisions for whose benefit the expenses were incurred2. The allocation 
method is left to management. This means that a reporting function is introduced, which 
                                                 
1 With a clear tax perspective. 
2 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards no. 14. 
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has effect on the value of assets and segmented income. For financial services 
companies only the latter applies (Fremgren & Liao, 1981, p.16). In their pursuit of 
different functions, some contradictory results may occur, which have implications for 
the design of transfer prices. First, there is no one transfer price, which can fulfil all 
functions, further, based on information asymmetries, setting prices for services 
between divisions by a corporate centre is inefficient and maybe hazardous, and because 
of interdependence between divisions, any one-way approach is difficult to implement. 
Transaction vs. planning function: serving the transaction function, a transfer price is 
supposed to reflect actual created cost, whereas in planning, a transfer price must 
convey information based on mid- and long-term perspectives. Coordination vs. result 
allocation function: in co-ordinating divisions it is of importance that a central 
governance body fixes internal service prices so as to determine divisional profits. In 
itself this implies a distorted business-economic perspective of a division. This is 
contradictory to the result allocation function for which we require true business-
economic insights. In this play, the issue of information asymmetry arises as divisions 
actually have better information in internal services than a central body. Only in cases 
where that central body, e.g. a corporate centre, is market-participant one can expect a 
more information symmetric situation. Motivation vs. coordination and result allocation 
functions: in order for transfer prices to be motivational, they must be free from 
manipulation, fully linked to the service and complete. From this, it is clear that they 
cannot be used for coordination purposes. Insofar that transfer prices affect divisional 
motivation, there might be a conflict between full divisional result allocation on the one 
hand and having the group's goals in sight as well. 
 
b) Distinguishing between different corporate centre costs  
 
The costs for the core functions of the corporate centre can consists of three categories 
(Innes & Mitchell, 1993): 1) costs, which cannot be definitely associated with a product 
because their incurrence is common to a variety of outputs, 2) costs which could be 
directly associated with products but which, on grounds of materiality, and/or 
convenience, are not, and 3) costs which are directly associated with individual products 
but which are deemed to be more appropriately treated as relating to all output. 
Although Activity-Based Costing could increase transparency, allocating these costs is 
inevitably arbitrary (Fremgren & Liao, 1981, p.2) as this seeks to divide something, 
which is almost indivisible1. Thomas (in: Fremgren & Liao, 1981, p.10) even stated that 
allocating these costs is incorrigible, meaning that they cannot be proved correct or 
incorrect. Zimmerman (in: Voegelin, 1999, p.139) discusses two types of allocation of 
the costs for the core functions of the corporate centre, which can be seen as corporate 
                                                 
1 Fremgren & Liao (1981) found that that the allocation bases chosen was mostly Sales, Net Assets and Total 
Direct Costs. 
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centre levy: a flat levy and a profit-dependent levy1. Micro-economics suggests that at 
the point where marginal costs equals marginal revenues, i.e. where the division works 
at its optimal point, a flat fixed levy for divisions does not have any positive influence 
for the group. Using a variable income levy for divisions does result in the optimal point 
being reached for the group. Although using the analogy of a levy makes the problem 
tangible, a further detailed exploration is difficult, as it does not answer the question 
how high this levy rate should be. With this analogy, we can see that allocating the costs 
for core functions can be used as management tool. Influencing divisional management 
may be achieved using other motivational mechanisms, and one can wonder on the 
effect of this tool. Added value costs can be allocated using a key based on divisional 
benefits or on fairness. Divisional managers will have ample possibility to question 
these costs and a business case per activity is indispensable. Shared services costs can 
be allocated using cost-based or market prices2.  
 
c) Price-setting for corporate centre services 
 
A process of multiple decisions can provide a solution to the question what should be 
paid for corporate centre services. The marketplace provides a process for services. The 
nearest equivalent that can be offered in respect to corporate centre services within a 
company is that the total cost of any item of controllable corporate centre cost must be 
authorised by and charged to the person consuming that item. There are four aspects to 
this principle: 1) the person authorising the expense must have a free choice to use or 
not to use the service and to buy it internally or externally 3 , 2) the person making the 
choice must be aware of the true cost to the company of the corporate centre service; 
even where company policy permits a free choice, decisions may be biased because, 
e.g., the accounting system does not associate all costs with the service, 3) it is difficult 
in most companies to establish which one person is responsible for all the expenses 
charged to a corporate centre service; in this accounting practice is at variance with 
management principles; no matter how essential it may be to account for a corporate 
centre service as a line item in corporate centre accounts, it is impossible to establish 
real control of corporate centre costs unless responsibility for charges is established, 4) 
if users of corporate centre functions approve, a situation will arise in corporate centre 
departments similar to within divisions: there will be some unused capacity. The 
amount and consistency of idle time in a corporate centre department will reveal the 
extent to which its activities are economically justified. This may indicate to 
                                                 
1 For further in-depth treatment of allocation of core costs we refer to Biddle & Steinberg (1985) and 
Moriarity & Allen (1991). Moriarity offers a template to use in spreadsheet software, available at 
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/M/Shane.R.Moriarity-1/dwl/AllocTem.xls (dated 1999). 
2 Canals (1997, p.292) states though that a critical aspect of a financial conglomerate is setting internal 
transfer prices for the services provided between divisions and the corporate centre. 
3 It must be clear to division managers that they have such a choice; they can apply the same methods of cost 
reduction in corporate centre areas that they on their direct costs.  
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management that provision of a service by a permanent internal organisation is not 
warranted. Corporate centre costs, which are charged to profit centres on the basis of 
actual use can meet acceptance relatively easy, provided, however, that the charge 
receiving manager in fact has complete control over such use in the same way he does 
over other costs. If he is not equally free to use/not to use competing outside services, 
any responsibility attributed to him for corporate centre costs is fictional to a degree. In 
choosing a specific internal service pricing method, the following components play a 
role (Voegelin, 1999, p.90): 1) strategic: what autonomy divisions have to participate on 
the external market, 2) market: does a complete market exist for specific services, 3) 
implementation: how difficult is it to install a infrastructure-supported process, 4) 
organisation: what are dependencies between profit centres, and 5) functional: what 
goals are to be achieved with internal service pricing. These different components lead 
to using different prices, as shown in Table 37 (Voegelin, 1999, p.84). 
 
Orientation n
Procedure  
Cost-based Market-based Benefit-based 
Centrally driven Full cost Market price 
Opportunity 
cost 
  Variable cost Market price minus   
  Cost plus     
  Marginal cost     
Negotiations between divisions with or 
without support of a central function 
  Negotiated prices, cost-,  market-,  or   benefit 
prices 
Or a mixture thereof 
  
Table 37: Types of transfer prices 
Market prices: a division can use market prices to reconstruct the external market 
within the firm (Voegelin, 1999, p.166ff). The functions market prices fulfil include the 
planning, management, result allocation, and mo tivation functions. Important 
advantages include that profit centres act as independent market participants, market 
prices lead to maximum profits for divisions and the group alike, market prices are 
objective, understandable and accepted, and market prices for internal services do not 
crowd out external market transactions. The divisions act in the sense that they take 
volume decisions as prices are set by the market and that they offer their internal 
services at prices set by the market. In order for market prices to be useful, the 
following conditions apply: there is a well-functioning market with a uniform, known 
price for the service, all supplying and demanding divisions must be free to enter and 
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exit the market, and the market knows no rationing1. Due to practicality, market prices 
might prove difficult in financial services. Reasons include: univocal appearance of 
different substitutes is lacking, no substitute is actually in existence, difficulty in 
fixation of prices due to market fluctuation, and banking secrecy laws might prevent 
market participation. Further, market prices are only useful in perfect markets with 
independent market participants. As divisions are not fully independent and as the 
internal market is captive, market prices can only be used as benchmarks. It is important 
that prices for the services should not be higher than for comparable services in the 
market. Using this approach brings three advantages: 1) the internal supply of services 
is better/same as external available, meaning that corporate centre departments behave 
similar to normal market participants, 2) divisions are secured in terms of price and 
negotiations can focus on the quantity and quality of the services, and 3) the corporate 
centre function involved will limit the service production to the minimum, as otherwise 
overcapacity will lead to a too high cost base. Cost-based prices: when market prices 
are not realisable, cost-based methods come into sight. The basis for cost prices can be 
actual, normalised, or planned costs. Advantages include the ease of determination and 
the low effort needed as data is already captured in accounting systems.  
 
Different cost approaches include:  1) variable costs approach: for internal services 
only the variable costs are being charged; the fixed costs stay at the supplying cost 
centre. This might be justified when divisions are evaluated on their profit contribution. 
This can lead to substantial problems in planning, 2) full cost approach: the charged 
profit centre sees the charges as variable cost; at the same time to the group these costs 
have components of fixed and variable cost. Advantage is that in this approach, the 
prices are transparent, and thereby difficult to manipulate, and relatively simple. 
Disadvantages include the allocation of inefficiencies and of joint costs stemming from 
other services. None of the functions as mentioned before are being fulfilled, 3) no-cost 
approach: services of minor importance could be supplied free of charge, thereby 
eliminating the possibility for profit-maximising behaviour, and 4) opportunity cost 
approach: here the price moves away from pure cost considerations. This method fulfils 
the management function but only parts of the other functions. In this case market-
conditions are introduced in the supply of internal services while at the same time 
transactions only take place internally. This approach also ensures that the highest2 
payoff is realised. As the prices are dependent on volumes, they are to be set in planning 
processes, which in turn limits divisional freedom. Internal service prices based on 
negotiations: by having internal service prices determined by negotiations, an internal 
market is constructed and decentralisation is supported. The negotiation process starts 
                                                 
1 When limits on supply and demand exist, the concept of market minus can be of use in the internal supply 
and demand. Here supply and market research costs should be deducted from the market price. If market 
prices are used, a profit margin has to be included. On a firm basis, in -/excluding profit gives a 0-sum effect. 
2 With the upper limit of that price at market -level. 
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when a department, which would like to be paid for internally supplied services, 
presents a price list to internal customers. These customers then can benchmark the 
prices externally and can accept or decline. A precondition is that internal customers 
have complete information on product-and market conditions and that market 
participation is possible. An independent and by all parties accepted centre for resolving 
issues, is necessary. In this way, the valuation of services will be more broadly 
interpreted if necessary. The literature is not conclusive on this (Voegelin, 1999, p.89). 
 
3. Allocation processes  
 
Costs can be allocated in a sequential and simultaneous way. Under the sequential 
process the expenses are closed out from one cost centre to another. No other allocation 
within the structure occurs at the time of close out. The simultaneous process on the 
other hand involves multiple allocations between cost centres concurrently. Under this 
method it is possible for a cost centre to receive an allocation from a centre that is also a 
recipient of its allocation. Therefore, we have different allocations at the same time; 
Figure 39 depicts the two systems (Cole, 1995, p.155)1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Sequential and simultaneous cost allocation 
                                                 
1 On a transaction level the cost allocation process, according to Horngren & Foster (1991, p.461), is: 1) 
choose the cost object: any activity for which a separate cost measurement is desired, 2) choose the direct 
costs to trace to the cost object, 3) choose which indirect costs to allocate to the cost object and how to 
aggregate before allocation, and 4) choose the allocation base for each of the indirect cost pools selected in 3. 
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PART 3: DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED 
CORPORATE CENTRE CONCEPT FOR FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES  
 
In this chapter, we arrive at the integrated corporate centre concept for financial 
conglomerates (ICCC). This concept is derived by harmonising theory from parts 1 and 
2. We will see that the dynamics and complexities of the financial services industry, the 
financial conglomerate structures and the corporate intentions lead to a corporate centre; 
Figure 40 shows an overview of the ICCC. The result of the theoretical part of this 
study, the ICCC, is an addition to the literature on financial conglomerates management 
and suggests an approach to deal with governance issues. It forms a comprehensive 
benchmark for financial conglomerates’ corporate centres. The ICCC consis ts of three 
interacting core elements: corporate centre nature, corporate centre management and 
organisation, and corporate centre economics. After having explored the ICCC, we will 
discuss four case studies, which are the corporate centres of the financial conglomerates 
ABN AMRO Bank, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank, and UBS, studied during 
2000. They serve to show to what extent financial conglomerates have implemented the 
ICCC and to provide in a first feedback. All case studies are subject to the trends as 
discussed in part I, chapter A and as shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 40: Overview Integrated Corporate Centre Concept 
A. Derivation of the ICCC for financial conglomerates 
 
I. The nature of the corporate centre 
 
1. Environmental dynamics, roles and structure of the corporate centre 
 
As per part 1, there are different forces at work in the financial services industry; Figure 
43 illustrates this. These forces have consequences for financial conglomerates in the 
fields of strategy, governance, organisation, and product/market combinations. 
Although one can ask if financial conglomerates should split up under specific 
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circumstances, we assume that financial conglomeration will be an important 
organisational form for the future.  Financial conglomerates would be better off to give 
priority to the question, which competencies they already have are worth developing or 
acquiring, in terms of defined (geographical) markets, distribution channels and 
products. These core competencies have to be managed in an excellent manner, 
resulting in economies of scale and scope in production and consumption of financial 
products. New distribution channels en market strategies must be a central theme, 
varying per market segment, leading to a split of core competencies in organisationally 
independent units, each defining their specific product-market driven development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Financial services industry dynamics 
If the corporate centre would like to enter an alliance, then that initiative should be 
supported (Van Wensveen, 2000, p.3)1. The divisions will then only take part in a 
                                                 
1 E.g. for the purpose of developing competencies, increasing capital power or for defensive purposes. 
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merger or alliance if that make commercial sense and if the managerial ambitions are 
realistic. These type of alliances offer a much more flexible solution to questions of 
increasing scale than straight merger1. Now, as financial conglomerates are confronted 
with similar industry changes, financial conglomerates move towards the same 
conglomerate organisational form, revealing herd behaviour. This can be seen from 
Table 382, which deals with the divisional structure of the top 20 of US and European 
banking conglomerates3. In 9 cases out of 20, Asset Management and Private Banking 
share a reporting line indicating that there is one extra management layer involved; this 
can be explained by the affinity of the businesses or by historical reasons. Striking is 
that 19 out of 20 firms have the organisational structure4, resembling divisions’ stand-
alone peer competitors, as shown in Figure 42: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Example of the weak form of conglomeration 
 
Most firms do not report separately on the existence of their corporate centre, but all 
acknowledge a headquarters with group functions. Other differences stem from 
company-specific circumstances. A longitudinal study could indicate where the 
organisational structures of individual firms came from, but based on the prototypes of 
universal banking as discussed in paragraph 1.B.I.2, we recognis e a move from the three  
centralised prototypes (full, British, and German) to the decentralised prototype of the 
American variant, the weak form of conglomeration. The distinction becomes a 
dichotomy between stronger and weaker forms of conglomeration and the question is 
how strongly the divisions are bound together within the conglomerate. Partially, the 
move of financial conglomerates towards the weak form of conglomeration from more 
centralised structures results in the creation of the corporate centre as an organisational 
                                                 
1 An example of this is ABN AMRO Rothschild, a joint venture between ABN AMRO Bank and N.M. 
Rothschild & Sons (capital market services). 
2 Based on company websites (March 2002). 
3 As measured by shareholders’ equity (Euromoney, 2001, p. 140ff), with exception of large institutions only 
focusing on retail activities. and Japanese and Chinese institutions, which, because of historical reasons, have 
highly intransparent structures.  
4 ING is the exception with a primary regional focus. 
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unit where the executive board and specific staff departments reside. The basic premise 
must be to decentralise activities to divisions if they do not have a group mission. 
Activities with a group mission should remain in the corporate centre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38: Divisional structure of financial conglomerates 
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Table 38: Divisional structure of financial conglomerates 
 
When decentralising, care should be taken with the levels of separateness. It must be 
enough to be able to compete, whilst at the same time synergies must be captured. 
Those operational and non-strategic activities, which would benefit from aggregation 
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resulting in the ability to reach scale economies, should be centralised in the financial 
conglomerate where the centralisation conditions are the best, probably outside of the 
corporate centre. These shared services could compete with outside suppliers1. We 
propose to distinguish the corporate centre in two roles, but note though that corporate 
centre departments can show elements of both roles and even might have shared service 
components. These roles are core and added value , with the examples and 
characteristics as in Tables 14 and 15. If management thinks necessary, the corporate 
centre can also perform a shared services role. However, if there is no strategic need, 
then these shared services should be placed outside the corporate centre and we propose 
to principally exclude shared services of the corporate centre, and judge on inclusion on 
a case-by case basis. Figure 43 shows how the ICCC can take on various moulds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Mould of the ICCC 
 
The roles as described by Hungenberg and Van Oijen & Douma can be recognised in 
this structure. Using this structure ensures that all corporate centre activities can be 
judged individually by their nature and contribution. Activities and influence of the 
corporate centre have to be limited to what is necessary for fulfilling the core role and 
what is possible, in terms of potential, for the added value role. The core role takes 
place in the core and policy statuses: centralisation will take place. The added value role 
                                                 
1 A separate analysis would be necessary to see if outsourcing of these services could make sense in terms of 
product quality and costs, given that corporate centre departments often operate as monopolies. In general, the 
group benefits if divisions are offered fewer centralised services; this indeed implies that outsourcing 
centralised services strengthens group performance. However, as we have seen in paragraph 2.B.III.2.b, as 
outsourcing increases, the net positive effect of decreasing staff levels and t hereby decreasing corporate centre 
costs decreases. The net advantage comes from application of market conditions. 
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takes place in the policy and matrix statuses: decentralisation will take place. Influence 
is mostly general and less functional in nature, although the latter is not out of the scope 
of the corporate centre. Taking Table 24 and the theme of outsourcing, as discussed in 
paragraph 2.B.III.2.b, into account, we propose to form the financial conglomerate’s 
corporate centre with functions as shown in Table 39. 
 
Function Group Finance 
& Control 
Group Human 
Resources  
Group Tax Group Legal & 
Compliance 
Group Audit  
Main activity Financial 
resource 
allocation and 
reporting 
Group wide 
policy setting 
and monitoring 
Tax optimisation 
and consulting 
Group wide 
legal and 
compliance 
policy setting 
and 
monitoring, 
relations with 
regulatory 
bodies 
Independent 
audit 
Role Core Core Core Core Core 
Outsourcing 
possible No Partly Partly Partly Partly 
      
Function Group Public 
Relations 
Group Risk 
Management 
Group Development Group 
Marketing 
Group 
Treasury 
Main activity Co-ordination 
of public and 
investor 
relations affairs 
Group wide risk 
policy setting 
and monitoring 
Supporting 
divisional synergies 
and generation of 
group strategies 
Managing 
group brand 
equity 
Liquidity 
management, 
balance sheet 
management1 
Role Core Core Added value Added value Added value 
Outsourcing 
possible Partly No Partly Partly No 
Table 39: Proposed functions in the corporate centre 
 
2. Effects of industry trends on corporate centre coordination 
 
Changes in the financial services industry are most visible in the divisions where 
managers are confronted with new competitive realities. However, corporate centre 
                                                 
1 As discussed in paragraph 2.C.II.1.b 
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managers will be confronted as well; Table 40 shows a list of functions in the corporate 
centre and shows which of these functions are affected by these specific environmental 
dynamics as mentioned in Figure 411. The main lever of change for the corporate centre 
in financial conglomerates should be the ability of the corporate centre to support 
strategy and to remain cost-effective. Changes in the portfolio of businesses or changes 
in corporate strategy must be seen as important activities of the corporate centre. The 
coordination instruments of the corporate centre, as discussed in paragraph 2.A.I.2, vary 
by function, but we recognise that, depending on its status (core, policy, and matrix) all 
instruments, such as personal instruction, programs, plans, self-management, role 
standardisation and (sub) culture, can be appropriate. Table 41 shows which 
departments should use which coordination instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40: Industry trends affecting corporate centre departments 
                                                 
1 We focus here on the specific governance role and the coordination instruments of the department (core or 
added value), which change because of an individual change specific to the financial services industry. It is 
completely clear that other (external) trends also play a role for specific departments, however, this will not 
lead to a change in governance responsibilities, but in a change in how activities are performed, e.g. web 
capabilities do not lead to a fundamental change in a governance role but does change the way a department 
performs an activity, i.e. in case of reporting or internal marketing of its activities. 
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Function Main activity Role  Environmental 
dynamics 
Complexity Status Coordination 
Instruments 
Group Finance & 
Control 
Financial 
resource 
allocation and 
reporting 
Core Static  High Core, 
policy  
Culture, role 
standardization and 
plans 
Group Human 
Resources  
Group wide 
policy setting 
Core Static  Low Policy  All instruments, 
personal instruction 
preferred 
Group Tax Tax optimisation/  
consulting 
Core Static  High Core, 
policy  
Culture, role 
standardization and 
plans 
Group Legal & 
Compliance 
Group wide legal 
policy setting, 
relations with 
regulatory bodies, 
setting 
compliance 
policies 
Core Static  Low Policy  All instruments, 
personal instruction 
preferred 
Group Audit Independent audit Core Static  High Core Culture, role 
standardisation and 
plans 
Group Public 
Relations 
Co-ordination of 
public and 
investor relations 
Core Dynamic  High Core Plans, goals and 
budgets 
Group Risk 
Management 
Group wide 
policy setting 
Core Dynamic  High Core, 
policy  
Plans, goals and 
budgets 
Group 
Development 
Supporting 
divisional 
synergies,  
generation of 
group strategies 
Added 
value 
Dynamic  High Policy, 
matrix 
Plans, goals and 
budgets 
Group Marketing Managing group 
brand equity  
Added 
value 
Dynamic  High Policy, 
matrix 
Plans, goals and 
budgets 
Group Treasury  Liquidity 
management, 
balance sheet 
management 
Added 
value 
Dynamic  High Policy, 
matrix 
Plans, goals and 
budgets 
Table 41: Coordination instruments per corporate centre function 
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3. Corporate centre contribution, value-based management and operational risk 
management 
 
a) Investor’s approach to ICCC-management 
 
When we regard the corporate centre as a value-creating body on behalf of the investor, 
then we can apply the investor’s view, based on portfolio management, to the financial 
conglomerate. Based on Figure 42, we propose to see a financial conglomerate as a 
portfolio of 5 stocks in stand-alone financial services company. Now, from portfolio 
theory we know that for a multi-security portfolio, the standard deviation and the 
expected portfolio return are (Elton & Gruber, 1995, p.59ff): 
 
 
 
 
Equation 6: Standard deviation for a multi-security portfolio 
 
 
 
Equation 7: Expected return for a multi-security portfolio 
 
Table 42 shows an example for a portfolio of 5 individual financial services stocks1: 
    wi Re s i rij       
1 Insurance activities 14% 10.3% 0.628 r12 0.2 r24 0.3 
2 Investment banking 22% 13.5% 1.156 r13 0.3 r25 0.3 
3 Asset management 11% 9.0% 0.122 r14 0.7 r34 0.5 
4 Retail banking 24% 14.2% 0.650 r15 0.6 r35 0.7 
5 Private banking 29% 8.0% 0.092 r23 0.4 r45 0.8 
  100% 11.1% 0.504     
Table 42: An example of 5 financial services stocks 
 
                                                 
1  
Re Averages of returns of a large number of comparable firms 
s i Averages of standard deviations of a large number of comparable firms 
rij Assumed correlation coefficients 
wi Ratio of allocated capital to total capital as decided by investor 
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Together with Equations 6 and 7, the standard deviation of the example portfolio is sp = 
0.504 with an expected portfolio return of Re= 11.138%. We call this portfolio the 
model ICCC-portfolio for the combination of these five stocks (ICCCpf). If the investor 
chooses to buy a share of a financial conglomerate (FC) with the same characteristics in 
terms of capital allocation, expected divisional returns and divisional standard 
deviations, then the standard deviation should be sp = 0.504 with an expected share 
return of Re= 11.138%. The straight line formed by the risk-free investment (e.g. Rf = 
5.750% and s f = 0) and the ICCC-portfolio is the ICCC-line (see Figure 44). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: ICCC-line 
 
If a share of the conglomerate plots above the ICCC-line (e.g. financial conglomerates 
(FC) A and D), then the investor should consider to buy the share as capital appreciation 
is expected; however, if the share of the financial conglomerate plots below the ICCC-
line (e.g. financial conglomerates B and C), then the investor should consider not to buy 
the share as capital depreciation is expected. If the financial conglomerate’s share plots 
on or above the ICCC-line, then the combination of the businesses is managed in an 
excellent manner. In terms of investor’s preference, the financial conglomerate is a 
superior form over holding individual stocks and internal units, which exist just to serve 
the conglomerate as such, such as the corporate centre, actually create value. 
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b) Corporate centre contribution 
 
Given the dynamics in the financial industry, divisions of financial conglomerates will 
continue to find themselves reacting imperfectly to these dynamics. The contribution of 
the corporate centre in a financial conglomerate therefore lies in supporting the growth 
of the business by repositioning (build proposition) and by reinventing the group by 
reshuffling of businesses with different characteristics (portfolio development 
proposition). Also, the corporate centre can support divisions in becoming more 
efficient by using resource allocation in a restricted way (stretch proposition). Perhaps 
the most important potential contribution of the corporate centre is the capability of the 
corporate centre to facilitate synergies (link and leverage propositions); by having the 
overview over the different divisions, the corporate centre should actively initiate 
synergy proposals, aimed at both scale and scope economies in production and 
consumption and design and deploy different instruments. Identifying and eliminating 
boundaries for synergy is also important (see paragraph 2.A.III.3). It is clear that the 
corporate centre cannot perform these activities successfully when the divisions are not 
motivated to pursue synergies, which requires incentive systems. The corporate centre 
must be highly competent and knowledgeable of the different businesses. 
 
c) Value-based and operational risk management 
 
As value-based management and operational risk management are becoming important 
issues for financial conglomerates, these issues are significant for the corporate centre in 
two manners: 1) insofar as the corporate centre departments perform a group task, they 
should promote and integrate value-based management and operational risk 
management in all their services offered to the divisions, and 2) the corporate centre 
departments themselves should implement value-based management and operational 
risk management in their own processes. The fact that the corporate centre does not 
have direct links to external customers can lure corporate centre management into the 
trap of fals e security, as a direct check might be absent1. Using Figure 4 for value-based 
management and the criteria for operational risk management, as discussed in paragraph 
1.C.III.3, we can make a scoring table for corporate centre departments as shown in 
Tables 43 and 44, in which 5 means a high score and 0 a low score. A high score at 
value-based management implies that condition to be well-developed. In operational 
risk management, it means the opposite: it implies the need to lower that score. These 
tables indicate where corporate centre departments should improve on the various 
dimensions in order to implement value-based management successfully and to 
minimise operational risk. 
                                                 
1 Corporate centre officials, often equipped with far-reaching authorities, can have great influence on value 
and risk and should be aware of that. 
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Finance & Control 5 4 4 4 3 3 
Human Resources  2 3 3 3 4 2 
Tax 4 4 2 2 3 3 
Legal & Compliance 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Audit 4 4 4 4 3 3 
Public Relations 3 3 4 5 3 2 
Risk Management 4 4 3 3 2 2 
Development 2 3 1 1 2 2 
Marketing 3 3 2 3 3 2 
Treasury 5 4 4 4 3 3 
Table 43: Example of scoring value-based management 
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Finance & Control 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Human Resources  1 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Group Tax 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 
Legal & Compliance 4 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 3 
Audit 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Public Relations 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 
Risk Management 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Development 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Marketing 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Treasury 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 
Table 44: Example of scoring operational risk management 
 
II. Corporate centre management and organisation 
 
1. Solving managerial issues 
 
In paragraph 2.B.I.2, we have identified six problems of the corporate centre in  
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governing a financial conglomerate. The agency problem between the corporate centre 
and the divisions can be solved using performance contracts. In these contracts, market 
conditions should be replicated and top management preferences can be reflected. 
Moral hazard  can be avoided if the incentive structure of managers is consistently 
symmetrical. This can be achieved by paying positive out on and deducting negative 
bonuses from an escrow account. These bonuses vary with swings in the valuation of 
the corporate centre and the group. The coordination  problem can be tackled by forming 
formal communication channels, such as committees, while at the same time adjusting 
the compensation systems to reflect the extra effort and result from these 
communications; this is also a mechanism useful for supporting synergies. Having a 
detailed and well-accessible information system provides a tool to deal with difficulties 
in organisational design . As the organisation structure does not vary with the 
environment by itself, we cannot expect that the organisation structure in itself enables 
solutions; the organisation structure should be empowered, i.e. give rise to initiation of 
the solution. In this way, it could be that managers from different departments and 
levels are working to solve a specific client need. Incentive systems, which take 
individual motivation in account should support motivational issues; however, the more 
individual the system becomes the more difficult to standardise processes. A high level 
of transparency ensures that influence costs remain limited. 
 
2. ICCC-management style 
 
Given 1) the industry dynamics, 2) the weak form of the financial conglomerate and 3) 
the focus of the corporate centre on the core and added-value role, we can now position 
the ICCC-management style. Using the continuum of Figure 26 between the strategic 
planning and financial control management styles (paragraph 2.B.II.1), the ICCC-
management style should be positioned between strategic and financial control.  The 
emphasis is on managing multiple separate profit centres, each with relatively 
independent responsibilities. In the strategic review process, the corporate centre can 
challenge divisions, especially where synergies are concerned. In this way the corporate 
centre attempts to add value. The planning process is focused on target agreements 
rather than on the means. Long- and short-term criteria ensure strong incentives for the 
divisions to deliver. Resource allocation is similar to the mechanisms in the capital 
markets. Decentralised organisation structures should overlap in the sense that 
committees are formed in which synergies can be explored. These committees should be 
chaired by representative divisional rotation (including the corporate centre). In this 
manner, the committee members all are responsible for realising the potential benefits. 
As detailed long-term strategic planning becomes increasingly difficult in the financial 
services industry, the focus has to be put more on the mid -term with short-term 
indicators. Strategy development should take place in the divisions and on a group level 
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in the corporate centre. Although the level of detail should not be too high, the strategic 
plans should result in financial projections. These top-down and bottom-up processes 
should interact, but only after the first plans are formulated, and should result in a 
complete strategy. Divisions have far-reaching autonomy within the stated mission and 
central policy objectives of the group, although they do have to take into account that 
corporate centre functions might need certain divisional input. Controls should always 
be such that results can be compared to competitors and other divisions: a normalised 
number is necessary. In addition, for the corporate centre, benchmarking, as discussed 
in paragraph 2.C.II.2, should yield useful insights. Using the terminology of Campbell 
& Gould, we can summarize the ICCC-management style as follows (Table 45): 
 
Key features Added value Subtracted value Pitfalls 
Separate profit 
centres, 
divisional 
coordination 
Simplifies task 
Early general management 
responsibility 
  
Budgetary 
planning  
Higher standards 
Challenges that won't deliver 
Avoids 'potholes' 
Distracts from 
strategic issues 
Encourages 
milking the 
business 
Business 
autonomy 
Advice, not instructions No co-operation, 
no 'help' for 
divisions 
Gratuitous 
suggestions 
Long- and short-
term criteria 
Acceptance of longer-term 
investments 
Balanced objectives 
Ambiguous 
objectives 
Tolerance for 
low 
performers 
Capital 
rationing 
Uninformed 
in/divestments 
Flexible controls More tenacious pursuit of long-
term goals 
More innovative, responsive 
strategies 
Subjective 
assessments 
Less 
accountability 
Can lead to 
politics 
Table 45: Summary of the ICCC-management style 
 
3. Staffing the corporate centre 
 
The calculation model in paragraph 2.B.II.3.c gives an indication how the core role of a 
corporate centre can be staffed. Based on Tables 29 and 38, Table 46 shows a more 
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detailed approximation of staffing levels1. Large corporate centre staffs are not 
generally rated as more effective than small ones. It is the skills of the staff and the 
value from their activities that matter more than their numbers or cost. At the same time, 
large corporate centre staffs are fully justified provided that they are genuinely needed 
to support value creation opportunities. As can be seen from and Table 47 and Figure 
45, it becomes clear that, as the financial conglomerate grows, in terms of headcount, 
the corporate centre grows slower, which points to scale effects. 
 
  Europe USA Europe USA 
Corporate centre function 
Corporate centre 
staffing 
per 1,000 fte 
(median) 
Financial 
conglomerate 
with 50000 
fte 
Group Finance & Control 3.9 6.4 193 320 
Group Human Resources  2.3 0.7 115 33 
Group Tax 1.0 1.2 50 58 
Group Legal & Compliance 2.5 4.6 123 229 
Group Audit  1.3 2.7 65 136 
Group Public Relations 0.7 1.1 34 53 
Group Risk Management 0.3 0.1 14 4 
Group Development 0.7 0.9 37 46 
Group Marketing 0.1 2.0 5 98 
Group Treasury  0.3 1.3 15 65 
Total corporate centre staff 
(fte) 
13.0 20.8 649 1040 
Of total fte  1.3% 2.1% 1.3% 2.1% 
Table 46: Staffing per corporate centre function in a financial conglomerate 
Total # fte  
 Status 
 
 A 
50,000 
B 
60,000 
C 
70,000 
D 
80,000 
E 
90,000 
F 
100,000 
Total corporate centre staff (fte) Europe 649 713 778 843 908 973 
   1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 
  USA 1,040 1,144 1,248 1,352 1,456 1,560 
    2.1% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 
Table 47: Corporate centre’ staffing in a growing financial conglomerate 
 
 
                                                 
1 Based on own calculations 
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Figure 45: Various sizes in a growing financial conglomerate 
 
III. Corporate centre economics 
 
1. Financial orientation of the corporate centre 
 
Financial conglomerates increasingly have more specialised divisions; this can be 
understood as an increase in the transparency and understanding of the level of 
diversification. As we saw in paragraph 2.A.I.1.b, this implies that more emphasis 
should be put on financial measures than strategic measures for assessing a division’s 
performance1. In the continuous search for the right corporate centre, the effectiveness 
of the corporate strategy and the corporate centre must be assessed. Principally, the 
corporate centre should be managed as a profit centre. This does not mean that 
corporate centre departments should make a monetary profit: it means that the 
behaviour of corporate centre managers and staff should be modelled as if the 
department was a market participant in its own right. Benchmarks, the Balanced 
Scorecard and incentive systems can help to orientate corporate centre managers. Also, 
the profit centre structure ensures transparency. Cost allocations out of the corporate 
                                                 
1 This does not mean that strategic considerations are unimportant; these are indeed important. 
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centre, as dis cussed in paragraph 2.C.III, can be seen as revenues. However, if revenues 
prove unable to calculate, the revenue side of the corporate centre department can be 
expressed in market-based financial or non-financial benchmarks, expressing efforts and 
results of the corporate centre (department) (see also paragraph 2.C.II.2). Better or same 
benchmark performances point to a proper relationship between cost and benefit. With 
reference to paragraphs 1.C.II and 2.C.I, the corporate centre should have an appropriate 
controlling organisation and mandate. Similar to the cost development of the corporate 
centre to the cost development of the financial conglomerate as a whole, if the corporate 
centre controller (CCCL) has the organisation and mandate, the controlling function 
would grow less fast than the corporate centre. This mandate should encompass 1) 
projections, revenue and cost budgeting, planning, investment and performance review, 
2) authority in the field of information and recommendation in matters of corporate 
centre expense, 3) instrumental in effecting changes in corporate centre costs, 4) 
divisional policy, the interpreting of firm-wide plans and projects insofar as they affect 
corporate centre planning, and executive contact for adjudication of interdepartmental 
matters, 5) source of studies and analyses of more efficient ways to perform corporate 
centre functions, particularly in the area of overlapping procedures, and 6) enforcement 
of plans to reduce corporate centre costs. It is important to stress that if the controlling 
mandate is too narrow, the level of management support for the CCCL is too low, or if 
the CCCL lacks resources, effective control cannot be established. 
 
2. Approximation of value and costs 
 
a) The Residual Value method 
 
Recognising the corporate centre as a profit centre allows us to estimate the necessary 
variables to use in the direct methods for the measurement of value creation as 
discussed in paragraph 1.C.I.1.b. Based on regression analysis of peer comparisons, this 
could be relatively straightforward but would consume quite some resources if done for 
reporting purposes only. If we desire to measure the value added of the corporate centre 
as part of the group instead of as a standalone unit, then the typical problem that 
revenues are lacking appears. Only the shareholder value creation of revenue generating 
profit-oriented units can be measured directly. This means that, from a methodological 
point of view, a direct calculation, such as mentioned in paragraph 1.C.I.1.b, for 
standalone business or otherwise revenue generating entities, is not possible for the 
corporate centre. We therefore present an indirect way of calculating added shareholder 
value of the corporate centre. We call this the Residual Value-method (ResVal-method) 
and it works as follows (see Equation 6): 1) calculate shareholder value creation per 
Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
164 
(revenue generating) division with Equation 21 over more than one period (leave out the 
corporate centre), 2) sum these values of the business divisions, 3) calculate the value 
creation of the group2 as the difference in market value of the group in the 
corresponding period, and 4) the difference between 2 and 3 is the shareholder value 
attributable to the corporate centre. 
 
 
Equation 8: The ResVal-method calculates the corporate centre value creation  
In using the ResVal-method, we should calculate the value of the divisions before cost 
allocation3 of corporate centre’s core and added value roles. Cost allocation should only 
be done for shared services, as these should be seen as internal service providers 
comparable with external ones. In this way, divisions resemble their competitive peers, 
which also do not receive any cost allocations, as they are not part of a financial 
conglomerate structure. Moreover, the corporate centre does not create value without 
causing costs. The result is that we can completely observe the corporate centre effect: 
the effect that divisions are members of a group and governed by a corporate centre. 
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Periodb
Division    Year 1 Year 2 
Period 
2-1 Year 3 
Period 
3-2 Year 4 
Period 
4-3 
Private banking 31 33 2 35 2 38 3 
Retail banking 12 16 4 14 -2 13 -1 
Investment banking 37 35 -2 31 -4 26 -5 
Asset management 8 6 -2 7 1 9 2 
Total for divisions 88 90 2 87 -3 86 -1 
  111% 100% 18% 96% -300% 101% 17% 
Group market value 79 90 11 91 1 85 -6 
Corporate centre value creation -9 0 9 4 4 -1 -5 
relative to group -11% 0% 82% 4% 400% -1% 83% 
Table 48: Quantitative value added by the corporate centre 
                                                 
1 From paragraph 1.C.I.1.a. As an example for the value creation in Table 45 for the division Private Banking 
in period 1: Economic Profit = NOPLAIT – Economic Capital * RAROC = 31 = 41 – 143*7% (assumed). 
2 We assume that the group is listed as one stock. 
3 We refer to paragraph 3.A.III.3: a discussion of allo cation for management purposes. 
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Table 48 and Figure 46 show an example for a financial conglomerate1. Obviously, it is 
difficult to break an increase or decrease in market value down to individual divisions, 
i.e. what value is created where due to synergies; a survey under shareholders could 
give an indication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Divisional value creation over time 
 
If that difference is positive, one might assume that the capital markets are judging 
factors such as synergies as positive. Peer comparison could give a first idea on that. 
The assumption is that divisions benefit from being a member of the group and that the 
corporate centre is responsible for the synergies: divisions by themselves, left to their 
own devices, would not strive for interdivisional synergies. Capital market participants, 
shareholders and group management should take careful consideration if the negative 
added value produced by the corporate centre is lower than the produced synergies. 
 
b) Providing a cost benchmark 
 
Based on the data in Tables 29, 33 and 39, Tables 49, 50 and 51 present benchmarks for 
costs levels for the corporate centre in financial conglomerates. As corporate centres in 
financial conglomerates vary, this benchmark can help as a first orientation. 
 
                                                 
1 The numbers are for illustration purposes only and do not stem from any existing financial conglomerate. 
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Average cost per corporate 
centre staff (kUS$) 142 217 327 142 217 327 
  65% 100% 151% 65% 100% 151% 
Group Finance & Control 547 835 1,259 907 1,387 2,090 
Group Human Resources  327 499 752 94 143 216 
Group Tax 141 215 324 165 252 379 
Group Legal & Compliance 349 534 804 649 992 1,494 
Group Audit  185 282 425 385 588 886 
Group Public Relations 97 148 222 151 230 347 
Group Risk Management 38 59 88 11 17 26 
Group Development 105 161 242 131 200 301 
Group Marketing 13 20 29 278 425 641 
Group Treasury 41 63 95 183 280 422 
Total corporate center cost 
per 1,000 fte in the financial 
conglomerate (in kUS$) 1,842 2,814 4,241 2,954 4,514 6,802 
Table 49: Corporate centre cost benchmark for financial conglomerates 
 
  Total corporate centre cost (in US$ mio)     
   Europe     USA   
Growing financial 
conglomerate (in 
fte) - status B to F l
ow
er
 q
ua
rt
ile
 
m
ed
ia
n 
up
pe
r q
ua
rt
ile
 
lo
w
er
 q
ua
rt
ile
 
m
ed
ia
n 
up
pe
r q
ua
rt
ile
 
60,000 101.3 154.8 233.3 162.4 248.2 374.1 
70,000 110.5 168.9 254.5 177.2 270.8 408.1 
80,000 119.7 182.9 275.7 192.0 293.4 442.1 
90,000 128.9 197.0 296.9 206.8 316.0 476.1 
100,000 138.1 211.1 318.1 221.5 338.5 510.1 
Table 50: Corporate centre cost development in an organically growing financial conglomerate 
Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
167 
Financial  
conglomerate with 
50,000 fte (status A)   Europe     USA   
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function l
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Group Finance & 
Control 27.3 41.8 62.9 45.4 69.3 104.5 
Group Human 
Resources  16.3 25.0 37.6 4.7 7.2 10.8 
Group Tax 7.0 10.7 16.2 8.2 12.6 19.0 
Group Legal & 
Compliance 17.5 26.7 40.2 32.4 49.6 74.7 
Group Audit  9.2 14.1 21.3 19.2 29.4 44.3 
Group Public Relations 4.8 7.4 11.1 7.5 11.5 17.3 
Group Risk 
Management 1.9 2.9 4.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 
Group Development 5.3 8.0 12.1 6.5 10.0 15.0 
Group Marketing 0.6 1.0 1.5 13.9 21.3 32.0 
Group Treasury 2.1 3.1 4.7 9.2 14.0 21.1 
Total corporate centre 
cost (in US$ mio) 92.1 140.7 212.1 147.7 225.7 340.1 
Table 51: Cost example of a corporate centre in a financial conglomerate 
 
In order to maximise insight in and control over costs, cost accounting should be done 
along the lines of work processes, in which value- and cost drivers are distinguished. 
ABC and PSDC are appropriate instruments in this respect. In revenue accounting for 
the treasury function, MFTP should be used. In this way, the corporate centre becomes a 
value- and market-oriented organisation. 
 
3. Corporate centre cost allocation 
 
The corporate centre has two types of roles and functions, core and added value. As the 
ICCC-mould in Figure 43 illustrates, shared services could be part of the corporate 
centre. Allocations for core functions should be seen as a corporate centre cost charge 
and are motivated by corporate interests. This means that corporate level management 
can decide how this burden is distributed over the divisions, portraying what corporate 
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level management thinks of its efforts for the divisions but without giving the 
impression of an arbitrary allocation. The allocation performs the motivation and 
influencing functions. Criteria for the corporate centre cost charge (also named indirect 
cost) should be fairness, neutrality and benefits received. If this burden falls on the 
corporate centre, then the charge is against group profit and is not used to influence 
divisions. This is the easiest method but has the effect that divisions experience the 
corporate centre to be for free or even perceive the corporate centre to be value 
destroying. Allocations for added-value functions should be justified by costs incurred. 
The best criteria for this type of allocation are cause and effect, and benefits received. 
The allocation performs the result allocation, transaction and motivational functions. If 
they exist, shared-service costs can be allocated based on the replication of a market 
place. This is done to justify costs and to compute reimbursement and to make 
economic decisions for resource allocation. Cause and effect, and benefits received 
must be the main criteria. In setting prices, it is important that the divisions do not form 
a captive market. Market prices are the main prices used, but cost-based prices might 
apply. As services might only be partly available on the market, prices should reflect 
this part availability. Negotiated prices, containing elements of market based prices and 
cost based prices are appropriate here. In order to have transparency in the real flows 
between the corporate centre and divisions, allocations should take place in a 
simultaneous way without netting, as discussed in paragraph 2.C.III.3. 
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B. Corporate centres in four financial conglomerates 
 
I. ABN AMRO 
 
1. General observations 
 
a) Introduction 
 
ABN AMRO Bank NV (AA)1 is a global banking group of 115,098 people (of which 
33.8 percent in the Netherlands) active in 74 countries and headquartered in 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands2. For 2000, its balance sheet totalled € 543 bn, net profits 
were € 2.4 bn and the market capitalization was € 37.2 bn (ABN AMRO, 2001). AA, 
presided by the Group Managing Board (GMB), is organised in five divisions and a 
headquarters, which are all based in Amsterdam (see also Figure 47): 
1. ABN AMRO Lease Holding, with 7,070 fte 
2. Foreign Division, with 59,324 fte 
3. Investment Banking Division, with 12,248 fte 
4. Netherlands Division, with 26,132 fte 
5. Resource Management Division, with 9,674 fte 
6. Headquarters, with 650 fte. 
 
During 2000, AA reorganised into three strategic business units (SBUs), Wholesale 
Clients, Consumer & Commercial Clients, and Private Clients & Asset Management, 
and a Corporate Centre. Goals of this reorganisation were (ABN AMRO, 2001, p.19): 
1) a clearer focus in the activities and organisation, 2) to improve service to clients, 3) to 
increase transparency in and accountability for value creation and destruction, 4) to 
have managers concentrate in what they do best, and 5) to provide employees with a 
more challenging working environment and to offer them a corresponding 
compensation. Although at present AA increasingly shows a trend in the direction of the 
American variant of a financial conglomerate the status in 2000 was more that of a 
mixture of the German and British variants. This is due to changing priorities in the 
product and client mix and its effect on the organisation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The corporate centre of ABN AMRO Bank was studied during 2000. Dynamic as the financial services 
industry is, many changes took place during and after 2000. 
2 For a description of the recent history of ABN AMRO Bank, specifically the merger of ABN and AMRO, 
we refer to Nawas (1995). 
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Figure 47: Changing organisation structure AA 
 
b) Value orientation 
 
AA recognises that there are different stakeholders, which have an interest in the 
development of the group’s results. The emphasis on shareholder value forms the best 
means for a well-balanced protection of the varying interests of these stakeholders. The 
ultimate yardstick to measure whether AA reaches its primary goals is the total 
shareholder return, as measured by the increase of the share price combined with 
dividend payments. The program AA has chosen to realise maximum shareholder value 
is called Managing for Value (MfV) and the bank expects MvF to be fully interwoven 
in the corporate culture. MfV demonstrates itself in two ways: 1) economic value, as 
witnessed in the market value of AA, and 2) economic profit, as defined as the net profit 
after tax less risk-adjusted cost of capital; this is the amount of annual value creation 
and corresponds to the methodology of Stern Stewart, as discussed in paragraph 
1.C.I.1.b. MfV is seen as a holistic approach with three fundamental aspects: 
organisation, strategy and finance. AA expects MfV to become a way of life. Capital 
and human resources will be allocated to activities, which offer the prospects for the 
best yields. AA uses MfV to improve performance, to facilitate cultural change, to 
improve the way the group dialogues with investors, and to improve the way the group 
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manages itself by increasing transparency and accountability throughout the 
organisation (ABN AMRO, 2000). In AA, value-based management is centred around 
six processes (Van Dun, 2000, p.24, based on McTaggert et al, 1994): 
1. Corporate governance: this involves determination of a) an organisational 
structure with the greatest clarity and transparency, and b) the right roles and 
responsibilities to achieve the highest degree of accountability for value 
creation or destruction. The GMB consists of members with SBU 
responsibilities and the Chairman and the CFO with group responsibilities. the 
Chairman and the CFO should: 1) make, uphold and reinforce the rules by 
which AA will be managed, 2) create the organisation needed to achieve AA’s 
governing objective, 3) ensure that all corporate and business unit strategies 
support the achievement of the governing objective, and 4) ensure that the 
corporate agenda is executed. The members with SBU responsibilities should: 
1) determine the highest value for their business units, and 2) implement the 
strategy successfully 
2. Strategic planning: this involves developing strategic options and is a 
continuous and bottom-op process. Based on three to four year economic profit 
projections, the highest value creating strategy can be identified and selected. 
Discussion and approval of strategic plans is a responsibility of the entire 
GMB. After approval, a performance contract is signed that commits the SBU 
management to perform the plan and the Chairman, the CFO and the corporate 
centre fund the strategy 
3. Resource allocation: the budgeting process should result from the strategic 
planning processes. The Chairman, CFO and the corporate centre are to decide 
where resources are best allocated 
4. Performance management: value-based targets play an important role in 
performance measurement. The internal measurement of performance is the 
sum of all business unit economic profit. The external measurement is related 
to total return to shareholders 
5. Management compensation: compensation should be linked to the governing 
objective. The GMB and Corporate Centre staff should be compensated on the 
basis of total return to shareholders and economic profit. SBU management 
should be compensated on the basis of SBU economic profit  
6. Financial policy and capital structure: besides the profit and loss account also 
the balance sheet is important; equity use is penalised via a capital charge. 
 
c) Operational risk management 
 
AA defines operational risk as the risk that a loss is created as a result of ineffective or 
failing internal processes, human behaviour and systems or as a result of external 
Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
172 
events. Operational events such as problems with information technology, shortages of 
the organisational structure or internal control, human behaviour, fraud and external 
threats are included (ABN AMRO, 2001, p.55). Responsibility for the operational risk 
management is with managers and staff at all levels of the organisation. There are 
several coordinators for operational risk management within the bank. They provide 
managers and staff with policies, methods, means of support and information to 
improve operational risk management. Further, in 2000 a management structure has 
been set up to coordinate, approve and implement operational risk management. Also, 
an operational risk policy was developed (including policies with regard to e-commerce 
and an approval process for the introduction of products, systems and projects) and the 
principle of internal risk assessment was further implemented. Improvement of systems 
for measuring operational risk is under development and will help to translate 
operational risk into necessary economic capital to fulfil capital requirements. 
 
2. The corporate centre 
 
a) The role and influence of the corporate centre 
 
The corporate centre is in charge of the governance of AA and supports and stimulates 
the SBUs in the execution of their business strategies. Corporate centre goals are: 1) to 
sustain and strengthen the primary goal of maximalisation of shareholder value 
throughout the group, 2) to see to it that the business units implement strategies 
consistently and achieve results necessary to generate a superior yield for shareholders, 
and 3) to administer the portfolio of AA-units in order to promote synergy benefits. The 
GMB will focus on the development of group strategy, resource allocation to the 
different SBUs, performance management, determination of potential synergies between 
the SBUs on material investments and acquisitions. A full delegation of operational 
responsibilities to the SBUs is  a fundamental aspect of the restructuring. The GMB does 
keep the final responsibility for strategy development on SBU level (ABN AMRO, 
2001, p.19ff). Certain necessary policies, decision-making and setting standards also 
remain at the group level. Part of the governance role of the corporate centre is strategic 
decision support. Transparent performance contracts between the GMB and the SBUs 
are a result of that and pave the way for MfV (ABN AMRO, 2001, p.26). These four-
year performance contracts, which substitute annual budgets and which links strategy, 
resources and performance, are signed between the CFO and the head of each SBU; the 
corporate centre commits to the resources and the SBU commits to the performance. 
The corporate centre has adopted a leadership model in which it works in collaborating 
partnership with the SBUs; in principle SBUs are autonomous. This becomes clear from 
the fact that the role of the corporate centre in strategy formulation has been much 
smaller in 2000 than in previous years (Van Dun, 2000, p.22). The soundness of 
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business plans and budgets are evaluated by the corporate centre that will allocate 
resources accordingly. Thus, the corporate centre is not involved in the planning and 
budgeting processes of the SBU’s but does evaluate the resulting plans and budgets. 
Monthly discussions between the GMB and the business units about the divisional 
performance is classified as ‘friendly’ but does not involve a fundamental discussion 
about the goals and objectives to be achieved. The relationship between corporate 
planning and control and divisional planning and control is functional and characterised 
as ‘loose’. The allocation of corporate centre costs is often a point of disagreement 
between the corporate centre and the business units. For coordination purposes, AA has 
the committees as shown in Table 52. 
 
Cross-SBU 
Committee 
Chair Other members  Activity 
Group Asset & 
Liability 
Committee 
CFO GMB members who are 
chairman of an SBU, 
SEVP Market Risk 
Management, SEVP 
Group Finance, SEVP 
Global Financial 
Markets, CFOs SBUs, 
EVP ALM, Chief 
Economist  
Responsibilities are corporate wide 
risk measurement methodology, 
overall risk limit setting per SBU 
and per currency for interest rate 
and liquidity mismatches, 
management of the consolidated 
liquidity and interest rate position of 
the bank, monitoring, analysing and 
advising the GMB on usage of 
capital per SBU, management of 
corporate capital structure, standard 
and policy setting for transfer 
pricing and inter SBU transactions, 
corporate investment portfolio 
management, and hedging the 
invested capital and profits in 
foreign exchange 
Controllers 
meeting 
CFO SEVP and EVPs Group 
Finance, CFOs and 
controllers of the three 
SBUs 
Involves policy and operational 
issues with regard to the finance 
function, including management 
information systems and capital 
allocation topics 
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Cross-SBU 
Committee 
Chair Other members  Activity 
IS Board CFO COOs of the three 
SBUs, a business/IT 
representative for each 
SBU, EVP Group 
Organisation & 
Information 
Management, EVP 
Group ICT, EVP Group 
Audit 
Advises the GMB on strategic ICT 
matters. The objective of this 
committee is to secure IT strategy, 
standardization and shared IT 
development as corporate agenda 
points and to stimulate synergy in 
the area of IT  
Corporate 
Remuneration 
Committee 
CFO GMB-members who are 
chairman of an SBU, 
SEV Group HR, EVP 
Corporate Career 
Focuses on compensation and 
benefit issues of senior management 
Group 
Operational Risk 
Committee 
CFO CFO and COO of each 
SBU, representatives of 
Risk Management, 
Group Finance, Group 
Audit, Corporate 
Compliance & Security, 
Group Organisation & 
Information 
Management, OR Policy 
& Support  
Defines and approves policies and 
standards on operational risk 
management 
(Policy) Group 
Risk Committee 
On rotation 
basis Head 
Risk Mgmnt 
and two senior 
members of the 
dept Risk 
Mgmnt 
One GMB member for 
each SBU, 
representatives of Risk 
Management of the 
SBUs, Credit Risk 
Management, Portfolio 
Management,  Loan 
Products and other 
businesses  
This was previously called the 
‘Concern Krediet College’. The 
meeting takes place three times a 
week, with the Friday meeting 
focussed on policy issues 
Human 
Resources Board 
Head 
Corporate 
Centre 
Head Group HR, Group 
HR members, heads HR 
SBUs 
 
 
 
Deals with group wide human 
resource topics 
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Cross-SBU 
Committee 
Chair Other members  Activity 
Resource 
Allocation and 
Performance 
Management 
Committee 
CFO Representatives of the 
SBUs and the Chairman 
of the GMB, SEVP and 
EVP group Finance 
Advises the GMB, the SBUs and the 
corporate centre on optimizing 
economic value creation in the 
setting of targets, the allocation of 
resources and the fixing of budgets. 
It assesses the business plans and 
reviews performance of the (S)BUs 
Table 52: Cross-SBU committees of AA 
 
b) Corporate centre functions and structure 
 
In including functions in the corporate centre, the guiding principle is that corporate 
wide supporting activities will take place in the corporate centre and business unit 
specific supporting activities will take place in the business units (Van Dun, 2000, 
p.27)1. Table 53 shows the functions in the corporate centre (ABN AMRO, 2001, 
p.27ff). The reporting lines in the corporate centre are shown in Figure 48. 
 
Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role 
Chairman Corporate 
Communications 
(including Investor 
Relations) 
Responsible for the in- and external 
communication of AA; also 
responsible for the preservation an 
improvement of the bank’s 
reputation 
Core 
Chairman Corporate 
Development 
Functions as consultant to the GMB 
in the management of the total 
portfolio; responsible for signalling 
and analysis of group level merger- 
and acquisition possibilities and the 
preservation of appropriate criteria 
Added 
value 
                                                 
1 Update: In the first half of 2001, AA made an assessment of its corporate centre. The goals were to increase 
the transparency of the corporate centre and to decrease the number of corporate centre staff from 650 fte to 
520 fte. AA distinguishes between three types of functions: 1) Governance: tasks supporting the executive 
board in their (strategic) decision-making, 2) Standard and policy setting: the setting of standards and policies 
to be implemented by the SBUs, and 3) Shared Services: tasks benefiting the SBUs, but which are bundled in 
the corporate centre because of economies of scale or scope; starting point is that the corporate centre does not 
take care of shared services unless explicitly requested by the SBUs or when they are strongly associated with 
the other two tasks. The first two functions were analysed with a focus on their efficiency and the latter task 
was assessed on the possibility for decentralisation. 
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Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role 
Chairman Group Audit Independent investigation of the 
quality of risk management within 
the group including the central 
supervision of basics and values of 
auditing (the operational audit 
responsibility devolved to the 
SBUs) 
 
Core 
CFO Group Finance Responsible for budgeting for 2001 
to financial and strategic planning 
over several years including 
resource allocation and performance 
management, development of a 
blueprint for a new group wide 
management information system, 
consolidation and external 
reporting, setting standards for 
administrative organisation, MfV 
implementation and maintenance, 
joint responsibility with the SBUs 
for realization of synergies and the 
production of models for Service 
Level Agreements and mechanisms 
for transfer pricing. 
Core 
CFO Group Risk 
Management 
Formulation of policies on risk 
policy and risk assessment, 
authorization of transactions above 
a certain SBU limit, credit portfolio 
management, approval of new 
financial instruments and 
quantitative models, the validation 
of risks and the management/ 
administration of cross-border risks 
and risks on governments 
Core 
CFO Group Information 
and Communication 
Technology  
Develops, approves and checks for 
compliance ICT standards and 
policies, leveraging group wide ICT 
buying power (together with SBUs) 
Shared 
services 
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Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role 
CFO Group Human 
Resources 
Supports the SBUs by offering best 
practices for recruitment and 
retaining of personnel, advising the 
GMB on people aspects and 
requirements for business strategy; 
also responsible for team work, 
sharing of knowledge and career 
moves over the SBU boundaries is 
stimulated 
Core 
CFO Corporate Affairs Contains compliance, legal affairs, 
fiscal affairs and economic research 
Core and 
shared 
services 
CFO EU-Liaison Office EU-level government affairs Core 
CFO Group Asset & 
Liability Management 
Reporting to Group Risk 
Management and Group Finance, it 
is responsible for the balance sheet 
structure and liquidity management; 
advising the GMB on capital usage 
per SBU, responsible for 
consolidated interest positions, 
hedging of income and invested 
capital, the portfolio of 
participations and financing 
strategies 
Core 
Table 53: Corporate centre functions and responsibilities at AA 
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Figure 48: Organisation chart of the corporate centre of AA 
 
c) Corporate centre economics 
 
The corporate centre activities are bound by performance contracts. As corporate centre’ 
financial performance is difficult to define, key performance indicators are still in the 
process of being defined. Corporate centre department managers and the head of the 
corporate centre sign the performance contracts, based on business plans and budgets. 
Finally, the collection of these contracts are bundled into one and agreed upon between 
the head corporate centre and the Chairman. The corporate centre departments are seen 
as cost centres. The added value activities in the corporate centre departments are 
benchmarked. Due to the unique character of the corporate centre functions, outsourcing 
is not seen as viable. Non-financial performance measurement does not take place. The 
total cost of the corporate centre is charged to the SBUs. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The corporate centre of AA is in the process of being formed, of which table 54 shows 
the comparison with the ICCC. 
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Characteristic 
Actual situation in 2000 
Conglomeration “German/British” variant shifting to the weak form of 
conglomeration 
Nature of corporate centre  
Role and functions Primarily core and added value, functions almost match 
ICCC in full; outsourcing not seen as option 
Coordination instruments per 
function 
Focused role standardisation, plans, goals, budgets 
Contribution, value-based 
management and operational 
risk 
Potential for contribution present, implementation unclear; 
value and operational risk orientation present, 
implementation in unclear 
Management and organisation of the corporate centre  
Solving managerial issues Performance contracts and committees are in place; 
transparency improves to keep influence costs low; 
solution for moral hazard unclear 
Corporate centre management 
style 
Coming from strategic control to financial control, 
equilibrium not reached yet, but targeted at ideal position 
Staffing the corporate centre Staffing level (650 fte, 0.6% of group) below lower limit of 
1,493 fte 1.3% of group  (upper limit is 2,394 fte, 2.1% of 
group) 
Corporate centre economics  
Financial orientation All departments are cost centres, corporate centre 
controlling unclear 
Approximation of value and 
costs 
Value measurement not performed, cost management 
unclear, non-financial performance measurements not 
present, benchmarking unclear 
Corporate centre cost 
allocation 
100% Cost allocation performed via performance 
contracts, practice of allocation procedure unclear 
Table 54: Conclusion on the corporate centre of AA in 2000 
It seems that in 2000, the corporate centre of AA was not exposed to demands of 
variety, such as questions of outsourcing or market replication. Corporate centre design 
is principally according to the ICCC. However, it is unclear if instruments are used 
effectively. As staffing is low, the full potential of the corporate centre may not be 
reached. Also, implementation of various programs is unclear. 
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II. Credit Suisse Group 
 
1. General observations 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Credit Suisse Group AG (CSG)1 is a global financial services company, including 
banking and insurance, of 80,538 people (of which 35.1 percent in Switzerland) active 
in 30 countries and headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland2. Its balance sheet totals CHF 
987 bn (€ 652 bn)3, net profits were CHF 5.8 bn (€ 3.8 bn) and the market capitalization 
was CHF 92.5 bn (€ 61,1 bn) (Credit Suisse Group, 2001). CSG, presided by the Group 
Executive Board (GxB), is organised in a corporate centre and four business units (see 
also Figure 49): 
1. Corporate Center4, with 162 fte, based in Zurich, Switzerland 
2. Credit Suisse Asset Management, with 2,350 fte, based in London, United 
Kingdom 
3. Credit Suisse Financial Services, including Winterthur Insurance and retail 
banking, with 40,577 fte, based in Zurich, Switzerland 
4. Credit Suisse First Boston, investment banking, with 28,122 fte, based in New 
York City, NY, United States 
5. Credit Suisse Private Banking, with 8,665 fte, based in Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Organisation structure CSG 
 
CSG has been reorganised in 1996 and 1997 (Jung, 2000, p.105ff) and since then has 
consequently moved further towards the weak form of conglomeration. 
                                                 
1 The corporate centre of Credit Suisse Group was studied during 2000. Dynamic as the financial services 
industry is, many changes took place during and after 2000 
2 For a description of the history of Credit Suisse Group, we refer to Jung (2000). 
3 At an exchange rate of €/CHF of 1.5136 on 31.12.2000 (source: Bloomberg). 
4 The corporate centre also includes units not allocated to the business units (662 fte); the first Corporate 
Centre was already established in 1989 (Jung, 2000, p.334) and has evolved from a financial holding into a 
management holding since then. 
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b) Value orientation 
 
During 2000, CSG introduced Value-based Analysis (VBA), which subtracts the cost of 
capital used in the business from cash flow to measure value created in a given period. 
CSG will use VBA in both performance measurements of its business units and in 
management compensation (Credit Suisse Group, 2001, p.5). Main priorities for the 
short-term future (Credit Suisse Group, 2001, p.12)1: 1) strengthen earnings power by 
increasing productivity in business areas, and minimise earnings volatility through strict 
risk management and by optimizing the business mix, 2) further develop the potential 
within the group  by strengthening the brand, and increase leverage across the group  in 
distribution, products, expertise and technology, and 3) focus on performance 
measurement, using VBA, and on capital allocation, introducing economic risk capital. 
 
c) Operational risk management 
 
In CSG, operational risk is the risk of adverse impact to the business as a consequence 
of conducting it in an improper or inadequate manner and may result from external 
factors. Five major operational risk categories have been distinguished for systematic 
approach reasons: organisation, policy/process, technology, human, external. Good 
operational management equates to good management and oversight. It often runs 
parallel to quality and/or knowledge management, all of which contribute to client 
satisfaction, a strong brand and shareholder value. The primary aim lies in early 
identification, prevention and mitigation of operational risks, as well as in timely and 
meaningful management reporting. Regular group-wide meetings take place to achieve 
this understanding of priorities and to foster dialogue between the corporate centre and 
the business units. Knowledge and experience is shared throughout the group to ensure 
a coordinated approach. Business lines take responsibility for their own operational 
risks. Operational risk management is not so much an issue of regulatory capital 
requirements but good management (Credit Suisse Group, 2001, p.43ff, Doerig, 2000). 
 
2. The corpor ate centre 
 
a) Mission of the corporate centre and business unit’ autonomy  
 
The mission of the corporate centre is the setting of group’s objectives and assisting 
implementation by facilitating processes including coordination among business units. 
Specific areas of corporate centre attention are accounting and controlling, risk and 
return relationships, shareholder matters, and corporate culture. The corporate centre 
                                                 
1 Italics added by the author; the author selected these three out of five; the other two focused on the growth of 
the business of asset gathering and investment banking. 
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acts as a centre of competence for the business units, specifically for matters concerning 
tax, acquisitions, human resources, information technology, and legal, and thus creates 
value. The corporate centre departments are responsible for implementing sub-
components of this mission. Also, another value creating activity of the corporate centre 
is the identification and facilitation of cross-business unit synergies and organisational 
leverage. Part of this is the avoidance of duplication. The business units are independent 
and linked via the group executive board and service level and revenue splitting 
agreements. In resource allocation, the corporate centre has a focus on strategic 
planning, in which the corporate centre sets the timing and the format for the strategic 
plans and where the GxB and the board of directors assess these plans. The GxB sets the 
targets for the business units after discussions with the business units. Further, the 
business units have full autonomy, except in issues of investor relations and 
communications, accounting standards and the coordination of strategies. Fine-tuning of 
interfaces between business units is a matter of the business units themselves (Credit 
Suisse Group, 2000, p.25). This does result in a culture issue, as it proves difficult to 
promote one company culture. For coordination purposes, CSG has committees as 
shown in Table 55 (Credit Suisse Group, 2000, p.9). 
 
Cross-business 
unit committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group IT and 
Operations 
Steering 
Committee 
GCFO A minimum of five 
members, a 
representative of the 
GxB and the 
respective 
responsible officers 
for IT and 
Operations in the 
business units as 
appointed by the 
GxB 
Coordination and monitoring of 
activities and projects, the 
establishment of standards and 
guidelines, the management of 
interfaces between the business units 
in the IT and Operations areas as 
well as the facilitation of IT and 
Operations activities across the 
business units; delegation of group 
tasks to the business units where 
appropriate; ensuring that IT and 
Operations strategies, planning and 
budgeting processes, architectures 
and standards etc. are established 
within each business unit (the 
committee does not define the 
contents of such instruments, apart 
from group interests and business 
unit interfaces); supported by a CIO-
office (in the corporate centre – EF) 
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Cross-business 
unit committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Risk 
Coordination 
Committee 
GCRO A minimum of five 
GxB-members and 
risk management 
officers on group 
level as well as in 
the BU´s as 
appointed by GxB 
Approval of general instructions and 
standards concerning risk 
management as well as certain 
ceilings for the group 
Table 55: Cross-BU committees of CSG 
 
b) Corporate centre functions and structure 
 
The corporate centre has the support functions for the GxB and the operational units. 
The decision on which function is to be included in the corporate centre is done on a 
case-by-case basis. Also, the corporate centre functions are understood to be too 
complex to be regarded for outsourcing and therefore cannot be outsourced. Table 56 
shows the functions in the corporate centre. The reporting lines in the corporate centre 
are shown in Figure 50.  
 
Reporting line Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCEO Group Communications Management of external 
communications: media 
relations; financial 
information and internal 
information; corporate 
identity 
Core 8.3 
GCEO Public Affairs Management of bank-related 
political issues; employee 
communications; networking 
with political and economical 
representatives; management 
of donations and 
memberships 
Core/ 
added 
value 
4.6 
GCRO Special Advisory Management support in case 
of acquisitions; risk policy; 
special advisory Middle East 
 
 
Added 
value 
n/a 
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Reporting line Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCRO Executive Relations Client contacts at Board 
level; representatio ns 
Core 1.9 
GCRO Risk Management Group level consolidation of 
risk reporting; concentration 
analysis; risk adjusted capital 
allocation/performance 
measurement; OR-
management 
Core 17 
GCRO Management Support  
 
N/A Shared 
services 
N/A 
GCFO Group Accounting & 
Reporting 
Ensure delivery of legal and 
business unit financials and 
key  performance indicators, 
drive allocation process, cash 
management and 
management of FX positions, 
maintenance of 
communication on relevant 
subjects 
Core 28.5 
GCFO Legal Services Optimisation of group 
structure, e.g. acquisitions, 
divestitures; legal and 
regulatory advice to group 
management and business 
units; coordination of inter 
business unit legal and 
compliance issues; relations 
to Swiss regulators and 
professional associations 
Core 6.7 
GCFO Tax Swiss tax coordination, tax 
compliance activities; front 
support in tax matters; 
contribute to tax policies 
Core 12.5 
GCFO Investor Relations Maintain relations with the 
investment community and 
rating agencies; annual report 
and shareholder letters; 
regular review meetings 
 
Core 3.0 
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Reporting line Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCFO Group IT Office Aligning IT activities and 
Group business objectives; 
enabling senior management 
to see the common threads 
and interactions among 
separate business units 
Shared 
services 
14.5 
GCFO Corporate Development & 
Finance 
Corporate business 
development, i.e. support of 
strategic plan; strategic mid-
term planning influencing 
capital allocation process; 
capital management; group 
insurance 
Added 
value 
5.2 
GCFO Funding Capital and funding 
optimisation 
Core 0.9 
CoS Human Resources Operative human resource 
management of corporate 
centre; strategic human 
resource management of the 
Group; coordination of 
human resource management 
of the business units; pension 
fund and insurances 
Core 15.6 
CoS Foundations/Corporate 
History 
Management of foundations; 
corporate history 
Shared 
services 
44.0 
CoS Logistic Support  Procurement of materials; 
organisation of infrastructure, 
cost management and 
controlling e.g. on running 
cost (only for the corporate 
centre) 
Shared 
services 
6.0 
Chairman Corporate secretary Provide management 
assistance to the Chairman, 
management of the share 
register 
Shared 
services 
8.1 
Chairman Audit N/A Core 
 
 
 
N/A 
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Reporting line Function Main activity Role Fte 
Chairman Security & Investigations Provide security training (also 
for intelligence), - 
engineering and -audits, and 
event security and advisory 
services on security; detection 
and investigation of criminal 
cases; recovery activities of 
financial and human 
resources; administration of 
cases and trends 
Shared 
services 
11.0 
Table 56: Corporate centre functions and responsibilities at CSG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Organisation chart of the corporate centre of CSG 
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c) Corporate centre economics 
 
Measuring the creation of shareholder value is done internally and results in a value of 
zero to negative. For the year 2000, the reported value creation for the corporate centre 
is - CHF 564 mio; corporate centre costs, including adjustments, yielded a net profit of - 
CHF 162 mio 1. The corporate centre is seen as a cost block and therefore cost 
management is seen as most important. On a monthly basis actual vs. budget 
comparisons are produced by the controlling function, as information for corporate 
centre department heads. Corporate centre performance and cost control is done by 
presenting monthly reports to the GCEO and the GCFO. Group Accounting & 
Reporting , the GCFO and the corporate centre department heads together supervise 
corporate centre costs . Corporate centre controlling plainly reports on costs. The 
corporate centre department heads are the owners of the costs, although allocated costs 
are less felt to be owned. Issues are resolved through management by exception. As the 
corporate centre is not seen as a business unit by itself, there is no business planning 
process. Also the corporate centre does not have a tool for qualitative performance 
measurement and there is no detailed recording of activities (time sheets). Corporate 
centre departments have defined success factors, which are reviewed by corporate 
centre department heads on a periodic basis and annually with supervisors. Corporate 
centre action items are discussed on a bilateral basis between a corporate centre 
department head and his or her superior. Corporate centre controlling performs the 
corporate centre budget process, which will change to a rolling forecast. Budget 
approval by the GCEO and GCFO is the ultimate hurdle for corporate centre managers. 
Corporate centre cost allocations2 take place via service level agreements and have the 
aim of reflecting the pricing structure of an unrelated third party transaction, although 
this is not achieved in all cases (Credit Suisse Group, 2001, p.14). Service level 
agreements are negotiated periodically by the relevant business units with regard to each 
individual product or service. This allocation results in the percentages as in Table 573. 
 
Credit Suisse 
Asset Management  
Credit Suisse 
Financial Services4 
Credit Suisse 
First Boston 
Credit Suisse 
Private Banking 
8% 33% 21% 16% 
Table 57: CSG corporate centre operating costs allocated in 2000 
                                                 
1 Excluding a charge for restructuring provision of almost CHF 1.1 bn (Credit Suisse Group, 2001, p.8). 
2 General characteristics of allocation in CSG, not specific for the corporate centre, are reported to be 
(Voegelin, 1999, p.280ff): costs allocated to "causing" business units, exploitation of synergies by 
concentration of resources and market power in one place in the group, maximum transfer of direct and 
allocated costs to the business units, move from cost -sharing concept towards a more market oriented service 
practice, encourage service providers to be more competitive with external market, and improve efficiency 
within individual business units. 
3 22% remains in the corporate centre 
4 Wintert hur 12 % and Credit Suisse Banking 21%. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The corporate centre of CSG has been formed following a course of high level of 
decentralisation. Table 58 shows the conclusion of the comparison of the corporate 
centre of CSG with the ICCC. 
 
Characteristic Actual situation in 2000 
Conglomeration Weak form 
Nature of corporate centre  
Role and functions Core, added value, and shared services; functions match 
ICCC in part 
Coordination instruments per 
function 
Focused and effective culture, role standardisation, plans, 
goals, budgets 
Contribution, value-based 
management and operational 
risk 
Potential for contribution p resent, implementation missing; 
value and operational risk orientation present, 
implementation unclear 
Management and organisation of the corporate centre  
Solving managerial issues Performance contracts present; very few committees, 
transparency keep influence costs low, solution for moral 
hazard unclear 
Corporate centre management 
style 
Financial control 
Staffing the corporate centre Staffing level (162 fte, 0.2% of group) much below lower 
limit of 1,045 fte, 1.3% of group (upper limit is 1,675 fte, 
2.1% of group) 
Corporate centre economics  
Financial orientation All departments are cost centres, corporate centre controlling 
active 
Approximation of value and 
costs 
Value measurement performed, cost management performed, 
non-financial performance measurements not present, 
benchmarking unclear 
Corporate centre cost 
allocation 
78% Cost allocation, performed via service level 
agreements, process and effectiveness unclear 
Table 58: Conclusion on the corporate centre of CSG in 2000 
 
In 2000, the corporate centre was rather small in terms of staffing; it seems that 
exploring and realising synergies is left to the business units. The formal structure 
matches the ICCC to some respect. Implementation of value orientation is partially 
done. Having a smaller corporate centre may make the implementation of formal 
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programs less necessary; management might be able to monitor implementation easier 
without formal programs. However, the synergy potential is possibly not reached.  
 
III. Deutsche Bank 
 
1. General observations 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Deutsche Bank AG (DB)1 is a multi-specialty bank of 98,311 people (of which 51.5 
percent in Germany) working in 73 countries and headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, 
where also all divisions have their base. Its balance sheet totals € 940 bn, net profits 
were € 4.9 bn and its market capitalization was € 55.2 bn (Deutsche Bank, 2001). DB, 
presided by the Group Board of Managing Directors (BMD), is organised in five 
divisions, a corporate centre and a support centre, which are all based in Frankfurt (see 
also Figure 51): 
1. Asset Management, with 4,916 fte2 
2. Corporates & Real Estate, with 13,764 fte 
3. Global Corporates & Institutions, with 17,696 fte 
4. Global Technology & Services, with 24,578 fte 
5. Retail & Private Banking, with 32,443 fte 
6. Corporate Centre, with 879 fte 
7. Support Centre, with 4,037 fte. 
 
During 2001, Deutsche Bank reorganised into the business groups Corporate and 
Investment Bank and Private Clients and Asset Management, and the units DB Services 
and Corporate Investments. Over the years, DB has been and still is moving from the 
German variant towards the American variant of universal banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The corporate centre of Deutsche Bank was studied during 2000. Dynamic as the financial services industry 
is, many changes took place during and after 2000. 
2 Full time equivalents, ultimo 2000. 
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Figure 51: Changing organisational structure DB 
 
b) Value orientation 
 
DB regards shareholders, customers, staff and society as its four key stakeholders with 
equal status. Maintaining a balance forms a compelling task. DB’s corporate identity is 
to create lasting added value for these stakeholders (Deutsche Bank, 2001, p.12).  
 
c) Operational risk management 
 
DB’s risk philosophy is underpinned by its objective to maximise shareholder returns 
within the framework of the overall risk appetite. DB defines operational risk as the 
potential for incurring losses through unmanageable events, business disruption, 
inadequately defined controls or control/system failure in relation to staff, customer 
relationships, technology, assets, other third parties/regulators as well as project and 
other risks (Deutsche Bank, 2001, p.140). DB expects operational risk to be a major 
challenge to the financial services sector in the coming years and has begun to 
implement a framework for operational risks on a global basis. An operational risk 
guideline, implemented last year, defines roles and responsibilities concerning the 
management and reporting of operational risks in the group (Deutsche Bank, 2001, 
p.165ff). Responsibility for operational risk management essentially lies with the group 
divisions. They bear the risk and they decide in what form and on what scale they 
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accept, control or reduce risk. They also decide what form of risk prevention measures 
have to be applied. In this context, an important role is played by a cost/benefit analysis. 
Responsibility for operational risks, parallel to the existing functions for credit and 
market risks, has been integrated into the bank’s risk management, which is independent 
of the business divisions. The GCRO has appointed a Chief Risk Officer for operational 
risks group wide (CRO OR). The CRO OR is represented on the Group Risk Board and 
is Chairman of the Operational Risk Committee. This committee, whose members 
include the divisional Operational Risk Officers and representatives of important staff 
functions, develops and implements the Group’s internal guidelines for managing 
operational risk. An important element of the framework is the self-assessment for 
operational risk developed by the bank (db Risk Map). This self-assessment creates an 
overview of the current risk profile within the business divisions and helps to define risk 
management measures, priorities and risk indicators. These will be monitored, besides 
other risk indicators for operational risk identified as relevant by the industry, in the 
bank’s scorecard system which is currently being rolled out. A group wide database for 
the reporting of losses from operational risk events (db IRS) provides information about 
the success of risk management as well as feedback on the quality of the risk indicators 
selected. The use of these instruments will enable complete and consistent operational 
risk reporting at divisional and group level.  
 
2. The corporate centre 
 
a) The role and operational mode of the corporate centre 
 
The corporate centre was formed as a result of the decision in the recent past that the 
bank should be organised along business lines instead of regions. The corporate centre, 
as seen by DB as a virtual holding and as a cross-divisional function, supports the BMD 
in directing the group divisions and subsidiaries towards global group targets. The 
corporate centre ensures, through policies, common standards and co-ordinated decision 
proposals, that BMD policy is pursued in a consistent and target-oriented manner. Also, 
the corporate centre is responsible for group-wide supra-divisional planning, steering 
and control, as well as for monitoring of and compliance with external requirements; it 
ensures optimal allocation of financial resources between the divisions and makes an 
important contribution to the exchange of information between operating units. In doing 
so, the corporate centre aims to contribute to long-term growth in the value of DB. As 
the tasks of the corporate centre are primarily of a strategic nature, the corporate centre 
units focus on the strategic management of the key resources, human and financial 
capital, as well as on group corporate branding. In particular, DB considers efficient risk 
management to be an indispensable core capability in banking business and the 
corporate centre houses risk-relevant functions, which report neutrally on risks in the 
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group. These functions, together with in- and external communications, which are also 
part of the corporate centre, make up a strong unit ensuring strategic consistency within 
the group (Deutsche Bank, 2001, p.42). The divisions are seen as having far reaching 
autonomy in some cases and no autonomy in others, especially in risk-relevant areas. 
The corporate centre works closely with divisions on projects in areas such as 
Controlling, Treasury, and Risk Management. The corporate centre works for all 
members of the BMD, but is managed by the members of the BMD, which do not head 
an operational division. The BMD has delegated the following rights of functional 
direction and disciplinary participation to the corporate centre: 
× The corporate centre units have the power to issue guidelines for all functional 
matters concerning them, the right to control compliance with standards and 
the right to institute sanctions in the group; functional responsibility lies with 
the respective BMD-members 
× Senior executive positions in divisional functions are filled subject to 
agreement between the corporate centre units and divisions; the corporate 
centre units have proposal right 
× Remuneration questions, bonus arrangements, target agreements, appraisals, 
promotions and specific personnel measures for senior executive positions are 
agreed by the corporate centre. 
 
DB has several cross-divisional committees; because of the group interest, these are 
presided by corporate centre delegates; examp les are shown in Table 59. 
 
Cross-divisional 
Committee 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Risk 
Board 
GCRO Divisional CROs, Chief of 
Staff Risk 
Risk strategy, risk 
regulations, -principles- 
and methods, credit 
processes, risk 
organisation, 
nomination of SC Es, 
risk portfolio analyses 
and management, risk 
capital planning, risk 
cost 
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Cross-divisional 
Committee 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Credit 
Policy 
Committee 
Head 
Group 
Credit Risk 
Divisional CROs, Chief of 
Staff Risk 
Quarterly evaluation of 
divisional credit 
portfolios, approval of 
credit principles, 
approval and 
recommendation of 
country limits, industry 
reports and supra-
divisional portfolio 
management 
transactions 
Global Risk 
Committee 
GCRO Divisional CROs, Chief of 
Staff Risk, Heads of different 
CC departments (Treasury, 
Controlling, Legal, Audit, 
Research) 
Information and 
discussion on actual 
risk position of DB 
Group, collective 
management action if 
risk concentrates 
Human 
Resources Board 
 Divisional Heads Human 
Resources 
Group wide 
coordination of Human 
Resource policies 
Business Area 
Controllers 
Meeting 
CFO Business area controllers Group wide 
coordination of 
controlling issues 
Investment 
Committee 
N/A Head Group Participations, 
Head Group Controlling, Head 
Group Treasury  
N/A 
Asset and 
Liability 
Committee 
Treasury Local and divisional 
management representatives, 
controlling, treasury 
Policies on capital 
issues, transfer prices, 
liquidity, refinancing 
and bank equity. 
Table 59: Cross-divisional committees of DB 
 
b) Corporate centre functions and structure 
 
DB has different functions which support multiple divisions but which are not part of 
the corporate centre. These operational functions are organised in the separate division 
called Global Technology & Services and are back-office in nature. They encompass 
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purchasing, payments, securities processing, custody services and electronic banking 
services. There are various centralised areas: 
1. Corporate centre (CCC): all functions, which are necessary to counsel and 
support the BMD in its task to manage DB-group and to report neutrally on 
risks. Goals: alignment of divisional and corporate goals, resource allocation, 
safeguarding a uniform and strong group appearance in- and externally 
2. Support centre (SC): supra-divisional functions of Controlling (systematic and 
efficient production of controlling information and standard reports), Audit, 
Corporate Real Estate and Services, Corporate Security and Human Resources 
(salary administration, training for German based part of DB and human 
resource counselling) are bundled to achieve synergies  
3. Divisional functions (DF) with 5193 fte: division-specific activities, which 
previously were performed by the corporate centre; during 2000 they are being 
allocated to the divisions, which can organise them as they see fit. 
 
CCC-functions have functional and disciplinary rights to issue directives towards 
divisional functions, functional rights to issue directives and disciplinary rights to assist 
towards the support centre. In case of important issues the CCC and the DF distribute 
competencies among themselves. Between the SC on the one and the CCC and the DF 
on the other hand, settlement of supplied services takes place. Relationships as per 
Figure 52. The corporate centre functional concept is depicted in Figure 53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Responsibilities and authorities of the corporate centre within DB 
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Figure 53: Corporate centre functional concept of DB 
 
The corporate centre houses the functions as shown in Table 60. 
 
Reporting 
line 
Sector Main activity Role 
CBMD Group Press Advising BMD in all media 
questions, development and 
execution of communications 
concepts, safeguarding compliance 
with uniform standards and ensuring 
co-ordinated market approach under 
DB brand name, steering and 
coordination of media activities 
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Reporting 
line 
Sector Main activity Role 
CBMD Corporate 
Development 
Domestic and international 
consolidation, pro-active portfolio 
management, e-commerce, group 
structure and role of the corporate 
centre, development, formulation 
and execution if a consistent, concise 
group strategy, environmental 
scanning, benchmarking, gathering 
of competitor intelligence, war 
gaming, conducting ongoing 
strategic dialogue with group 
divisions and business areas, 
reconciling group division and 
business areas strategies with overall 
group strategy, managing and/or 
monitoring specific strategic 
projects, executing mergers, 
acquisitions, disinvestments, and 
restructurings, setting-up of joint 
ventures, co-operations and strategic 
alliances, managing direct group 
investments outside divisional 
responsibilities and DB Investor, 
administration, reporting and 
mandates 
Added 
value 
CBMD Group Press Advising BMD in all media 
questions, development and 
execution of communications 
concepts, safeguarding compliance 
with uniform standards and ensuring 
co-ordinated market approach under 
DB brand name, steering and 
coordination of media activities 
 
 
 
 
 
Core 
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Reporting 
line 
Sector Main activity Role 
CBMD Group Marketing & 
Communications 
Brand management, corporate 
design; brand and market research 
internally as well as externally; 
investor relations, positioning 
planning, public relations, definition 
of group-wide PR strategy; 
systematic fostering of relations; 
sponsoring activities, corporate 
events and protocol, coordination of 
mandates and memberships; internal 
group communications, 
development, implementation and 
monitoring of standards, publication 
of internal supra-divisional media 
Added 
value 
CBMD Group Economic 
Research 
Analysis and forecasting of macro-
economic developments and 
developments on national and global 
financial markets, including 
influences of economic policy 
measures; of fundamental risks, 
industry and country risks and rating 
them; development, enforcement and 
control of standards and guidelines 
for analyses and forecasts; 
coordination of economic research 
Shared 
services 
CBMD Group Legal Policy-oriented and project-related 
legal advisory for BMD and 
corporate centre units, ensuring 
uniform group coverage for group-
relevant and supra-divisional legal 
issues, participation in transactions 
and businesses with major 
importance for the group, 
development and coverage of group-
relevant initiatives concerning 
legislative and regulatory 
developments to maintain existing 
fields of business and develop new 
Core 
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Reporting 
line 
Sector Main activity Role 
CBMD Group Compliance Advising BMD and corporate centre 
units on fundamental supra-
divisional, important and 
extraordinary issues of monitoring 
compliance with bank and capital 
market law and conduct and the 
avoidance of regulatory risks; 
production of global standards and 
guidelines as well as systems of 
direction and reporting for 
compliance relevant maters, and 
monitor compliance with them; 
fostering relations with regulatory 
authorities 
Core 
CBMD Corporate Centre 
Coordination  
N/A Core 
CFO Group Controlling Periodically collecting information 
from divisions on profit, volume and 
risk, and transposition of the 
information into analyses and 
proposals for concrete steering 
measures 
Core 
CFO Group Audit  N/A Core 
CFO Group Tax Clarification of fundamental taxation 
issues, ensure compliance with a 
corporate tax culture, tax 
counselling, preparation of tax 
accounting, external tax audits, 
coordination of tax departments 
Core 
CRO Group Risk Board Development and setting of group-
wide policies and process 
parameters, limits for single 
exposures, portfolio segments and 
country risks; authority to decide or 
recommend credit proposals; active 
portfolio management; control of 
compliance with policies and 
guidelines 
Core 
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Reporting 
line 
Sector Main activity Role 
CRO Group Risk 
Management 
Guidelines for assessment of the 
Group's market risk exposure; 
determination of limit structure for 
market risks; approval of market risk 
overruns; independent information 
on limit utilisation and overall risk 
situation; global process 
coordination; review and approval of 
risk and performance models 
Core 
CRO Group Treasury  Issuance of debt funding and capital; 
responsibility for and access to 
unsecured liquidity in the group; 
ensuring group solvency; 
management of interest rate risk 
associated with all non-trading book 
assets and liabilities; capital, reserves 
and capital ratios; processing of 
capital applications from 
subsidiaries; coverage of regulators 
Added 
value 
CRO Office of Vice-
Chairmen 
Risk-policies and training, ex- and 
internal communication to senior 
management, risk officials, rating 
agencies, regulators and equity 
analysts, and methodology 
containing risk ratings, pricing tools, 
research and project management 
Core 
CHRO Group Human 
Resources  
Personnel policy guidelines, 
formulation and implementation of 
hr-strategies, responsibility for the 
development of culture values and 
management, advising on 
organisational development and 
change processes, development of 
hr- tools, implementation of 
knowledge management and 
intellectual capital and multi-
disciplinary learning systems and 
Core 
Table 60: Corporate centre functions and responsibilities of DB 
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The reporting lines of the corporate centre functions are shown in Figure 54. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: Organisational structure of the corporate centre of DB 
 
c) Corporate centre economics 
 
Corporate centre costs are supervised in the unit Corporate Center Coordination . 
Corporate centre units have employees, who also take care of controlling matters; they 
report to the corporate centre unit head. The Head Corporate Center Coordination, also 
responsible for the corporate centre costs, can make recommendations if costs are out of 
line1. In this case the Head Corporate Center Coordination has a moderating role. The 
Head Corporate Center Coordination meets on a regular basis with the board members 
responsible for the corporate centre to discuss corporate centre controlling issues, and 
the numbers receive great scrutiny from corporate centre management. All corporate 
centre units are managed as cost centres. In trying to keep costs down, the target for 
CCC is to decrease the number of employees to around 650 fte; this general goal of 
keeping costs down remains valid in times of growth of total business volume and size 
of the group. As the corporate centre is a cost generating division, shareholder value 
creation is not measured. Qualitative measures, occasionally used for projects, take 
place via a scorecard with the use of so called traffic lights. These lights vary in colour 
                                                 
1 In 2000, corporat e centre profit before tax went up from – € 452 mio to – € 440 mio (Deutsche Bank, 2001). 
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green, yellow and red and are being set by the corporate centre unit head. The business 
planning and budgeting process of the corporate centre starts off with targets given to 
corporate centre management. Then a bottom-up process initiates in which corporate 
centre management produces business plans and budgets. The budget has validity for 1 
year; the business plan stretches over a period of 3 to 5 years. The costs of the SC-
functions of the corporate centre are allocated to divisions based on pre-agreed 
conditions, market oriented prices and on demand of service. Divisions do not procure 
SC-type services on the external market. Prime motivation is that these services would 
also be needed when the divisions would be operating independently. It is very difficult 
to compare DB corporate centre services, benchmarking therefore take place only in 
cases where comparisons are possible. Notwithstanding that, the relationship between 
cost of corporate centre service and its quality is subject of intensive discussions. The 
CCC-costs were planned to be charged to divisions via a fixed key and can be 
understood as a corporate (centre) levy, a charge for being able to use DB resources 
such as the brand. A general idea is to analyse corporate centre departments in an 
ongoing manner as to assess the feasibility of increasing chargeability. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The corporate centre of DB is in the process of formation. Table 61 shows the 
conclusion of the comparison of the corporate centre of DB with the ICCC. In 2000, 
implementation of a corporate centre concept is done via relative formal ways. This 
begs the question to what extent the formal and informal organisations are similar. Also, 
there seems to be a multitude of detailed coordination instruments, which shows the 
seriousness with which governance is performed but which also might lead to 
inefficiencies. Mixtures of instruments and management styles might have led to an 
unfocused appearance. A formal value orientation was not implemented, but using 
market prices in allocation can lead to market replication. The effectiveness of the 
corporate centre in reaching synergies might not be maximal due to low staffing level. 
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Characteristic Actual situation in 2000 
Conglomeration “German” variant shifting to weak form of 
conglomeration 
Nature of corporate centre  
Role and functions Core, added value, and shared services; 
functions match ICCC as far as core and 
added value are concerned 
Coordination instruments per function Mixed role standardisation, plans, goals, 
budgets 
Contribution, value-based management and 
operational risk 
Potential for contribution present, 
implementation unclear; value, with focus 
on multiple stakeholders, and operational 
risk orientation present, implementation 
unclear 
Management and organisation of the corporate centre  
Solving managerial issues Service level agreements and committees 
present; lower transparency leading to 
higher influence costs, solution for moral 
hazard unclear 
Corporate centre management style Mixture of Strategic Planning, Strategic 
Control and Financial Control 
Staffing the corporate centre Staffing level (879 fte, 0.9% of group), 
below lower limit of 1,275 fte 1.3% of 
group  (lower limit is 2,045 fte, 2.1% of 
group) 
Corporate centre economics  
Financial orientation All departments arecost centres, corporate 
centre controlling ok 
Approximation of value and costs Value measurement not performed, cost 
management performed, non-financial 
performance measurements not present, 
benchmarking unclear, project scorecard 
implemented 
 
Corporate centre cost allocation 100% Cost allocation, based on market 
prices, performed via service level 
agreements 
Table 61: Conclusion on the corporate centre of DB in 2000 
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IV. UBS 
 
1. General observations 
 
a) Introduction 
 
UBS AG (UBS)1 is a global integrated investment services firm and a leading bank in 
Switzerland of 71,076 people (of which 42 percent in Switzerland) active in over 40 
countries and headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland2. For 2000, its balance sheet totalled 
CHF 1,088 bn (€ 719 bn) 3, net profits were CHF 7.8 bn (€ 5.1 bn) and the market 
capitalization was CHF 112.7 bn (€ 74.4 bn) (UBS AG, 2001a). UBS, presided by the 
Group Executive Board (GEB), is organised in three business groups and a corporate 
centre (see also Figure 55): 
1. UBS Asset Management, with 2,860 fte, based in Chicago, IL, United States 
2. UBS Switzerland, retail, corporate and Swiss private banking with 28,785 fte, 
based in Zurich, Switzerland 
3. UBS Warburg, investment and international private banking, with 38,445 fte, 
based in London, United Kingdom 
4. Corporate Centre4, with 986 fte, based in Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
UBS is committed to an integrated business model and is not merely a holding 
company. It is a portfolio of complementary businesses, managed together for optimal 
shareholder value, where the whole is worth more than the sum of its parts. UBS’ 
business groups are accountable for their results and enjoy considerable autonomy in 
pursuing their business objectives. However, UBS has to work in a coordinated manner 
to take advantage of the synergies available from the perspective of strategy and 
financial performance, both revenue and cost. 
                                                 
1 The corporate centre of UBS was studied during 2000. Dynamic as the financial services industry is, many 
changes took place during and after 2000. 
2 The merger of Swiss Bank Corporation and Union Bank of Switzerland forming UBS in 1997/1998 is 
discussed in Schütz (1998). For a description of the recent history of SBC, one of the two predecessors of 
UBS, we refer to Rogge (1997). 
3 At an exchange rate of €/CHF of 1.5136 on 31.12.2000 (source: Bloomberg). 
4 The Corporate Centre was formed in 1994, when the group underwent a major reorganisation. 
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Figure 55: Organisation structure UBS 
 
b) Value orientation 
 
UBS implemented a value-based management (VBM) framework, which supports 
value-based decisions, performance assessment and external communication. The heart 
of the framework is a process for monitoring the development of the value of the group 
and its constituent businesses, based on the identification of the fundamental drivers of 
value creation (UBS, 2001a, p.38ff). The aim of VBM is to create an understanding of 
the sources and drivers of value within all of UBS’ businesses, and to integrate this 
understanding into its management processes and principles, translating the value 
creating mindset into action. Figure 56 summarises the VBM processes. In measuring 
shareholder value creation, UBS Switzerland uses a value report. Based on the 
discounted cash flow methodology, the capital asset pricing model and risk adjustments, 
values for the division are being analysed for sensitivities in the most important value 
drivers. An important input is the business plan. Part of the value report is the value gap 
analysis, which is the difference between the internal calculated value and the value 
calculated by external financial analysts (Haeringer & Stadelmann, 2001, p.1179). The 
fundamental assumption underlying the VBM framework is that the creation of 
sustainable value is the primary objective of business activity. By emphasizing 
sustainable value creation, UBS considers the interests of both its shareholders and 
other important stakeholders such as employees, clients and regulators. The framework 
views the management as fiduciaries of shareholder wealth. To ensure long-term 
success, a company must provide its owners with a total return greater than its risk-
adjusted cost of capital. To be truly effective, the VBM framework must become an 
integrated part of key management processes, such as the formulation and evaluation of 
strategic plans and investments, the measurement and evaluation of performance, and 
the definition of criteria for performance related compensation (UBS, 2001a, p.40). In 
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order to have an operational tool for analysing the extent to which current and projected 
performance contribute to sustainable value creation, UBS has identified for each 
business unit, relating to revenue, cost and investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: The UBS’ VBM framework 
 
c) Operational risk management 
 
UBS calls operational risk consequential risk. The consequential risk categories are 
transaction processing risk, liability risk, legal risk, compliance risk, security risk and 
tax ris k. UBS is continuing to develop both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
the management and control of consequential risks. A measurement framework has 
been formulated, but full implementation depends on the existence of multi-period 
exposure and loss data. Current efforts are therefore centred on building this history and 
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on the qualitative aspects of risk management and control – identification and recording 
of risks and exposures, establishment of policies, standards and procedures, close 
monitoring and management of identified risks, and initiation of corrective action where 
necessary in response to incidents (UBS, 2001a, p.66). By identifying and recording 
these risks and tracking their evolution, UBS will establish the basis from which the 
quantitative framework can be realised. The consideration of consequential risks is an 
important element in the assessment of new businesses and of transactions with unusual 
structure. Under the GCRO and business group CRO’s, all consequential risks are now 
formally integrated into the independent risk control process. 
 
2. The corporate centre 
 
a) Nature of the corporate centre 
 
Due to business and geographical complexity, the role of a focused and professional 
corporate centre has become invaluable to UBS. The corporate centre objective is to 
guarantee the professionalism, commercial efficiency and strategic direction of the 
business groups. In many ways its role is that of an enabler and facilitator for the entire 
group (UBS, 1999d). UBS perceives the need for a strong corporate centre, with the 
mission to maximise sustainable shareholder value by coordinating the activities of the 
business groups. It ensures that they operate as a coherent and effective group with a set 
of common values and principles. Further, the corporate centre is the only part of the 
group acknowledged by all the business groups as being neutral and is therefore 
accepted as independent when interdivisional issues are discussed. The corporate centre 
contributes to the overall result of the group, in that it has a unifying function and 
always emphasises group considerations. Thus, it facilitates synergies between the 
business groups. All sectors aim at enhancing functional and cross-business group co-
operation, at avoiding duplications, and subsequently to increase efficiency and 
profitability. The basic modus operandi for the corporate centre is to have minimal 
process ownership counterbalanced by strong governance by setting standards and 
principles (UBS, 2001a, p.37). This way, staffing levels remain low. In practice, this 
implies that the corporate centre departments are not very influential with the exception 
of certain themes. In the resource allocation process the corporate centre influence can 
be classified as weak and process oriented; each step in the process is reached by 
consensus. Leadership can be classified as minimal with a focus on guidance. Resource 
allocation has a long-term focus so as to avoid the false appearance of accuracy. Table 
62 shows the concrete actions for UBS’ corporate centre to fulfil its mission. 
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 Contribute to the long-term maximization of shareholder value  
A Ensuring the group is competitively positioned in growing market places with an optimal 
business model and adequate resources 
1 Define the valuation drivers for the Group and business groups and integrate these into 
our strategy, performance measurement and external communication 
2 Ensure that our financial management policies and actions are co-ordinated with our 
strategy  
3 Develop a communications strategy for the Group and improve the coordination of 
communications with all constituencies (including regulators) 
4 Improve the quality of financial and non financial key performance indicators and 
competitive benchmarks, and increase the focus on costs and client revenues 
5 Identify the opportunities and threats represented by technology and develop strategies to 
leverage technology to create value 
6 Review the IT governance of the Group 
7 Design and implement a risk adjusted performance measurement process 
8 Optimise the branding strategy for the group 
B Ensuring the long term financial stability of the group by maintaining an appropriate 
balance between risk and profit 
1 Improve the Group's overall governance processes and procedures 
2 Ensure that the Group has an independent risk organisation 
3 Further reinforce the linkages between the control functions (financial, market and credit 
risk, legal and compliance, etc.) 
4 Put in place a credible plan for the improvement in time to market of financial information 
and the standardisation of financial processes across business groups where appropriate 
5 Review the Group's real estate strategy  
6 Continue with a pro-active tax planning strategy, with a focus on the issues arising from 
EU tax coordination 
C Ensuring that the business groups, while being accountable for their results, operate as a 
coherent and effective group with a common set of values and principles 
1 Encourage a spirit of teamwork through operating transparently, with integrity, 
intellectual honesty, flexibility and respect 
2 Improve succession planning, introduce mentor schemes for promising talent and improve 
graduate recruitment 
3 Continually reinforce the critical importance of exploiting synergies and implement a 
commercial approach to Service Level Agreements 
4 Implement a rigorous approach to identifying and eliminating duplication 
5 Integrate key performance indicators, particularly aimed at cost, into the group's 
compensation processes 
Table 62: UBS’ corporate centre’s actions aimed at shareholder value creation 
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b) Corporate centre management and organisation  
 
The corporate centre encompasses group level functions, which cannot be devolved to 
the business groups. Additionally, the corporate centre plays an active role with regard 
to funding, capital and balance sheet management, and with regard to risk management 
(UBS, 1999e, p.30). The heads of the functional areas of the corporate centre have 
functional directive and functional controlling authority throughout the group (UBS, 
2000 p.5). The corporate centre houses the functions as shown in Table 63. The 
reporting lines are depicted in Figure 57. 
 
Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCFO Group Controlling Responsible for devising and 
implementing integrated and 
controlling and accounting 
processes throughout the 
group, to produce the 
group’s regulatory, financial 
and management accounts; 
includes corporate tax, 
focusing on optimising tax 
issues; consulting the 
divisions on tax issues co-
ordinating tax aspects with a 
global perspective, and 
corporate centre operations: 
to ensure transparency and 
accountability of the 
corporate centre as an 
operating business group 
Core 194 
GCEO Group 
Communications and 
Marketing 
Effective communication of 
strategy, values and results to 
employees, clients, investors 
and the public, and to 
support the long term 
building of a strong global 
brand by developing and 
implementing a coherent 
visual identity and integrated 
brand and marketing comms 
Added 
value 
66 
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Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCEO Group Human 
Resources 
To create a global employer 
of choice, able to attract, 
develop, motivate and retain 
talents by establishing 
standards, principles and 
procedures for performance 
evaluation, compensation, 
recruitment, training 
Core 34 
GCEO Legal and 
Compliance 
Protects reputation by 
managing its legal, 
compliance and regulatory 
affairs; to counsel on legal 
and compliance matters; to 
manage intellectual property 
Core 18 
GCFO Group Treasury  Managing group liquidity 
risk, group funding risk, and 
non-trading related foreign 
exchange and interest rate 
risk; handling financial flows 
- investment and allocation 
of regulatory and divisional 
capital as well as the 
management of the group's 
equity. Internal consultancy 
Added 
value 
26 
Chairman Group Internal Audit To assist management and in 
particular the BoD, in the 
discharge of their 
responsibilities to monitor 
and continually ensure the 
adequacy of the overall 
effectiveness of UBS' 
internal control processes; to 
provide objective and 
independent appraisals, 
detailed observations and 
recommendations relating to 
key risk areas 
 
Core 240 
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Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCEO Group Economic 
Research 
Provides the GEB with 
advisory and support 
functions and to co-ordinate 
cross-divisional economic 
research efforts 
Shared 
services 
27 
GCEO Group Mandates To manage mandates for 
group participations and to 
be responsible for UBS 
foundations 
Added 
value 
10 
GCEO Group Management 
Support  
To support to the GEB and 
BoD; to organise and 
manage employee 
communication 
Shared 
services 
32 
GCFO Group Risk 
Management 
To develop the risk policy 
framework, for setting and 
monitoring the related risk 
limits (excluding credit risk 
limits), to aggregate and 
assess total risk exposure, to 
approve valuation models, 
and to define risk 
measurement methodologies 
for submission to the GEB 
and BoD. Manage the 
Market Risk Control unit; 
includes 50% of the joint 
venture with Group Credit 
Risk Management 
Core 77 
GCFO Group Credit Risk 
Management 
To formulate credit risk 
policies, to determine 
methodologies to measure 
credit risks, to set and 
monitor credit and country 
limits, and to manage the 
business group credit risk 
control units; includes 50% 
of the joint venture with 
Group Risk Management 
Core 95 
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Reporting 
line 
Function Main activity Role Fte 
GCFO Group Strategic 
Analysis 
Creates complex business 
models within the divisions, 
placing employees 
internationally to implement 
and co-ordinate planned 
objectives. The team also 
analyses competitors and 
examines acquisition 
candidates for the group, 
providing key decision-
making and often working 
closely with divisional 
corporate finance teams. The 
area has evolved into an 
internal consultancy 
operation where lt-planning 
is carried out 
Added 
value 
17 
GCFO Investor Relations Primary contact for 
institutional investors in 
UBS shares. The department 
prepares presentations for 
investors and arranges road 
shows. It also meets with 
analysts and investors on a 
regular basis both in 
Switzerland and abroad. Also 
responsible for preparation 
of the annual report. 
Core 12 
Table 63: Corporate centre functions and responsibilities of UBS 
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Figure 57: Organisational structure of UBS' corporate centre 
 
UBS has different cross-business group committees, which because of their operational 
nature are not part of the corporate centre. Because of the group interest of these 
committees, these are presided by corporate centre delegates (see Table 64). 
 
Cross-business 
group committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Governance 
Committee 
GCEO GCFO, Group Controller, 
GCRO, GCCO, Business 
group Heads Corporate 
Governance/Legal and 
Compliance, Head Group 
Internal Audit, Head 
Group Legal & 
Compliance 
 
 
Responsible for the 
coordination of the 
group’s public policy 
interface with central 
banks and regulators, 
for minimizing the 
group’s reputation risk 
Group Chief
Executive
Officer
Group Human
Resources
Group
Management
Support
Legal &
Compliance
Group
Communications
and Marketing
Group
Economic
Research
Group
Mandates
Group Chief
Financial
Officer
Chief Credit
Officer
Chief Risk
Officer
Group
Controller
Group Treasury
Group Strategic
Analysis
Investor
Relations
Chairman
Group Internal
Audit
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Cross-business 
group committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Finance 
Committee 
N/A Chairmen of Group Risk 
Committee, Group 
Controlling Committee, 
Group Treasury 
Committee 
Responsible for co-
ordinating the group’s 
accounting, risk 
management and 
control, treasury and 
financial 
communications 
processes 
Group Human 
Resources Committee 
CEO Head Group HR, business 
group heads HR 
Responsible for the 
definition of human 
resources policies and 
standards which 
contribute to the 
identification, 
recruitment, 
development and 
retention of high-
calibre staff 
Group IT Committee CIO UBS 
CH 
CIO UBSW, Head IT 
Operations UBSW, Head 
IT Systems Engineering 
UBSCH, Head IT User 
Services UBSCH, Head 
Architecture & Business 
Support UBSCH, Head IT 
Operations UBSCH, COO 
PB, Head IT PB, Head IT 
UBSAM Head 
Investment Clients, Head 
Corporate Centre 
Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
Ensuring group wide 
coordination of 
policies and standards 
in the IT area 
(standardization, 
architecture, security, 
networking, and 
service level 
agreements).  
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Cross-business 
group committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group 
Communications and 
Marketing Committee 
GCEO GCFO, Head Group 
Management Support, 
Head Investor Relations, 
Head Regulatory 
Relations, Head Group 
Public Relations, Head 
Group Marketing, Head 
Group Economic 
Research, Business Group 
Reps 
Ensuring that 
communication to all 
stakeholders, 
internally and 
externally, is 
transparent, accurate, 
concise, timely and 
consistent 
Group Operations 
Committee 
GCEO CEO UBSCH, CEO 
UBSW, CEO PB, COO 
PB, Head Operations 
UBSCH, Head Operations 
UBSW, Head Logistics 
UBSW, Head Securities 
Operations UBSCH 
Manages functions 
such as cash 
accounting, securities 
trading, custody, 
operations risk, 
payments to ensure a 
single group market 
interface for 
currencies and 
securities group level 
standards and policies 
for data mngmnt/OR 
Group Risk 
Committee 
GCRO CFO, CCO, Group 
Controller, Head Group 
Insurance Management 
Liability Risk Control, 
Head Group Strategic 
Analysis, Business group 
CCOs, Head Market Risk 
Control UBSW, Head 
Country Risk, Head Risk 
Process Review 
 
 
 
 
 
To review the status 
of implementation and 
the compliance with 
the risk framework 
across all risk 
categories 
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Cross-business 
group committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Group Controlling 
Committee 
Group 
Controller 
CFO, business group 
controllers, regional chief 
accountants, Head 
corporate controlling & 
accounting, Head 
Corporate Center 
Controlling, on ad-hoc 
basis CRO, CCO, Head 
Group Treasury, Head 
Corporate Center 
Operations, Head 
Corporate Tax 
Responsibilities 
include ensuring a 
group-wide consistent 
vision of controlling 
and accounting, 
policies and 
principles, decide on 
the group’ s planning 
cycle, decide on 
methods and 
procedures for 
implementation, 
ensure common 
controlling language 
and exploit synergies, 
ensure timeliness and 
quality of controlling 
and accounting 
process 
Group Treasury 
Committee 
N/A N/A N/A 
Corporate Real Estate 
Committee 
Head of 
Corporate 
Real Estate 
COOs of the business 
groups, ad hoc delegates 
from other units 
Responsibilities 
include establishment 
and ensuring 
implementation and 
compliance of policy, 
strategy, principles, 
guidelines and 
standards, resolving 
cross business group 
disputes, ensuring data 
integrity, facilitation 
tasks and 
responsibilities 
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Cross-business 
group committees 
Chair Other members Activity 
Legal Structure 
Committee 
Head 
Corporate 
Tax 
Head Group Treasury, 
CRO UBS Switzerland, 
Head Legal, UBS 
Warburg, Head Legal, 
UBS Asset Management, 
Head Legal, UBS Private 
and Corporate Clients, 
delegates from Private 
Equity and corporate 
centre, Head of Corporate 
Accounting 
Responsibilities 
include pre-approving 
the formation of all 
new legal entities, 
branches or 
representative offices, 
pre-approving of the 
liquidation, transfer, 
merger, closure or 
material change of 
business purpose of 
relevant current legal 
entities, branches and 
representative offices, 
ensuring that each 
relevant legal entity is 
assigned to a business 
group, ensuring that 
all changes to the 
group’s legal structure 
are made in 
compliance with 
relevant laws and 
regulations and are all 
properly recorded 
Table 64: Cross-business group committees of UBS 
 
c) Corporate centre economics 
 
At the corporate centre, controlling is seen not as a task of corporate centre management 
but as a task of the controlling department. This means that costs are primarily 
supervised by Corporate Center Controlling. Only when actual costs substantially differ 
from budgeted costs, corporate centre management will want an explanation. Corporate 
Centre Controlling primarily has an advising role to the Group Controller. The mission 
of Corporate Center Controlling is  to deliver client focused state-of-the-art controlling 
products and processes, including management account reports, integrity of systems 
structures, and implementation of controlling processes, to corporate centre divisional 
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and sector management to support decision making (UBS, 1999b). As Corporate Center 
Controlling does not have a complete infrastructure of its own, good working relations 
are necessary. At UBS, the opinion is that it is unclear how much really can be managed 
of the corporate centre cost base, due to the nature of the corporate centre, and it seems 
that cost management in itself is in conflict with the nature of the corporate centre. The 
corporate centre departments are managed as cost centres, with the notable exception of 
Group Treasury, which is seen as a profit centre, with strong controls and limits. 
Performance measurement takes place via key performance indicators and business 
group’ satisfaction. The financial result of the department is less relevant; it is the group 
result and individual manager performance, which receives most attention. 
Benchmarking takes place more as an exception, than as a rule. At UBS, the purpose of 
the business planning process is to provide senior management with the information 
required to objectively evaluate the strategic factors affecting the firm in general and the 
corporate centre in particular, in order to achieve and maintain a sizeable and 
sustainable competitive advantage (UBS, 1999c). During the business planning process, 
information flows between different organisational partners, be it within the corporate 
centre, and/or between business groups. This information flow is required to ensure that 
the business area plans are synchronised. Corporate Center Controlling and senior 
management co-ordinate the efforts, review the plans as they develop and consolidate 
these at the business group level. The active involvement of senior management in 
strategic business plan development generally ensures a high degree of commitment by 
the organisation. Business plans should cover a period of three years and should be 
updated whenever material changes occur; Table 65 outlines the business planning 
process. A bottom-up character can be recognised: 1) business plan on sector level: this 
business plan is the most comprehensive of all and is the basis for the final corporate 
centre plan, 2) business plan on area level: this business plan is a summary of the sector 
plans with the key items and shows the strategies for the Chairman-, CEO- and CFO-
areas, and 3) business plan on business group level: this business plan is a summary and 
shows the strategies for the Corporate Center. 
 
Step Action 
1 Definition of current role, mission and responsibilities as a result of present, 
realised strategy  
2 Examination of business environment in which the sector operates 
3 Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the sector 
4 Development of a realistic, challenging vision through long-term goals 
5 Quantification and qualification of goals (critical success factors) and a cross-
section of alternative strategies permitting the attainment of these goals; adoption 
and validation of appropriate strategies 
Table 65: Business planning at the corporate centre of UBS 
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UBS has a well-developed allocation process for costs and revenues (see Figure 58). 
Direct costs are being charged via service level agreements (SLAs), which are contract-
type documents describing interdivisional supply and demand. The goals of this 
allocation process are: 
× Ensure fair and transparent revenue/cost allocation 
× Describe and define revenue/cost base and underlying revenue /cost drivers  
× Foster understanding of value chain by agreements between provider and recipients 
× Establish basis for continuous learning process within the organisation 
× Support process to identify and realise inherent revenue and cost synergies 
× Foster and deepen co-operation between Business Groups/Business Units and 
enforce principle of an integrated financial services group by avoiding duplications. 
 
As a management accounting principle, the allocation of corporate centre costs to the 
business segments is based upon concepts of benefit and controllability. Basically, the 
business group, which controls the process or is responsible for the logistic bears the 
cost (UBS, 1999e, p.9). For the year 2000, 16 percent of the total corporate centre 
operating cost was directly allocated to the business groups (i.e. via SLAs). This means 
that the business groups receive these cost charges as direct cost, which has an impact 
on the result of the business group. The result of the business group is linked to 
managers' compensation, implying that business group management has an incentive to 
lower that cost. This cost can be lowered in two ways 1) use a lower volume of services: 
this is possible in changing times or by lowering the need for the service and 2) 
negotiate a lower price: generally speaking, the price paid, which is the unit cost 
allocated, is the cost of the service. By exerting pressure on the corporate centre by 
means of external benchmarking or by being able to produce the service in-house at 
lower cost, the corporate centre is incentivised to lower its cost and think of new and 
lower cost ways of producing that service. A capped amount of 10% of the indirect 
costs are allocated based on headcount and resulted in the key as shown in Table 66. 
Although this allocation does have effect on the net result of the business group this has 
no impact on business group managers' compensation. The incentive to produce these 
services at lower cost is with corporate centre management. 
 
Corporate Center 
UBS Asset 
Management UBS Switzerland1 UBS Warburg 
4% 6% 48% 42% 
Table 66: Indirect cost allocation of the corporate centre at UBS 
 
                                                 
1 Of which 18% for Private Banking and 30% for Private & Corporate Clients 
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Figure 58: Allocation process in UBS 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The corporate centre of UBS is a well-established business entity in the group. Table 67 
summarises the conclusion on the corporate centre of UBS. In 2000, the corporate 
centre resembled the ICCC in terms of organisation and transparency. However, there 
seems to be contradiction between the role, which the corporate centre is said to play, 
and which it plays in reality; this contradiction may result in confusion and loss of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Mixture of management styles and coordination 
instruments can lead to low transparency and the perception that the corporate centre 
does not have a clear mission. Although controlling seems active, the lack of value 
measures and market replication might result in that the synergy potential might not be 
reached. The staffing level seems well targeted and fulfils a basic premise.  
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Characteristic Actual situation in 2000 
Conglomeration “American/German” variant shifting to weak form of 
conglomeration 
Nature of corporate centre  
Role and functions Core, added value, and shared services; functions match 
ICCC as far as core and added value are concerned 
Coordination instruments per 
function 
Mixed culture, role standardisation, plans, goals, budgets 
Contribution, value-based 
management and operational 
risk 
Potential for contribution present, implementation unclear;  
value, with focus on multiple stakeholders, and operational 
risk orientation present, implementation unclear 
Management and organisation of the corporate centre  
Solving managerial issues Service level agreements and committees present; relative 
lower transparency leading to higher influence costs, 
solution for moral hazard unclear 
Corporate centre management 
style 
Mixture of Strategic Planning, Strategic Control and 
Financial Control 
Staffing the corporate centre Staffing level (986 fte, 1.4% of group), little bit above 
lower of 922 fte, 1.3% of group  (upper limit is 1478 fte, 
2.1% of group). 
Corporate centre economics  
Financial orientation All departments are cost centres, Group Treasury is a 
limited profit centre; corporate centre controlling focused 
and active 
Approximation of value and 
costs 
Value measurement not performed, cost management 
performed, non-financial performance measurements not 
present, benchmarking unclear 
Corporate centre cost 
allocation 
Cost allocation, based on cost prices, performed via service 
level agreements and maximum 10% via indirect allocation 
Table 67: Conclusion on the corporate centre of UBS in 2000 
 
V. Conclusion from the case studies 
 
From Table 68, we recognise that the financial conglomerates in the case studies show a 
tendency to move to the weak form of conglomeration as regional and intransparent 
structures are reorganised in divisions, focused on product/market combinations, and a 
corporate centre. The main difference between the financial conglomerates lies in the 
presence or absence of an extra management layer between a major division and the 
executive board. This is illustrated by the example of Private Clients and Asset 
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Management, which are separate organisational units reporting to the same executive in 
AA and DB, but reporting individually to the executive boards of CSG and UBS. 
 
 
Weak form  AA CSG DB UBS 
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 Holding 
Company 
Corporate Centre Corporate 
Centre 
Corporate Centre Corporate 
Centre 
Securities 
(general) 
Investment 
Banking 
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Investment 
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Investment 
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Investments International 
Private 
Banking 
Banking 
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Retail and 
Corporate 
Banking 
 Private 
Banking  
Swiss Private 
Banking 
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with Retail 
and 
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Private Clients & 
Asset 
Management 
Asset Mngmnt 
Private Clients & 
Asset Management 
(PCAM) 
Asset 
Management 
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 Various AA Lease 
Holding 
Various DB Services, 
Corporate 
Investments 
Various 
Table 68: Organisation structures of the case studies 
 
Supported by historical publications on the case studies (ABN AMRO, Nawas, 1995; 
Credit Suisse Group, Jung, 2000; Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank, 1999, 2001, and 
UBS, Rogge, 1997), a move from the original centralised forms to the weak form of 
conglomeration of the firms is confirmed (Figure 59). This move is not complete and 
results in that the firms are in between variants. Difficult organisational transformation, 
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paired with motivational issues, results in inefficiencies. This may also lead to 
incomplete governance, allowing for adverse consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59: Case studies on the continuum of conglomeration 
 Of the case studies, three out of four use shareholder value as tool for performance 
measurement (DB is the exception). To what extent value-based management, including 
an institutionalised controlling cycle, is implemented in the case studies, is difficult to 
say. At least, we can state that top management is aware of the shareholder value 
premise. AA, CSG and UBS use shareholder value to serve all stakeholders. At DB, 
shareholders are seen as one group of stakeholders out of four major stakeholders. Table 
69 shows comparisons of the departments in the corporate centre according to the 
Integrated Corporate Centre Concept (ICCC) with the case studies. Although there are 
differences in reporting lines, the organisational structures of the case studies indeed 
match the organisational structure of the ICCC to a large extent. 
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Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
223 
ICCC AA CSG DB UBS 
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ICCC AA CSG DB UBS 
 Economic 
Research (part of 
Corporate 
Affairs) 
 Group Economic 
Research 
Group Economic 
Research 
 EU-Liaison 
Office 
Public Affairs, 
Executive 
Relations, 
Foundations 
Corporate History 
 Group Mandates 
Table 69: Comparison of case studies' departments 
 
What is striking, is that 1) functions according to ICCC are largely present, but the 
treasury activities performed in the Corporate Centre are limited to funding, 2) 
implementation of value-based management and operational risk management is 
unclear, 3) coordination instruments are sometimes mixed and not focused, 4) the moral 
hazard problem is not solved and transparency is sometimes low, 5) there is no 
unambiguous choice for a single management style, 6) staffing is lower than the 
benchmark allows, 7) there is a cost centre orientation and only CSG has a value 
measurement, and finally 8) cost allocation is performed, but remains difficult to initiate 
and implement. Focussing on the Group Treasury department, the cases reveal that the 
activities of this department are limited to funding, which can be relevant for the ICCC-
model. Also, the Group Treasury departments in the cases are managed as cost centres, 
without a profit orientation. Capital market transactions to hedge the group balance 
sheet positions (i.e. nullifying currency-, interest rate- and duration mismatch) should be 
labelled as ALM-transactions and performed by a trading desk. These transactions are 
driven by risk considerations, implying that profits might even be foregone. The 
execution of these trades is performed at divisional trading desks. These trading desks 
are normally part of a for-profit operation in a division and receive orders from the 
Corporate Centre, where the decision-making body, i.e. committee, is a larger body than 
just the Group Treasury department. The transactions should have market prices, in 
order to create an understanding of the true insurance premium needed to cover group-
level risks and the true risk-return characteristics, and provide for proper incentives. The 
result of these ALM-transactions should be shown separately in the results of the Group 
Treasury function. Specifically focussing on management styles, we recognise that the 
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softer factors in the case studies match the ICCC to a lesser extent. Table 70 and Figure 
60 show the individual cases1. 
 
  ICCC AA CSG DB UBS 
Strategic Control          
Decentralised profit centres, Divisional coordination Y Y Y Y Y 
Extensive strategic planning process N Y N Y Y 
Business autonomy Y Y Y  Y 
Long- and short-term criteria Y Y Y Y Y 
Tight controls N Y N Y Y 
Financial control          
Separate profit centres Y Y Y Y Y 
Budgetary planning  Y Y Y Y Y 
Business autonomy Y Y Y  Y 
Short-term criteria N N N Y Y 
Tight controls N Y N Y Y 
Strategic Planning          
Complex, co-ordinated structure N N N Y Y 
Extensive strategic planning process N Y N Y Y 
Strong central leadership N Y Y Y N 
Long-term criteria N Y N Y Y 
Flexible controls Y   Y     
Table 70: Match of the cases and the ICCC with standard management styles 
Presented differently in figure 61, we see that Credit Suisse Group matches the ICCC-
management style best followed by ABN AMRO Bank, UBS, and then Deutsche Bank. 
Although attempts are made, it seems difficult to decide on and implement the ICCC 
unambiguously. This might lead to an ineffective corporate centre. There may be 
organisational obstacles within the financial conglomerates preventing reaching a 
dynamic state, oscillating around the ideal corporate centre. These obstacles can include 
the perception that implementing the ICCC is not needed or possible, conflicts of 
interest between managers, unawareness of the importance of a well-functioning 
corporate centre, and a focus on only keeping costs low. A clear implementation of the 
ICCC would enable an effective and efficient corporate centre reaping the benefits of 
synergies, which would allow financial conglomerate structures to prove their worth. 
The complete analysis is summarised in Table 71. 
                                                 
1 The ICCC states that a condition should be present; if the case study matches this, we see a Y; if the ICCC 
states that a condition should be absent and this condition is matched, we see a N. In other cases there is a 
mismatch (equal weighing of characteristics assumed). 
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Figure 60: Match of the cases and the ICCC with standard management styles  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61: Cases’ management styles vs. the ICCC 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
ICCC ABN AMRO Bank Credit Suisse
Group
Deutsche Bank UBS
ICCC vs. cases' corporate centre management styles
%
 fi
t w
ith
 m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ty
le
Strategic Control Financial control Strategic Planning
53%
27%
47%
93%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
ABN AMRO
Bank
Credit Suisse
Group
Deutsche Bank UBS
Corporate centres of the cases
M
at
ch
 w
ith
 th
e 
IC
C
C
-m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ty
le
Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
227 
Characteristic ABN AMRO 
Bank 
Credit Suisse 
Group 
 
Deutsche Bank 
 
UBS 
Conglomeration “German/British” 
variant shifting to 
the weak form of 
conglomeration 
Weak form “German” variant 
shifting to weak 
form of 
conglomeration 
“American/Germ
an” variant 
shifting to weak 
form of 
conglomeration 
Nature of corporate centre     
Role and 
functions 
Primarily core and 
added value, 
functions almost 
match ICCC in 
full; outsourcing 
not seen as option 
Core, added value, 
and shared 
services; functions 
match ICCC only 
in part  
Core, added value, 
and shared 
services; functions 
match ICCC as far 
as core and added 
value are 
concerned 
Core, added 
value, and shared 
services; 
functions match 
ICCC as far as 
core and added 
value are 
concerned 
Coordination 
instruments per 
function 
Focused role 
standards, plans, 
goals, budgets 
Focused and 
effective culture, 
role standards, 
plans, goals, 
budgets 
Mixed role 
standards, plans, 
goals, budgets 
Mixed cultur e, 
role standards, 
plans, goals, 
budgets 
Contribution 
value-based 
management and 
operational risk 
Potential for 
contribution 
present, 
implementation 
unclear; value and 
operational risk 
orientation 
present, 
implementation in 
unclear 
Potential for 
contribution 
present, 
implementation 
missing; value and 
operational risk 
orientation 
present, 
implementation 
unclear 
Potential for 
contribution 
present, 
implementation 
unclear; value, 
with focus on 
multiple 
stakeholders, and 
operational risk 
orientation 
present, 
implement unclear 
Potential for 
contribution 
present, 
implementation 
unclear; value, 
with focus on 
multiple 
stakeholders, and 
operational risk 
orientation 
present, 
implementation 
unclear 
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Characteristic ABN AMRO 
Bank 
Credit Suisse 
Group 
 
Deutsche Bank 
 
UBS 
Management and organisation of the corporate centre     
Solving 
managerial issues 
Performance 
contracts and 
committees are set 
up or already 
active; 
transparency 
improves to keep 
influence costs 
low; solution for 
moral hazard 
unclear 
Performance 
contracts present; 
very few 
committees, 
transparency keep 
influence costs 
low, solution for 
moral hazard 
unclear 
Service level 
agreements and 
committees 
present; relative 
lower 
transparency 
leading to higher 
influence costs, 
solution for moral 
hazard unclear 
Service level 
agreements and 
committees 
present; relative 
lower 
transparency 
leading to higher 
influence costs, 
solution for moral 
hazard unclear 
Corporate centre 
management 
style 
Coming from 
strategic control 
to financial 
control, 
equilibrium not 
reached yet  
Financial control Mixture of 
Strategic 
Planning, 
Strategic Control 
and Financial 
Control 
Mixture of 
Strategic 
Planning, 
Strategic Control 
and Financial 
Control 
Staffing the 
corporate centre 
Staffing level 
(650 fte, 0.6% of 
group) below 
lower limit of 
1,493 fte, 1.3% of 
group  (upper 
limit is 2,394 fte, 
2.1% of group) 
Staffing level (824 
fte, 1.0% of group) 
below lower limit 
of 1,045 fte, 1.3% 
of group  (upper 
limit is 1,675 fte, 
2.1% of group) 
Staffing level (879 
fte, 0.9% of 
group), below 
lower limit of 
1,275 fte, 1.3% of 
group  (lower limit 
is 2,045 fte, 2.1% 
of group) 
Staffing level 
(986 fte, 1.4% of 
group), little bit 
above lower of 
922 fte, 1.3% of 
group  (upper 
limit is 1,478 fte, 
2.1% of group) 
Corporate centre economics     
Financial 
orientation of the 
corporate centre 
All depts are cost 
centres, corporate 
centre controlling 
unclear 
All depts are cost 
centres, corporate 
centre controlling 
focused and 
active 
All depts are cost 
centres, corporate 
centre controlling 
focused and active 
All depts are cost 
centres,  Treasury 
is a limited profit 
centre; corporate 
centre controlling 
focused and 
active 
 
 
 
Part 3: Development and Application of the ICCC for Financial Conglomerates 
229 
Characteristic ABN AMRO 
Bank 
Credit Suisse 
Group 
 
Deutsche Bank 
 
UBS 
Approximation 
of value and 
costs 
Value 
measurement not 
performed, cost 
management 
unclear, non-
financial 
performance 
measurements not 
present, 
benchmarking 
unclear 
Value 
measurement 
performed, cost 
management 
performed, non-
financial 
performance 
measurement not 
present, 
benchmarking 
unclear 
Value 
measurement not 
performed, cost 
management 
performed, non-
financial 
performance 
measurement not 
present, 
benchmarking 
unclear, project 
scorecard 
implemented 
Value 
measurement not 
performed, cost 
management 
performed, non-
financial 
performance 
measurement not 
present, 
benchmarking 
unclear 
Corporate centre 
cost allocation 
100% Cost 
allocation 
performed via 
performance 
contracts, practice 
of allocation 
procedure unclear 
78% Cost 
allocation, 
performed via 
service level 
agreements, 
process and 
effectiveness 
unclear 
100% Cost 
allocation, based 
on market prices, 
performed via 
service level 
agreements 
Cost allocation, 
based on cost 
prices, performed 
via service level 
agreements and 
maximal 10% via 
indirect allocation 
Table 71: Comparison of the corporate centres of AA, CSG, DB and UBS in 2000 
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C. General conclusion and outlook for further research 
 
As indicated in the general introduction: there is a specific shared need for theories for 
strategic renewal in the financial services industry, and although four case studies are 
not significant for a statistical analysis, we find that financial conglomerates are indeed 
looking for improvement of their governance through the corporate centre; this also 
becomes increasingly important in the eyes of the regulators. This thesis deals with that 
issue and proposes an integrated corporate centre concept for financial conglomerates 
(ICCC) taking into account the dynamics and complexity of the financial services 
industry, the forming of financial conglomerate structures, value-based management, 
operational risk management, strategic management and organisational economics. The 
ICCC is a dynamic concept, changing with external influences and has three interacting 
core elements: nature of the corporate centre, corporate centre management and 
organisation, and corporate centre economics. Management theory, as applied to the 
financial services industry, is far from complete. This study can form a basis for further 
research (see also Figure 62). Interesting would be: 
× A statistical analysis of more financial conglomerates on the implementation of the 
ICCC: this would raise questions on barriers to implementation, would yield in an 
increasingly useful benchmark, and would allow for further model refinements 
× A detailed comparison of corporate centre departments and their peers, e.g. in 
consulting firms, on the external market: this would yield an insight to what extent 
and how corporate centre departments could be outsourced 
× A theory on detailed performance indicators per corporate centre function: this 
would lead to an increased understanding of corporate centre’ value drivers 
× An analysis to what extent corporate centres add value to their financial 
conglomerates using the Residual Value-method: this would lead to insights to 
what extent financial conglomerates are value-creating organisational structures  
× As the Residual Value-method results in a value for corporate centre creation, 
development of a market-based replication of the corporate centre, especially of the 
needed economic capital and the cost of equity, i.e. via a peer comparison with 
professional services firms, could lead to an understanding of measuring corporate 
centre profits similar to a professional services firm 
× Further application of management theory in financial services, especially aimed at 
fields such as ISO-style quality management, non-financial performance indicators 
and non-traditional risk management: this would support the understanding and 
professionalisation of the management of financial conglomerates. 
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Figure 62: Examples for further research 
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SUMMARY 
 
In part 1, we discuss 1) the fundamental changes in the financial services industry, 2) 
financial conglomerate structures and 3) value-based-management. These are core 
components for understanding the challenges and intentions of corporate level 
management of financial conglomerates. 
 
The financial services industry, financial conglomeration and value orientation 
 
In the first chapter, we highlight the major trend of consolidation in the financial 
services industry. This trend is most visible in business publications, and interacts with 
other trends. Financial conglomerates grow due to the fact that size is believed to be the 
answer to many difficulties. As consolidation continues and non-traditional financial 
service activities enter into financial service activities by financial services firms, the 
safety net expands, thereby imposing additional costs on the financial system. At the 
same time, regulators are looking for new ways of supervision. New capital 
requirements for credit, market and operational risk (Basel II), mandatory subordinated 
debt, a better supervisory structure and guidelines for corporate governance are all 
under development. The expectation is that, after a period of focus on model-based risk 
management, regulators will now be increasingly focusing their attention at 
management processes. Various trends contribute to the consolidation drive. For one, 
technological progress is very important as technology erodes entry barriers; financial 
services firms face pressures from a wider and more diverse range of competitors. New 
technologies support the development of new financial products and these products 
create new challenges for financial services firms. These products increasingly are 
capital-market based instead of straightforward savings- or credit facilities. Well-
developed economies tend to shift from a bank -based system towards a market-based 
system in which the majority of the financing need is provided for by the capital market. 
While regulators attempt to supervise the financial system, deregulation leads to 
increased competition with margins being driven down and requiring scale economies. 
This dynamic is complemented by the drive to eradicate excess capacity in the global 
financial services industry. At the same time, and perhaps resulting from these industry 
changes, the lines of the financial services industry are blurring. Non-financial services 
firms are making inroads in the financial services industry: we call this near-banking. A 
specific form of near-banking is in-house banking: non-financial firms perform several 
financial activities for themselves. Another special case of near-banking is internet 
banking. Innovations in communication and information technology has led to the 
increased possibility of total process automation of searching, buying, selling, 
producing and distributing and introduces the notion of contract banking, in which a 
Summary 
234 
complete package of services for a client consists of the management of contracts for 
those products individually. Financial services firms are reacting by setting up separate 
internet divisions, partnering with technology-oriented firms, and forming alliances with 
firms in- and outside of the financial services industry.  
 
In the second chapter, we discuss financial conglomerate structures. The financial 
services industry is made up of many types of participants of which financial 
conglomerates are often the most visible. There are four different prototypes of financial 
conglomerates recognised, which range from almost complete to very loose integration. 
Financial conglomerates are formed when management feels that this structure is best 
suited to achieve maximum synergies: economies of scope and scale in production and 
sales of financial services. Synergies, from the firm’s perspective, can be reached in 
improved client management, when distribution channels are used for more products, 
simultaneous marketing of products, use of information for different products and the 
reduction of portfolio risk. From the client’s perspective, synergies may exist in the 
procurement and use of a complete financial services package instead of individual 
products. There are diseconomies of scope, which may jeopardize the advantages of the 
financial conglomerate structure. We recognize regulation and compliance costs of a 
large bureaucracy, complexity of managing several businesses, lack of trust in the use of 
client’ information and decrease of transparency as a result of reduction in market 
discipline, as potential issues. 
 
As we see in the third chapter, in dealing with environmental turbulence and the 
optimisation of the structure, financial conglomerates focus on the creation of 
shareholder value in all their activities. Functional excellence is not the only pre-
condition for success, increasingly a client focus, reducing x-inefficiency, and company 
repositioning in the (financial services) industry becomes important. There are various 
methodologies to measure shareholder value creation, which in essence is about 
achieving a return on capital higher than its cost. Six characteristics determine to what 
extent a financial conglomerate is value-oriented: performance drive, value-base, low 
cost, self-reinforcing processes, two-way communications, and bottom-up and top-down 
management. The company organisation for value-based management is the profit 
centre. Profit centres are organisational units, which are responsible for their own 
results and are able to decide independently from each other. Adjacent to the profit 
centre concept is lean banking, which focuses on the optimisation of operational 
processes through well-known concepts from industrial management. Measuring the 
results of value-based management is of utmost importance on both corporate and 
divisional levels, as well as within divisions. Value controlling measures the gap 
between the market value of the firm and its potential, and supports divisions with the 
implementation of value-enhancing strategies. Instruments for value-controlling include 
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the Matched Funds Transfer Pricing concept, Activity Based Costing, and Process-
oriented Standard Direct Cost Accounting. The non-financial dimension is assessed 
with the Balanced Scorecard, which can be seen as a system of operational measures 
(i.e. ratios), which are connected to each other via cause-and-effect relationships. One 
important determinant of shareholder value creation is lowering risk, as this results in a 
lower firm cost of capital. Financial conglomerates, though, accept risk to generate 
profits. For financial conglomerates there are five risk categories: systemic risk, 
company-specific strategic risks, market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. 
Operational risk  is the potential for any disruption in the financial conglomerate’s 
(operational) processes and includes reputational risk, legal enforcement of contracts 
and claims, possibly having a severe impact on the financial conglomerate’s perception 
in the market, share price devaluation and a loss of standing. Operational risk seems to 
be more in the management realm than in accounting. 
 
Discussion of the corporate centre 
 
Given that we now understand the major governance issues for financial conglomerates: 
fundamental changes in the financial services industry, financial conglomerate 
structures and value-based and (operational) risk management, we discuss the main 
governance body of financial conglomerates in part 2: the corporate centre. We focus on 
its nature, management and organisation, and economics. In the first chapter, we 
discuss (de-) centralisation, roles and contribution of the corporate centre. On the 
continuum between centralisation and decentralisation, we distinguish between five 
statuses: core, policy, matrix, service, and autarchy. These statuses have different 
characteristics and are appropriate in situations of different complexity and 
environmental dynamics. In the ranking of increasing coordination, we recognise the 
following instruments: company (sub) culture, role standardisation, self-management, 
plans, programs, and personal instruction. In conjunction with issues of decentralisation 
and coordination is the issue of influence of the corporate centre, which tends to be 
highest in the general planning areas, and lower in the functional. There are three 
requirements for value creation by the corporate centre: 1) opportunity, 2) skills and 
resources, and 3) the degree of understanding by the corporate centre. Opportunities 
arise from an imperfect fit between divisions and the environment. The following five 
types of opportunities are distinguished: build, stretch, link, leverage and portfolio 
development. One way to realise the synergy potential is to identify affinities and 
critical interrelationships within the group, develop and analyse value chains per 
division and look for common characteristics, formulation of a strategy in coordination 
with corporate and division strategies with goals supporting the pursuit of 
interrelationships, and configuration of the synergy activities. 
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In the second chapter we focus on the management and organisation of the corporate 
centre. The form of the corporate centre is decreasingly determined by historical and 
cultural differences and increasingly by industry trends. Further, when a firm is active in 
a regulated industry, such as the financial services industry, the corporate centre has to 
take special influences into account: (quasi) government supervision introduces 
additional administrative overheads, and the lack of competition associated with 
operating in regulated industries tends to permit higher costs. Organisational economics 
highlight other managerial issues in financial conglomerates: the agency problem 
between corporate centre and divisional managers, moral hazard, coordinating costs, the 
tension between coordination and organisational design, motivation problems, and costs 
for influencing (ensuring correct distribution of costs and revenues). These issues can be 
dealt with by focusing on minimizing costs and eradicating inefficiencies. Corporate 
centres evolve as a result of change in the overall size of the company, change in the 
level of influence corporate managers have over divisional decisions, change in the 
level of services provided to the business divisions, and concern about the cost-
effectiveness of the corporate centre. In managing financial conglomerates, three 
corporate centre management styles can be distinguished: Strategic Planning, Strategic 
Control, and Financial Control. Five tradeoffs, leading to a specific style, can be 
identified: leadership versus autonomy, coordination and co-operation versus clear 
responsibilities and accountability, thorough analysis and planning versus 
entrepreneurial speed and responsiveness, long-term strategic targets versus short-term 
financial targets, and flexible strategies versus tight controls. In designing a corporate 
centre, it is useful to start  with the core role. This is a matter of ensuring that all 
corporate obligations can be professionally discharged. The second  step is to identify 
the major (intended) sources of added value by the corporate centre: the added value 
role. Companies that can find no major value added opportunities should consider to 
demerge, or to reduce the corporate centre to the core role only. The third  step is to 
focus attention on shared services, which may or may not be placed in the corporate 
centre: the shared services role. Corporate centre functions that outsource tend to 
employ fewer staff. Notwithstanding this fact, they are not as small as might be 
expected; as outsourcing increases, the net positive effect in terms of staff levels 
decreases. On average, financial services firms have three to four times the corporate 
centre staff as manufacturing companies of comparable sizes. Although companies in 
the financial services industry can have many linkages between divisions, it is unlikely 
that this accounts for the larger corporate centre by itself. The level and nature of 
corporate centre functional influence is a driving factor in shaping the number of 
corporate centre staff. The study provides for a calculation model on core role staffing. 
 
In the third chapter, we focus on corporate centre economics. As an organisational unit 
with its own mission, strategy and goals, control is indispensable. Control of corporate 
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centre costs should be initiated at the highest level. Corporate centre’s staffs do not have 
the direct profit motivation that exists in commercial divisions. One way to control 
corporate centre cost and to develop a profit motivation in the corporate centre is to 
implement the profit centre concept. This requires the corporate centre to have 
revenues; these revenues can be (replicated) market-based allocations (transfer prices). 
General corporate centre cost is to be supervised by a special appointed executive, the 
corporate centre controller. The purpose of corporate centre controlling is to limit costs 
of the corporate centre, and to develop efficiencies in the performance of corporate 
centre functions, similar to those that in divisions. The functions of planning, control 
and supervision of corporate centre costs can be delegated only to a management level 
superior to the corporate centre functions. This is virtually untenable unless it receives 
the full support of the most senior level management. It is in the areas within the 
corporate centre that tendencies toward empire building can be quite pronounced, 
making solid control necessary. Planning and control is an ongoing loop in which both 
activities are continuously performed and intertwined.  Reducing corporate centre costs 
can be difficult as corporate centre services are often of an intellectual nature, have a 
high level of complexity and can be non-repetitive. Also, if no attempt is made to 
compare corporate centre departments to a, possibly replicated, external market, there 
will be no competitive pressure to keep costs low. Last but not least resistance exists 
with corporate centre managers, often based on historical issues, bad experiences or 
overrating of their own capacities. Caution must be expressed here: there does not 
appear to be any support for the idea that financial conglomerates with smaller 
corporate centres have greater financial success. The corporate centres of firms that had 
profitability and shareholder return above the average for their country were, in terms of 
staffing, around 20 percent larger than those of firms with below average profitability. 
 
In addition to financial measurement, benchmarks representing value drivers, provide in 
instruments to measure (improvements in) performance and to identify problems when 
goals are not reached. Ideally, control measures should be objective, complete and 
responsive. Cost allocation, a widespread practice, comes into play to when the 
corporate centre transfers its cost to divis ions to recognise (virtual) corporate centre 
revenues. The purposes for cost allocation are to make economic decisions for resource 
allocation, to motivate managers, to measure income and assets for reporting to internal 
and external parties, and to justify costs. There are six criteria for cost allocation: cause-
and-effect, benefits received, fairness or equity, ability to bear, independence of cost 
objectives, and neutrality. Allocation functions for shared services include: transaction, 
planning, to supply prices to be used in planning processes, management, result 
allocation, motivation, and influence of behaviour. Although allocating core role costs 
through Activity Based Costing could increase transparency, allocating these costs is 
inevitably arbitrary as this seeks to divide something, which is almost indivisible and 
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incorrigible, meaning that, although transparent, they cannot be proved correct or 
incorrect. The marketplace provides a process for services. The nearest equivalent that 
can be offered in respect to corporate centre services is that the total cost of any item of 
controllable corporate centre cost must be authorised by and charged to the person 
consuming that item. Price setting for corporate centre cost allocation can be done in 
three ways: 1) (replicated) market prices, 2) cost prices, and 3) negotiated prices. 
 
Development and application of an Integrated Corporate Centre Concept for Financial 
Conglomerates 
 
In part 3, we arrive at the integrated corporate centre concept for financial 
conglomerates (ICCC). This ICCC is a synthesis of parts 1 and 2 and focuses insights of 
those parts. The concept is an addition to the literature on management issues in 
financial conglomerates and suggests an approach to deal with governance issues. It 
also forms a comprehensive benchmark for financial conglomerates’ corporate centres 
and as such will be used to evaluate corporate centres of four financial conglomerates. 
The ICCC consists of three core elements, which interact with each other: corporate 
centre nature, corporate centre management and organisation, and corporate centre 
economics. The case studies are the corporate centres of the financial conglomerates 
ABN AMRO Bank, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank, and UBS, studied during 
2000. In the first chapter we present the ICCC. As financial conglomerates are 
confronted with similar industry changes and show herd behaviour they move towards 
the same conglomerate organisational form. As more efficiency in production and 
consumption of financial services can and should be reached to cope with the industry 
changes, financial conglomerates more and more separate their different activities, 
leading to relative independent divisions and sub-divisions, which are organised around 
certain product-market combinations. Increasing separateness within financial 
conglomerates can be recognised as a move towards the American variant of universal 
banking. The distinction between different variants of universal banking becomes a 
dichotomy between stronger and weaker forms of conglomeration; the American variant 
then is the weak form of conglomeration. Partially, the move of financial conglomerates 
towards the weak form of conglomeration from more centralised structures results in the 
creation of the corporate centre as an organisational unit where the executive board and 
specific staff departments reside. For the corporate centre the basic premise must be to 
decentralise activities to divisions if they do not have a group mission; activities with a 
group mission should remain in the corporate centre. Those operational and non-
strategic activities, which would benefit from aggregation resulting in the ability to 
reach scale economies, should be centralised in the financial conglomerate where the 
centralisation conditions are the best, most probably outside of the corporate centre. 
These shared services could then compete with outside suppliers. A separate analysis 
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would be necessary to determine if outsourcing of these services could make sense in 
terms of product quality and costs. We propose to reserve two roles for the corporate 
centre, but note though that corporate centre departments can show elements of both 
roles and even might have shared service components. These roles are core and added 
value. If senior management thinks necessary, the corporate centre can perform a shared 
services role. However, if there is no strategic need, then these shared services should 
be placed outside the corporate centre: we propose to principally exclude shared 
services of the corporate centre and judge on inclusion on a case-by case basis. The core 
role takes place in the core and policy statuses: centralisation will take place. The added 
value role takes place in the policy and matrix statuses: decentralisation will take place. 
Corporate centre influence is mostly general and less functional in nature, although the 
latter is not completely out of the scope of the corporate centre. We propose to include 
Group Finance & Control, Group Human Resources, Group Tax, Group Legal & 
Compliance, Group Audit, Group Public Relations, Group Risk Management, Group 
Development, Group Marketing, and Group Treasury.  
 
In the study we show which departments are affected by specific environmental 
dynamics. The coordination instruments of the corporate centre vary by function, but we 
recognise that, depending on its status (core, policy, and matrix) all instruments, such as 
personal instruction, programs, plans, self-management, role standardisation and (sub) 
culture, can be appropriate. The contribution of the corporate centre in a financial 
conglomerate therefore lies in supporting the growth of the business by repositioning 
(build proposition), and by reinventing the group by reshuffling of businesses with 
different characteristics (portfolio development proposition). Also, the corporate centre 
can support divisions in becoming more efficient by using resource allocation in a 
restricted way (stretch proposition). Perhaps the most important potential contribution 
of the corporate centre is the capability of the corporate centre to facilitate synergies 
(link and leverage propositions) As value-based management and operational risk 
management are becoming important issues for financial conglomerates, these issues 
are significant for the corporate centre in two manners: 1) insofar as the corporate centre 
departments perform a group task, they should promote and integrate value-based 
management and operational risk management in all their services offered to the 
divisions, and 2) the corporate centre departments themselves should implement value-
based management and operational risk management in their own processes. In the 
study we propose scoring tables for measuring value-based and operational risk 
management. We have identified six problems of the corporate centre in governing a 
financial conglomerate. The agency problem between the corporate centre and the 
divisions can be solved using performance contracts. Moral hazard can be avoided if 
the incentive structure of managers is consistently symmetrical. The coordination 
problem can be tackled by forming formal communication channels while at the same 
Summary 
240 
time adjusting the compensation systems to reflect the extra effort and result from these 
communications. Having a detailed and well-accessible information system provides a 
tool to deal with difficulties in organisational design . Incentive systems, which take 
individual motivation in account, should support motivational issues. A high level of 
transparency ensures that influence costs remain limited. On the continuum between the 
strategic planning and financial control management styles, the ICCC-management style 
should be positioned between strategic and financial control . In this way, the corporate 
centre fits the weak form of conglomeration. The emphasis is on managing multiple 
separate profit centres, each with relatively independent responsibilities. In the strategic 
review process, the corporate centre can challenge divisions, especially where synergies 
are concerned. The planning process is focused on target agreements rather than on the 
means. A tight control system ensures strong incentives for the divisions to deliver. 
Resource allocation is similar to the mechanisms in the capital markets, however a 
longer perspective is chosen than short-term profits. Decentralised organisation 
structures should overlap in the sense that committees are formed in which synergies 
can be explored. These committees should be chaired by representative divisional 
rotation. As detailed long-term strategic planning becomes increasingly difficult, the 
focus has to be put more on the mid-term with short-term indicators. Strategy 
development should take place in the divisions and on a group level in the corporate 
centre. Although the level of detail should not be too high, the strategic plans should 
result in financial projections. Divisions have far-reaching autonomy within the stated 
mission and central policy objectives of the group, although they have to take into 
account that corporate centre functions might need certain divisional input. Controls 
should always be such that results can be compared to competitors and other divisions. 
In addition, for the corporate centre, benchmarking should yield useful insights. 
 
A staffing calculation model gives a good indication how the core role of a corporate 
centre can be staffed. As the financial conglomerate grows, in terms of headcount, the 
corporate centre grows slower, which points to scale effects. Financial conglomerates 
increasingly have more specialised divisions; this can be understood as an increase in 
the transparency and understanding of the level of diversification. This implies that 
more emphasis should be put on financial measures than strategic measures for 
assessing a division’s performance. Principally, the corporate centre should be managed 
as a profit centre. This means that the behaviour of corporate centre managers and staff 
should be modelled as if the department was a market participant in its own right. Cost 
allocations out of the corporate centre can be seen as revenues. However, if revenues 
prove unable to be calculated, the revenue side of the corporate centre department can 
be expressed in market-based financial or non-financial benchmarks, expressing efforts 
and results of the corporate centre (department). 
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The corporate centre should have an appropriate controlling organisation and mandate. 
Similar to the cost development of the corporate centre to the cost development of the 
financial conglomerate as a whole, if the corporate centre controller (CCCL) has the 
proper organisation and mandate, the controlling function would grow less fast than the 
corporate centre. This mandate should encompass projections, revenue and cost 
budgeting, planning, investment and (budget) performance review process, authority in 
the field of information and recommendation in matters of corporate centre expense, 
instrumental in effecting changes in corporate centre costs, divisional policy, the 
interpreting of firm-wide plans and projects insofar as they affect corporate centre 
planning, and executive contact for adjudication of interdepartmental matters, source of 
studies and analyses of more efficient ways to perform corporate centre functions, 
enforcement of plans to reduce corporate centre costs. It is important to stress that if the 
controlling mandate is too narrow, the level of management support for the CCCL is too 
low, or if the CCCL lacks resources and information, effective control cannot be 
established. Recognising the corporate centre as a profit centre allows us to estimate the 
necessary variables to use in the direct methods for the measurement of value creation. 
Based on regression analysis of peer comparisons, this could be relatively 
straightforward but would consume quite some resources if done for reporting purposes 
only. If we would like to measure the value added of the corporate centre as part of the 
group instead of as a standalone unit, then the typical problem that revenues are lacking 
appears. We therefore present an indirect way of calculating added shareholder value of 
the corporate centre. We call this the Residual Value-method (ResVal-method) and 
principally it calculates the generated value by the corporate centre as the difference 
between the generated value of the divisions and the difference in market value of the 
group over a period of time. In using the ResVal-method, we should calculate the 
generated value of the divisions before cost allocation of corporate centre’s core and 
added value roles. The assumption is that divisions benefit from being a member of the 
group and that the corporate centre is responsible for the synergies: divisions by 
themselves, left to their own devices, would not strive for interdivisional synergies. 
Capital market participants, shareholders and group management should take careful 
consideration when the standalone divisions produce a higher added value than the 
group value. The study also presents detailed benchmarks for costs levels for the 
corporate centre in financial conglomerates. In order to maximise insight in and control 
over costs, cost accounting should be done along the lines of work processes, in which 
value- and cost drivers are distinguished. Activity-Based Costing and Process Standard 
Direct Costing are appropriate instruments in this respect. In revenue accounting for the 
treasury function, Matched Funds Transfer Pricing-method should be used. 
 
As discussed, the corporate centre principally has two types of roles and functions, core 
and added value; shared services could be part of the corporate centre. Allocations for 
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core functions should be seen as a corporate centre cost charge and are motivated by 
corporate interests. The allocation performs the motivation and influencing functions. 
Criteria for the corporate centre cost charge should be fairness, neutrality and benefits 
received. If this burden falls on the corporate centre, then the charge is against group 
profit and is not used to influence divisions. This is the easiest method but has the effect 
that divisions experience the corporate centre to be for free or even perceive the 
corporate centre to be value destroying. Allocations for added-value functions should be 
justified by costs incurred. The best criteria for this type of allocation are cause and 
effect, and benefits received. The allocation performs the result allocation, transaction 
and motivational functions. If they exist, shared-service costs can be allocated based on 
the replication of a market place. This is done to justify costs and to compute 
reimbursement and to make economic decisions for resource allocation. Cause and 
effect, and benefits received must be the main criteria. In setting prices, it is important 
that the divisions do not form a captive market. Market prices are the main prices used, 
but cost-based prices might apply. As services might only be partly available on the 
market, prices should reflect this part availability. Negotiated prices, containing 
elements of market based prices and cost based prices are appropriate here. 
  
In the second and third chapters, we discuss four case studies and compare these with 
the theoretical findings of the first chapter in part 3. After recent reorganisations, the 
financial conglomerates in the case studies show a tendency to move from more 
centralised organisational structures, the strong form of conglomeration , towards the 
weak form of conglomeration as regional and intransparent structures are reorganised in 
divisions focused on product/market combinations and a corporate centre. The main 
difference between the financial conglomerates lies in the presence or absence of an 
extra management layer between a major division and the executive board. This move 
towards the weak form of conglomeration is not complete yet, which results in that 
financial conglomerates are in between variants. Difficult organisational transformation, 
paired with motivational issues, results in inefficiencies. Also this may lead to 
incomplete governance, allowing for adverse consequences. Of the case studies, three 
out of four use shareholder value as tool for performance measurement. To what extent 
value-based management, including an institutionalised controlling cycle, is 
implemented in the case studies, is difficult to observe. The study includes a detailed 
comparison of the case studies with the ICCC. Although there are differences in 
reporting lines, the case studies indeed match the ICCC to a large extent. What is 
striking, is that  functions according to ICCC are largely present, implementation of 
value-based management and operational risk management is unclear, coordination 
instruments are sometimes mixed and not focused, the moral hazard problem is not 
solved and transparency is sometimes low, there is no unambiguous choice for a single 
management style, staffing is lower than the benchmark allows, there is a cost centre 
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orientation and only one financial conglomerate has a value measurement, and cost 
allocation is performed, but remains difficult to initiate and implement. Although 
financial conglomerates make serious attempts, it seems difficult to decide on and 
implement the ICCC unambiguously. This might lead to an ineffective corporate centre. 
There may be organisational obstacles within the financial conglomerates preventing 
reaching a dynamic state, oscillating around the ideal corporate centre. These obstacles 
can include the perception that implementing the ICCC is not needed or possible, 
conflicts of interest between managers, unawareness of the importance of a well-
functioning corporate centre, and a focus on only keeping costs low. A clear 
implementation of the ICCC would enable an effective and efficient corporate centre 
reaping the benefits of synergies, which would allow financial conglomerate structures 
to prove their worth and prove manager’s actions right. 
  
ANNEXES  
 
Questionnaire 
 
A Corporate centre mission, strategy & implementation 
 
1 Please describe the mission and strategy of the CC 
 
2 Please describe how the strategy is implemented (i.e. what are detailed action items 
for CC-management, what are the instruments of coordination used) 
 
3 Which conditions are met so that the corporate centre can add value, how does the 
corporate centre add value  and how is this added value determined/calculated 
 
B Corporate centre management style 
 
4. How would you classify the organisation structure of the financial institution as a 
whole (e.g. independent profit centres, integrated business units, strong staff groups 
at corporate centre or at division) 
 
5. How would you classify the role of the corporate centre in divisional business  
planning and budgeting and why (e.g. how ext ensive, which focus) 
 
6. In relation to divisional autonomy, how would you classify the leadership performed 
by the corporate centre and why, and how is any type of (minimum) leadership 
performed (e.g. sponsoring, reach, dependencies, level of coordination) 
 
7. Which focus do the resource allocation and objective setting have (e.g. short/long 
term, linkage personal incentives) 
 
8. How would you classify the CC-performance/cost control system and why (e.g. how 
tight/loose) 
 
C Scope of the corporate centre 
 
9 Which types of activities are distinguished and what are their focus (e.g. management, 
service, coordination) 
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10 Which functions do you have in the corporate centre and what are their main 
activities (e.g. Human Resources, Procurement), please indicate how many fte work 
in the different sectors in absolute numbers and in % of group total 
 
11 Which group-wide committees do you have and what are their main activities, who 
is chairing the committees 
 
D Corporate centre performance 
 
12. How are the different CC-departments financially managed (e.g. Treasury and 
Procurement as profit centres, Controlling as cost centre) 
 
13 How does the planning and budget process for the CC-departments take place 
 
14 How do you know that CC-costs in relation to the CC-services are reasonable (e.g. 
via manager incentives) 
 
15 What is the format on the calculation of the CC- P/L-account 
 
16 Where is CC-cost supervised (e.g. by which function, multiple answers) 
 
17 What is the authority/mandate of the executive responsible for CC-controlling 
 
18 How does qualitative measurement of CC- departments take place 
 
19 What are the detailed procedures (if any) of allocating CC-costs to divisions 
 
20 How much of the CC-costs (in %) gets charged to divisions 
 
21 What are the reasons to charge CC-costs to divisions 
 
22 Other observations and remarks for expectation of future developments 
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List of Interviewees 
 
ABN AMRO Bank NV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands     
Mr. Tom de Swaan Chief Financial Officer &                      
Head Corporate Centre 
04.01.2001   
Ms. Saskia van Dun Assistant-to Mr. De 
Swaan 
 
04.01.2001 
16.10.2001 
Also email and 
telephone exchange  
Credit Suisse Group AG, Zurich, Switzerland     
Mr Peter Bachmann Head Group Accounting 
& Reporting 
27.09.2000   
Ms. Beatrice Fischer Corporate Secretary 20.09.2000   
Dr. Stefan Götz Head Corporate 
Development 
27.09.2000   
Mr. Philip Hess Head Chief of Staff 23.11.2000   
Mr. Pierre Schreiber Head Corporate 
Secretary 
20.09.2000   
Mr. Thomas Widmer Head Group Controlling 
& Deputy Head Group 
Accounting & Reporting 
 
03.08.2000  
17.08.2000 
25.10.2001 
Also email and 
telephone exchange 
Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, Germany     
Mr. Joachim Hellermann Head Corporate Centre 
Coordination  
29.05.2000  
26.09.2000 
11.10.2001 
Also telephone 
conversation 
Mr. Yvo Postleb Assistant-to Mr. 
Hellermann 
 
29.05.2000 Also email and 
telephone exchange 
UBS AG, Zurich and Basel, Switzerland     
Mr. Rolf Enderli Head Group Treasury 07.02.2000   
Mr. Damian Imboden Group Strategic Analysis 19.04.2000   
Dr. Peter Pop  Head Corporate Centre 
Operations 
03.10.2000 
16.10.2001 
Also email and 
telephone exchange 
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Value per Share Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Example of Value per share methodology 
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ABC Activity Based Costing 
AG Aktiengesellschaft 
ALM Asset & Liability Management 
ß Company or division specific risk factor 
BMD Group Board of Managing Directors 
BU Business Unit 
CCC Corporate Centre core 
CCCL Corporate Centre Controller 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
ceq Cost of Equity 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CFROI Cash Flow Return on Investment 
CHRO Chief Human Resources Officer 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
CMBD Chairman of the Board of Managing Directors 
CoS Chief of Staff 
CRO Chief Risk Officer 
CRO OR Chief Risk Officer for Operational Risks 
CSG Credit Suisse Group AG 
? f Potential change in underlying factors 
DB Deutsche Bank AG 
DF Divisional functions 
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
EC Economic Capital 
e.g. For example 
EMU European Monetary Union 
etc. Et cetera 
EU European Union 
EP Economic Profit 
EVA ™ Economic Value Added 
EVP Executive Vice President 
ff And further 
FCF Free Cash Flow 
fte Full time equivalent 
MfV Managing for Value 
GCEO Group Chief Executive Officer 
GCFO Group Chief Financial Officer 
List of Abbreviations 
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GCRO Group Chief Risk Officer 
GMB Group Managing Board 
GxB Group Executive Board 
IC Invested Capital 
ICCC Integrated Corporate Centre Concept 
MFTP Matched Funds Transfer Pricing Method 
N/A Not available 
NOPAIT Net Operating Profit after Interest and Tax 
NOPAT Net Operating Profit after Tax 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development 
p. Page 
Posmarket value Market value of positions 
PSDC Process Standard Direct Costing 
pp. Pages 
RAROC Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital 
RARORAC Risk-Adjusted Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital 
RoE Return on Equity 
Rf Riskfree rate 
Rm Average market return 
ROIC Return on Invested Capital 
RORAC Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital 
Rp Equity risk premium 
SC Support centre 
SEVP Senior Executive Vice President 
Sf Sensitivity of positions to changes in underlying factors f 
TSR Total Shareholders Return 
UBS UBS AG 
VaR Value at Risk 
VBA Value-Based Analysis  
VBM Value-Based Management 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
SBU Strategic Business Unit 
SC Support centre 
SVA Shareholder Value Added 
VpS Value per Share 
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